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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

I-III: DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE  
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION  
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No.

1197

DATE

14/15 Jul 1945

I GROUND:

SOLOMONS:

1. Bougainville: 13 Jul: En garrison Suhane Id shelled by arty; en posn 1 mi N Wearnes Hill engaged; contacts made 1 mi E, 1½ mi N and 2 mi N Shishigatero.

NEW GUINEA:

2. Wewak: 13 Jul: Minor en contacts as village 2½ mi SE and 2 mi S Yamil captured; en movement N obsvd 4 mi SE Yamil; natives rpt 120 Japs at Jama (26 mi SSE Maprik).

BORNEO:

3. Balikpapan: 14 Jul: Stiff resistance continues fr en strongpoints 1200 yds NE Batochampar; 8 Japs killed in ambush 1500 yds NNE of this village; nil opposn to patrols along coast Hwy to Amborawang (8 mi NE Manggar).
4. Brunei Bay: 14 Jul: Contact with en 5000 yds SE Beaufort maintained.

PHILIPPINES:

5. Mindanao: Sarangani Bay: 14 Jul: Nil resistance to advances NW to posns 7½ mi NW Koronadal and SE to posns vic Tupi. Now of Davao: 14 Jul: Nil contacts to extensive patrolling in the Kibangay-Gumalang-Calinan area. Agusan Valley: 14 Jul: Only minor contacts in Agusan Valley.
6. Cebu: 13 Jul: An estimated 50 Japs contacted moving E 1 mi S Bogo.
7. Luzon: Central Sector: 14 Jul: Scattered en contacts E of Manila; 128 Japs killed and 252 found dead Infanta area. Northern Sector: 14 Jul: Against slight en opposn Palanan town captured after unopposed landing in Palanan Bay; en trps with hvy wpns defending rd 3 mi E San Mariano; lt resistance overcome in advances to Lansa and Habian (1 mi NW and 2 mi NE Kiangnan); strong resistance met 3 mi NE Camp 30; stubborn opposn continues Mankayan area.

II AIR:

MALAYA:

1. Kuantan: 13 Jul: 6 serv S/E a/c dest & 3 other a/c seriously dam by 2 special search B-24s; 4 dummy a/c obsvd on a/d; lt AA defenses were ineffective; 1415I.

NANSEI SHOTOS:

2. Ie Shima: 12 Jul: Sev bombs dropped by en a/c; minor dam sustained; early morn.
3. Okinawa: 14 Jul: Lone en T/E B shot down by CenPac CAP 52 mi NW; 0440I.
4. Yakushima: 14 Jul: 1 F dest on Takuna strip by rocket firing F4Us.

EMPIRE:

5. N Honshu-Hokkaido: 14 Jul: (Prelim rpt) Min of 24 en a/c dest & 62 dam on grd, mostly at Matsushima, Matsudo, & Misawa a/ds (N Honshu); 1 en rcn a/c shot down 85 mi fr surface force; bad weather curtailed opns over Hokkaido where Obihoro a/d only fld not completely closed in.
6. Tokyo Area: 10 Jul: (Final rpt) 109 en a/c dest, 231 dam on grd; 2 en a/c shot down; nil air opposn enctrd over tgts; our losses were 5 Fs & 5 T/Bs in cbt (7 pilots & 6 air crew).

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III NAVY:

NEW GUINEA:

1. Cape D'Urville: 14 Jul: 1 surfaced sub rptd.

MOLUCCAS:

2. Halmahera: 13 Jul: 2 barges strafed at Tidore Id.

LESSER SUNDAS:

3. Bali: 13 Jul: 6 barges in Benoa Bay.
4. Lombok Id: 13 Jul: 1 barge bombed with unobsd results.
5. Alor Id: 13 Jul: 5 barges bombed & strafed with unobsd results.

CELEBES:

6. Donggala: Night 12/13 Jul: PTs strafed beached canoes, 5 mi SW.

BORNEO:

7. Kuching: 14 Jul: 2 luggers strafed without damage, 30 mi W at Lundu.

JAVA:

8. Banjoewangi: 13 Jul: 3 freighters (150/300T).
9. Sourabaya: 13 Jul: Usual shipping in hbr.

MALAY PENINSULA:

10. Trengganu: 13 Jul: 1 barge (50') strafed & damaged.
11. Kota Bharu: 14 Jul: Sailing vsls only.

FRENCH INDO CHINA:

12. Haiphong: a) 13 Jul: Photos show 2 tankers (5200T), 3 freighters (300/1000T) (poss unserviceable). b) 14 Jul: 2 subchasers & 2 freighters (150/300T).
13. Saigon: 11 Jul: Photos show 1 freighter-tpt (over 4000T) poss sunk, 5 mi SE. (Prev rptd as receiving 3 direct hits).

HAINAN:

14. Tonkon Pt: 14 Jul: 1 hospital ship on crs NNE, spd 8, 115 mi E.
15. Yulin Bay: 14 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T), 2 sm u/i ships.
16. Kiungshan: 14 Jul: 1 tug & 4 sm luggers anchored.
17. Hainan Str: Night 13/14 Jul: 1 junk sunk, 1 damaged.

FORMOSA:

18. Keelung: 14 Jul: 3 u/i ships.

CHINA:

19. Amoy: a) Night 13/14 Jul: 2 junks strafed, NE of Amoy. b) 14 Jul: 2 subchasers & 2 freighters (150/300T).
20. HongKong: 14 Jul: 3 freighters (150/300T).
21. Ft. Bayard: 11 Jul: 2 junks (75') destroyed, 2 damaged.
22. Shantung Penin: a) 14 Jul: 1 destroyer & 1 lrg coastal steamer anchored. b) 14 Jul: 1 lrg coastal freighter sunk. c) 14 Jul: 1 lrg oiler bombed.

NANSEI SHOTO:

23. Amami-O-Shima: 13 Jul: 1 boat (40') damaged, 35 mi NW.

KOREA:

24. W Coast: 14 Jul: 2 vsls (60T) & 3 2-masted schooners bombed & strafed; 1 freighter (150/300T) sunk, 1 badly damaged, 3 schooners heavily damaged; 3 2-masted schooners sighted.

JAPAN:

25. Maizuru Area: 10 Jul: Photos show: 1 training cruiser (Kashima), 1 destroyer hull (Matsu class), 7 subs, 1 old destroyer, 4 destroyer escorts, 5 frigates, 1 sub-tender (Chogei), 2 hospital ships (Arimasan Maru & Hikawa Maru), 1 LSM, 7 merch vsls (17,500T total), 2 merch vsls (11,000T total) repairing & liner Conte Verde (18,765T) all at Maizuru; 1 light cruiser (Agano), 5/6 destroyers (Matsu class), at Obama; 1 LSM, 10 merch vsls (29,500T total) at Tsuruga.
26. Hokkaido: 14 Jul: Carrier based planes destroyed 2 train ferries at sea, 10 sm freighters, 1 old destroyer, 2 picket boats; damaged 1 train ferry, 4 med tankers, 1 med transport, 5 med & 8 sm freighters, 2 destroyer-escorts, 1 subchaser, 1 tug, & 1 lugger.
27. Honshu: a) 11 Jul: 2 picket boats damaged NE of Sendai; fishing boats strafed off Yokosuta. b) 13 Jul: 1 lrg freighter (150/300T); 1 freighter (300/850T) destroyed off Shikine; 3 fishing boats destroyed, 3 dam off Kazu Shima. c) 13 Jul: 1 freighter-tpt (700/1300T) left listing & dead in water, 25 mi SSW of Hamamatsu. d) 13 Jul: 8 picket boats off E coast.

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## IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

### 1. Summary of the Enemy Situation.

#### a. Activities in Forward Areas:

##### Northern Philippines (Luzon):

East of Manila: Minor, scattered contacts continue in Sibul Spring-Infanta area.

Palanan Bay: Slight enemy opposition to capture of Palanan; landing in Palanan Bay unopposed.

San Mariano: Enemy troops armed with heavy weapons are defending trail east of San Mariano.

Kiangan: Light resistance overcome, as our troops made substantial gains northeast and northwest of Kiangan.

Highway 11: Strong resistance from enemy riflemen in well prepared positions northeast of Camp 30.

Mankayan: Stubborn opposition from strongly fortified positions continues in Mankayan area.

##### Southern-Central Philippines (Mindanao):

Sarangani Bay: Nil enemy resistance as elements our forces continue advances northwest from Koronadal and southeast from Tupi along Highway 5.

Northwest of Davao--Agusan Valley: Only minor enemy contacts to extensive patrolling.

##### Borneo:

Balikpapan: Enemy is continuing stubborn defense of strong position astride highway north and east of Batochampar.

Brunei Bay: Enemy possibly withdrawing from Limbang to Tenom; 600 enemy reportedly moving from Ridan to Linei, 45 miles southeast of Miri. Enemy concentrations rptd in vicinity Ranau 40 miles east of Jesselton.

#### b. Activities in Rear Areas:

Malaya: 6 a/c dest & 3 dam at Kuantan.

Nansei Shotos: Minor dam by en air raid at Ie Shima, 12 Jul; 1 T/E B & 1 F dest by our CAP 14 Jul.

Empire: 87 en a/c dest or dam (prelim) on 14 Jul; 342 en a/c dest or dam on 10 Jul.

#### c. Identifications: None.

d. Weather: Curtailed operations against Hokkaido and cancelled operations against Kyushu.

### 2. Conclusions.

#### a. Enemy Capabilities:

##### Operations in Borneo:

##### 1) Maintenance of Scattered Centers of Resistance.

a) Northwest Sector.

b) Southeast Sector.

##### Operations in the Philippines:

##### 2) Defense of Isolated Areas, Northern Luzon.

##### 3) Scattered Attempts to Survive on Mindanao.

##### Operations in Japan:

##### 4) Air Defense.

##### Operations in China:

##### 5) Troop Shifts and Consolidation.

a) North China.

b) Central China.

c) South China.

d) East China.

##### Operations in Borneo:

1) Maintenance of Scattered Centers of Resistance: Strong unified enemy resistance on Borneo has yet to develop. However, slight indications point to an increase in opposition southeast of Beaufort. Activity in the Balikpapan sector has been spotty and seemingly without purpose, except to secure a withdrawal from the area with a limited force.

a) Northwest Sector: The advance north along the Beaufort-Jesselton railroad continues as 24th Brigade troops reached Papar (30 miles

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northeast of Beaufort) encountering only slight opposition. Other elements of the Brigade met stubborn resistance from well prepared enemy positions approximately 5 miles southeast of Beaufort, along the Padas River and the Beaufort-Tenom railroad. Activities in the Brunei-Miri area to the south have been limited to small scattered patrol contacts.

The plan of enemy defense in the northwest appears to be divided into two areas as evidenced by statements from natives, prisoners of war and captured documents. The Jesselton-Ranau sector extending south to the Papar River, is defended by the 25th IMR, two independent infantry battalions and one independent MG battalion. The other, southeast of Beaufort, along the Padas River southeast to Tenom then north to Keningau, by elements of the 56th IMB; recent information suggests the location of the headquarters along with combat elements in the Tenom area. A prisoner of war claimed that Major General Akashi, commanding officer of the 56th IMB, with 130 troops left Brunei on 17 June enroute to the vicinity of Tenom. That strong enemy resistance may develop as Allied troops advance north of the Papar River to Jesselton and southeast from Beaufort to Tenom appears likely since his main line of communication is now threatened. The loss of Jesselton and Tenom perhaps will force his withdrawal inland in the direction of Ranau where other troop concentrations are reported. From there, he will have the choice of withdrawing into the mountains for defense of selected terrain or scattering into independent groups purely for physical survival. (See Enclosure No. 1).

b) Southeastern Sector: Stubborn resistance continued 1,500 yards northeast of Mt Bato champar along the Balikpapan-Samarinda road, while other troops, patrolling three miles east of the Manggar-Sambodja road, reached Amborawang village, approximately 8 miles northeast of Manggar, without contact. There was no significant change in the enemy situation in the Balikpapan area during the past several days; he has employed a limited delaying action on the main escape route to the north while the bulk of the former garrison appears to be withdrawing to the north and northeast.

Of the present operational areas, only does the northwest sector present potential obstacle to the extension of Allied control. Type of reaction to further penetrations into this area is not conclusively discernible; however, indicated dispositions of strength suggests that attempts will be made to deny or delay seizure of the Jesselton area and the Keningau Valley.

#### Operations in the Philippines:

2) Defense of Isolated Areas, Northern Luzon: Enemy activity increased slightly in the Duman River area and along the Ilagan-Palanan Bay Trail, 3 miles east of San Mariano. Patrolling in the foothills of the Sierra Madres uncovered some enemy strength as evidenced by several unsuccessful night banzai attacks against our positions in the Paret River Valley, about a mile northwest of Singayan. On the east coast of Luzon, guerrillas made an unopposed amphibious landing at Palanan Bay, advanced inland without opposition and seized the barrio of Palanan. Since the Ilagan-Palanan Bay Trail was the only developed lateral communication line between the east coast and Cagayan Valley, the landing has rendered this former escape route useless. With our troops and guerrilla units now converging from both east and west, remnants, possibly approximating 800-1,000 are now forced to defend this area or scatter into the mountains flanking the trail. In each instance, they face complete destruction. Stubborn opposition 3 miles east of San Mariano, on the west entrance to this trail, suggests that the enemy in this sector may continue delaying actions until reduced to ineffectiveness. Mopping up in the Jones area as well as in the Dupax-Aritao-Pingkian sector continues with only slight encounters with small wandering enemy groups.

Elements of the 6th Division crossed the Imbulao River and continued their northward advance astride Highway 4 without opposition. The absence of any significant strength subsequent to the initial breakthrough of enemy positions southeast of Kiangnan implies that the bulk of the troops have withdrawn to the mountains west of Highway 4. Unopposed seizure of Kiangnan adds further evidence to this probable course of action. Relatively little change occurred in the Mankayan-Bontoc sector. Enemy movements toward the western entrance of the only remaining lateral in the Cordillera Mountains

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continues, indicating, as previously pointed out, an attempt to occupy and defend positions between KP 90 and the barrio of Loo.

Viewing the overall situation west of Highway 5, it is now apparent that the enemy has committed and lost considerable strength in the defense of the Mankayan, Bontoc and Kiangnan approaches, and is now thoroughly limited to denial attempts of a few selected sectors with extremely limited facilities. His loss of key points and control of the entire Cordillera sector can only be forestalled to some extent by difficult terrain and adverse weather conditions. Final withdrawal to the high ground between Highways 4 and 11 and limited defense of close-in approaches thereto still appears to be the enemy's most likely course of action. (See Enclosure No. 2).

3) Scattered Attempts to Survive on Mindanao: In all remaining sectors of enemy occupation on Mindanao, his situation is uniformly that of complete avoidance of contact in order to physically survive. In upper Agusan Valley, only minor straggler contacts were produced by extensive patrolling of Halapitan, Sagunto and Waloe; an estimated platoon is the strongest group recently encountered throughout the area. It is now apparent that the bulk of 30th Division remnants, withdrawn from Bukidnon, are widely dispersed from east of the Pulangi River along the Umayan River to Agusan Valley. Guerrillas report many small Jap groups in hiding along the Umayan River Canyon, without supplies or effective communications, and suffering heavy attrition from our air strikes. Resistance along the lower reaches of Kibawe-Talomo Trail, west and north of Kibangay, has virtually ceased. The enemy's complete avoidance of contact throughout the Sarangani Bay area has permitted our unopposed consolidation of the Buayan airstrips and an unimpeded traverse of Highway 5 by our units converging from north and south thereon.

Having long lost any significant defensive capability, widely isolated enemy remnants on Mindanao now evince an almost complete pre-occupation with problems of physical survival. (See Enclosure No. 3).

#### Operations in Japan:

4) Air Defense: In the current series of carrier and fleet operations against the home islands of Japan, active enemy air defenses have been practically non-existent. Despite a strong air potential, the enemy has apparently elected to pursue a policy of passive defense almost to extreme.

Aerial photos taken of 65 airdromes in the Tokyo area on 10 July, the first day of operations, reveal a total of 1791 operational aircraft (82½% single engine and 17½% twin engine types). In addition, 636 non-operational aircraft were present, a good percentage of which might be converted to an operational status. Thus, as our carrier aircraft began operations against the enemy homeland on 10 July, the Tokyo area alone possessed an immediate air defense strength of almost 1800 aircraft, and a total potential force of 2427 planes.

A careful analysis of the photographs disclosed an increased use of villages, cemeteries and wooded areas for aircraft concealment. In several instances the distance from outlying dispersal areas to the nearest airfield exceeded five miles, with existing roads serving as taxiways. Revetments and camouflage was the most extensive ever encountered.

These factors of passive resistance, so emphatically revealed in the photos, further substantiates previous indications that the enemy is apparently determined to conserve his air strength, probably for use against an actual invasion.

The effectiveness of these tactics, so rigidly adhered to by the enemy during the past week, is further emphasized by the results of our operations so far. On 10 July, only 9 enemy aircraft were seen airborne, as over 1000 of our carrier aircraft slashed at the Tokyo air center. On the ground, the enemy suffered 109 aircraft destroyed and 231 damaged. His only airborne losses were 2 reconnaissance planes shot down near our surface vessels. On 14 July, preliminary reports indicate that no defending enemy aircraft were encountered; losses inflicted on the ground included 24 destroyed and 62 damaged on airfields in Northern Honshu. As on the 10th, the only airborne enemy loss was a reconnaissance aircraft shot down while seeking our surface force. Adverse weather hampered our planes in the operations on 14 July.

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Thus in two day's operations, the enemy has suffered the loss of 136 aircraft destroyed and 293 damaged, although opposed by over 1000 aggressive Allied aircraft. In similar carrier operations against the Philippines and the Nansei Shotos, where the enemy chose to defend in the air, his ground losses were high (not so completely dispersed and camouflaged) and his air losses were also very high, almost equaling the numbers destroyed on the ground, even though opposed by a much smaller force than the 1000 planes which ranged over Tokyo unopposed.

The great saving in pilots and combat crews is the obvious result of the passive resistance tactics. The widespread dispersal, camouflage and concealment has so far served to keep the ground losses down considerably as compared with previous operations.

However, this policy of defense is a losing policy, as are all defensive tactics of a similar nature. The widespread dispersion is costly in extra consumption of critically short gasoline to accomplish long stretches of taxiing to the strips, and accordingly, increases maintenance problems arising from overheated engines, not built for over-long operation on the ground.

The enemy, however, apparently considers that the advantages of a passive aerial defense outweigh the disadvantages, according to the eventual employment of his air strength that he is contemplating. The resultant conclusion is that the enemy has embarked on a strict policy of passive air resistance to closely conserve his air potential. So far, he has rigidly adhered to this plan. He is, however, capable of mustering well over a 2 to 1 advantage in fighters alone over our carrier fighters, and thus provide a strong air defense of his homeland.

#### Operations in China:

##### 5) Troop Shifts and Consolidation:

a) North China: Troop movements in both North and Central China are resulting in increased concentrations in strategic centers, several of which are inland but still astride good communication lines funnelling into the Shanghai area. The latter itself has emerged as a focal point of strength and defensive development. The extent of these movements is indicated by reports that during the past 60 days, 100,000 troops have crossed the Yellow River at Chenghsien, many of whom moved on northward. Meanwhile in Northeastern China, 10,000 troops with 138 armored cars and 116 pieces of artillery were reported to have moved north through Tsinan on the Tzuyang-Tsinan Railway during the period of 16-21 June. An unconfirmed Chinese report stated that Japanese troops estimated at 40,000 recently passed through Suchow moving toward the seaport of Haichow. In addition the enemy is centralizing his forces to the extent of withdrawing from Western Shansi Province and relinquishing rail points on the Tungkuan-Taiyuan Railway, leading into Manchuria.

This continued shifting of large bodies of troops northward suggests an eventual relinquishment of most of the occupied territories south of the Yangtze and subsequent building-up of large troop concentrations astride key railway nets and water communication routes of Central and Northern China.

b) Central China: Following closely the current trend being evidenced in the north, large troop movements northward characterized enemy activity in Central China during the past week. Since 15 June an average of 2,000 troops each night reportedly have moved north through villages north of Hanchow. A new area of enemy concentration has been noted in the Lake Poyang region with a possible present strength of 20,000 men, some of whom are moving toward Shanghai, approximately 300 miles to the northeast. By the concentration of strong protective forces between Hengyang and Chang-sha, by stiff resistance to Chinese pressure in the vicinity of Paoking, and by his rapid construction of defensive works around Chang-sha, it is evident that the Japanese appreciate the necessity for maintaining the Hengyang-Chang-sha corridor for eventual evacuation of his remaining forces from South China.

c) South China: During the week 3,000 enemy troops were reported to have moved from the Indo-China port of Haiphong by water to the Luichow Peninsula, and thence overland toward Fort Bayard. Elements of the Japanese 22nd and 37th Divisions, northeast of Hanoi, are presently being

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employed in a delaying action against Chinese pressure from the north. At HongKong the enemy is erecting additional fortifications, but at the same time almost one-third of the garrison troops have been evacuated to the mainland in the last fifteen days. It may be that the HongKong area's relegation to a rear area has, from the enemy's viewpoint, removed the sector from the list of imminent invasion targets and has impressed him with its inutility for Empire defense, thus accounting for a smaller garrison force but with increased defensive installations.

d) East China: In the Shanghai area, fortifications have been hurriedly erected around the Yangtze River estuary, and defense works have been constructed in depth extending south from Shanghai beyond Hangchow. Gun emplacements and revetments of reinforced concrete are said to be under construction on Chungming Island in the mouth of the Yangtze, while coast defense guns are being installed on Chou Shan Island, 25 miles off the coast. Estimates place 170,000 troops in the Shanghai area. This strength coupled with accelerated construction of fortifications and defensive works implies that the Japanese apparently consider this area as the most critical in China.

In summarization, it appears that the enemy, paying particular attention to the Yangtze estuary at Shanghai, guarding the main communication artery of China, intends to eventually marshall the bulk of his forces in a relatively few strategic centers in Northeast China. (See Enclosure No. 4).

b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Maintenance of Scattered Centers of Resistance on Borneo: Of the present operational areas, only does the northwest sector present a potential obstacle to the extension of Allied control. Type of reaction to further penetrations into this area is not conclusively discernible; however, indicated dispositions of strength suggests that attempts will be made to deny or delay seizure of the Jesselton area and the Keningua Valley.

2) Defense of Isolated Areas, Northern Luzon: Final withdrawal to the high ground between Highways 4 and 11 and limited defense of close-in approaches thereto still appears to be the enemy's most likely course of action.

3) Scattered Attempts to Survive on Mindanao: Having lost any significant defensive capability, widely isolated enemy remnants on Mindanao now evince an almost complete preoccupation with problems of physical survival.

4) Air Defense: While the enemy has a strong air potential available for the defense of his homeland, he has so far relied on a strict policy of passive resistance, and will probably continue until threatened with an actual invasion.

5) Troop Shifts and Consolidation: It appears that the enemy, paying particular attention to the Yangtze estuary at Shanghai guarding the main communication artery of China, intends to eventually marshall the bulk of his forces in a relatively few strategic centers in Northeast China.

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To Accompany Encl No. 1  
Daily Summary No 1197

EXPLANATORY NOTES:


13/14 Jul:

1. A "large" enemy concentration in the villages near Ranau (45 miles E of Jesselton) was indicated by local sources.
2. Without opposition, a company of the 2/32 Bn moved by barge from Membakut River to a point along the coast  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles S of Pangakayan. Other troops, moving N along the railway from Kimanis joined this company and advanced to Papar encountering only slight resistance.
3. Contact being maintained with enemy of undetermined strength along the Beaufort-Tenom railroad 5,000 yds SE of Beaufort.
4. PW captured in the Trusan Valley claims Major General AKASHI, with 130 troops left Brunei 17 June enroute to the headwater of the Padas River; since General AKASHI commands 56th IMB, the probable location of this headquarters is suggested.
5. Native reports indicate that the enemy is withdrawing from the Limbang area to Tenom (65 miles NE) by way of Bidang, Sagan, Sebulu and Tomani.
6. In the Marudi area, natives state that 600 Japs were seen moving from Ridan to Linei approximately 40 miles SE of Miri. Approximately 100 were unarmed, all carried 20 days food supply.

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To Accompany Encl No. 2  
Daily Summary No. 1197

#### EXPLANATORY NOTES

On 13/14 Jul:

1. Over twenty Japs were killed as a result of 3 unsuccessful night banzai attacks NW of Singayan.
2. Our patrols reached a position 3 miles E of San Mariano where they encountered heavy enemy opposition supported by automatic weapons.
3. Guerrilla forces made an unopposed amphibious landing at Palanan Bay seizing barrio of Palanan without opposition.
4. Scattered contacts in Jones area resulted in 26 Japs killed or captured.
5. A civilian report of unknown reliability states that 5,000 enemy (probably greatly exaggerated) are moving from Santa Cruz (22 miles NW of Echague) NW to Butigui (11 miles NW of Santa Cruz) with approximately 150 carabao. The civilian further stated that the majority of this group consisted of airservice troops, with some naval personnel. No defensive positions were seen in their bivouac areas.
6. Elements of the 6th Div crossed Imbulao River, on Highway 4 and established OP vicinity Habian (3 miles NE Kiangnan) and dispatched patrols N as far as Lagawe (1½ miles NNW of Habian) without enemy contact.
7. Against moderate resistance elements of the 32nd Div continued their advance northward astride Highway 11 reaching positions 3 miles NE of Camp 30.
8. Against stubborn but declining resistance, troops of PA units continue moving Southeast toward KP 90 on Highway 11.

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REF ID: A55111

To Accompany Encl No. 3  
Daily Summary No. 1197

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

On 14 Jul:

1. Only minor enemy contacts developed by extensive patrolling throughout Halapitan-Sagunto-Waloe area; guerrillas report considerable number of Japs in hiding along Umayan R Canyon W of Agusan Valley, and suffering heavy attrition from our air strikes.
2. Nil significant enemy resistance encountered during consolidation of Kibangay-Tamogan-Gumalang sector NW of Davao.
3. Guerrilla reports continue to identify remnants of the 166th Ind Inf Bn, formerly at Cotabato, in remote inland areas NW of Kabacan.
4. At last report, enemy had completely avoided contact with our converging forces along Highway 5; no significant enemy activity was noted throughout the entire Sarangani Bay area.

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
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ENCLOSURE NO. 3  
MINDANAO

Military Intelligence Section  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

COMBINED GROUND SITUATION  
TO: 2400/I 14 JULY 45  
MSGs TO: 1200/I 15 JULY  
For Summary No. 1197

0 10 20 30 40 50  
STATUTE MILES



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
To Accompany Encl No. 4  
Daily Summary No. 1197

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

1. Recent enemy moves indicate a general evacuation of western Shansi Province to the extent of relinquishing the rail points of Chihhsien, Pingyao and Fenyang.
2. During the past 60 days 100,000 troops reportedly crossed the Yellow R at Chenghsien, then moved northward. Hsin Hsiang seems to be the main redeployment center for enemy forces in N China.
3. Chinese estimate that over 30,000 enemy troops moved into and thru Hsingyang during the period 19-25 June.
4. The enemy build-up of strength in the Poyang Lake area continues with reportedly 2,000 Japanese troops moving nightly from the west into this region.
5. The enemy recently has been actively engaged in erecting a defense system from Chuchow N to Changsha probably as additional security for the continued use of the Hangyang-Changsha corridor.
6. The Liushow sector is being rapidly evacuated, reportedly with no more than 1,000 troops presently in its immediate area.
7. Japanese troops and civilians are moving by small craft from the port of Naiphong along the coast to the Luichow Peninsula thence to Fort Bayard for subsequent evacuation to Canton.
8. Chinese troops are exerting constant pressure on the enemy forces withdrawing S from Linking.
9. Additional fortifications are being constructed at Hongkong. A seemingly contradictory activity is taking place at the same time with almost one third of the garrison forces evacuating to the mainland in the past 15 days.
10. The Japanese are constructing extensive fortifications in depth from Hangchow northward encompassing the whole of the Shanghai area, including the islands of Chungming and Chen Shan.
11. Chinese estimate that 40,000 enemy troops are moving into the area of Haichow. Previous information indicated that a system of defenses were hastily being erected at Laoyao near Haichow.

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**CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA**  
 Enclosure No. 4

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
 SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
 Military Intelligence Section  
 General Staff  
**COMBINED SITUATION**  
 To 14 July 1945  
 For Summary No. 1197

**LEGEND**  
 Solid lines show Japanese areas of control; they do not represent a fixed line of resistance.  
 Areas of principal enemy troops concentrations.



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

I-III: DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE  
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION  
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No.

1196

DATE

13/14 Jul 1945

I GROUND:

SOLOMONS:

1. Bougainville: 12 Jul: En arty 1700 yds WSW Chinatown, Buka Passage, silenced by counter-battery fire; en trps 1800 yds WSW Bonis airfield engaged; en movement 2000 yds S Ruri noted; patrol contacts 3800 yds W, 4800 yds SE and 4800 yds NE Kara (10 mi ENE Shishigatero); en, supported by arty, engaged vicin Shishigatero; Jap posns 2000 yds N Rusei evacuated.

NEW GUINEA:

2. Wewak: 12 Jul: En posns 600 yds WNW Kulauru Mission occupied; Jap posns 3000 yds ENE and 4500 yds NE Yamil contacted; minor contacts in villages 3000 yds W and 4800 yds NE Yamil.

BORNEO:

3. Balikpapan: 13 Jul: Stubborn resistance continued 1400 yds NE Mt Batochampar; patrols contacted sm en grps 4 mi WNW and 1 mi SSE Penadjam; coastal stretch 18 mi S and W Penadjam found clear of en.
4. Brunei Bay: 13 Jul: Slight opposn overcome in advance astride Beaufort-Jesselton Railroad to Papar; en posn engaged 1400 yds S Dalam Pump Station.

PHILIPPINES:

5. Mindanao: Sarangani Bay: 13 Jul: Nil en opposn to capture of Buayan airstrip, W bank Buayan River, or to advance 4000 yds NE Dadjangas. NW of Davao: 13 Jul: Scattered en grps encountered 1000 yds W Moab and 3500 yds SW Sirib. Agusan Valley: 13 Jul: Continued minor patrol clashes vicin Waloe.
6. Luzon: Northern Sector: 13 Jul: Sm en force contacted 2000 yds E Cumao along Dummun River; 3 sm night attacks repulsed vicin Paret River, 27 Japs killed; only scattered resistance to mopping up in Kiangan area; posns reached 1 mi NE Camp 30 against scattered Jap opposn; en continues defense vicin Mankayan with MG, grenade and mortar fire; against moderate en resistance, Philippine Army troops advanced SE to Luglug astride Highway 11.

II AIR:

FORMOSA:

1. Pescadores: Night 12/13 Jul: 1 en a/c made pass at N-B with nil dam.

SOUTH CHINA SEA:

2. Hainan Id: 12 Jul: 1 lrg T/E a/c obsvd in revet at Kiungshan a/d; 1 u/i S/E a/c in another revet.

CHINA:

3. Canton: a) 13 Jul: 7 en a/c flew fr Canton to Swatow (agts rpt). b) Night 12/13 Jul: 2 of 3 en a/c airborne made passes at blind B & 1 dropped aerial bomb, nil dam. c) Night 11/12 Jul: 2 intcpters made passes at blind B with nil dam.

JAPAN:

4. Honshu: Toyohashi: 13 Jul: 2 en Fs accompanied 2 PBLys for 30 mi without attack.

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Summary 1196 - Cont'd

## III NAVY:

### MOLUCCAS:

1. Halmahera: a) 11 Jul: PTs destroyed 11 cargo prahus. b) 12 Jul: 1 boat hit, 1 prahu left sinking, 3 prahus hit, 1 barge & 1 canoe destroyed.

### LESSER SUNDAS:

2. Soembawa: 13 Jul: 2 barges & 1 vs1 (2/3000T) in Bima Bay area.

### BORNEO:

3. Bandjermasin: 12 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T), 1 lugger on Barito R.

### FRENCH INDO CHINA:

4. Haiphong: 13 Jul: 5 sm tankers anchored.

### PHILIPPINES:

5. Mindanao: 12 Jul: 1 poss surfacing sub in Sarangani Str on crs NExE.

### HAINAN:

6. Hoi How: 13 Jul: 1 lrg tug, 4 sm luggers.

### FORMOSA:

7. Keelung: 13 Jul: 1 freighter-tpt (300/1200T), 2 freighters (150/300T), 1 lugger anchored.

### CHINA COAST:

8. Haitan Id: 13 Jul: 2 u/i vs1s, 30 mi S.

9. Amoy: 13 Jul: 1 freighter-tpt (2/4500T) anchored.

10. Yellow Sea: 13 Jul: 1 Terusuki Destroyer, 1 2-stack destroyer, 1 old destroyer, 2 destroyer escorts on crs SE, spd 15, 160 mi E of Hsi-lien.

11. Luichow Penin: 11 Jul: Ground sources rpt (graded C-3) 200 boats carrying trps daily fr Ft Bayard to Shuitung.

12. Shanghai: 12 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) destroyed N of Shanghai.

### NANSEI SHOTO:

13. Miyako Retto: 12 Jul: 1 sm craft strafed at Tarama Is.

### KOREA:

14. W. Coast: 12 Jul: Allied sub rpts sinking 16 schooners (300T average) & 1 tug. Another sub sank 2 sm freighters, 1 sm tanker, 1 minesweeper.

15. Chosen Str: 13 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) sunk.

### JAPAN:

16. S. Kyushu: a) 10 Jul: 3 subs sighted W & SW of Yaku Shima. b) 12 Jul: en sub attacked.

## IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

### 1. Summary of the Enemy Situation:

#### a. Activities in Forward Areas:

##### Northern Philippines (Luzon):

Cagayan Valley: Scattered enemy contacts continue along the Dummun and Paret Rivers.

Kiangan: Only minor resistance encountered as our forces continue mopping up recently captured Kiangan.

Bontoc: Moderate resistance encountered by PA troops south of Pingad astride Highway 11.

Mankayan: Enemy covering withdrawal from Mankayan area from strongpoints with machine guns, grenades, and mortars.

##### Southern-Central Philippines (Mindanao):

Sarangani Bay: Nil opposition to securing of beachheads at Buayan and at Dadjangas, where advances over 2 miles inland were made. No resistance as Tupi and Malungan (34 miles northwest and 16 miles north of Buayan) reached.

Northwest of Davao: Scattered enemy groups engaged in Moab-Sirib area.

Umayan River Valley: Reliably reported that several hundred Japanese were killed in air strikes 19-21 June in Umayan River Valley; still large numbers of enemy in area.

Agusan Valley: Minor patrol contacts in vicinity of Waloe.

##### Borneo:

Balikpapan: Stubborn enemy resistance continued from strongpoint northeast of Mt Batochampar. Across the bay from Balikpapan scattered enemy contacts inland from Penadjam; coastal stretch 18 miles south and west of Penadjam found free of enemy.

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Brunei Bay: Enemy positions overcome and continued advances made northeast of Beaufort and southeast of Miri. Nil en air activity.

b. Activities in Rear Areas:

Formosa: 1 en a/c made pass at N-B.

Hainan Id: 2 en a/c on Kiungshan a/d.

Canton: 7 en a/c flew fr Canton to Swatow; 3 en a/c intcptd N-B.

Japan: 2 en Fs followed PB4Ys nr Toyohashi.

c. Identifications: None.

d. Weather: Okinawa based air operations cancelled.

2. Conclusions:

a. Enemy Capabilities:

Operations on Borneo:

1) Withdrawal from the Balikpapan Area.

Operations in the Philippines:

2) Delaying Actions, Lower Cordilleras, Northern Luzon.

Operations in Japan:

3) Reaction to Coordinated Air Attacks.

Operations on Borneo:

1) Withdrawal from the Balikpapan Area: Except for stubborn resistance confined to a small area 1,500 yards northeast of Mt Batochampar on the Balikpapan-Samarinda road, the enemy situation in the entire sector remains relatively quiet. The enemy was subjected to heavy shelling by our artillery in an effort to reduce strong positions blocking our advance to the north. Patrols searching southeast from Soember-Kiri reached the road 1,000 yards in rear of the enemy without contact. An abandoned seaplane base on the east coast of the bay, approximately 14 miles north northwest of Balikpapan, was discovered by an overwater patrol; aircraft and photographic equipment had been destroyed. Across Balikpapan Bay, patrols, continuing their search, reported the coastal area south and west to the Toenan River, approximately 18 miles from Penadjam, clear of enemy. No opposition was encountered as our troops moved along the Manggar-Sambodja Road to a point 8 miles northeast of Manggar.

Recently, three enemy trucks and a passenger car carrying troops were sighted by an air observer along the road running south of Mt Wentawir, approximately 30 miles north of Balikpapan; the vehicles were camouflaged with bushes and quickly took cover at the approach of the aircraft. This activity, although minor, coupled with previous reports of troop movements and concentrations along this route, indicates that a withdrawal is taking place. Absence of resistance, except northeast of Mt Batochampar along the Balikpapan-Samarinda road, the only practicable escape route, strongly suggests that a delaying action is covering the withdrawal of the bulk of enemy troops previously reported in that area, and at the same time holding up the Allied movement to the oilfields in Samarinda. (See Enclosure No. 1).

Operations in the Philippines:

2) Delaying Actions, Lower Cordilleras, Northern Luzon: Following the occupation of Mankayan, Philippine Army units continued their attack southeast astride Road 393 toward KP 90. Observers report that a small-scale withdrawal is being carried out by the enemy in this area, presumably moving to selected positions in the vicinity of KP 90 and the barrio of Loo. The area between KP 90 and Loo has previously been reported as fortified with cave and tunnel installations. Even though withdrawal is in progress, a probable rear guard action in the form of stubborn opposition is taking place, supported by MGs, mortars and grenades. Since this area between KP 90 and Loo appears well suited for a defense, with fortifications and supply installations having been developed, perhaps this area is being reinforced or occupied by elements now withdrawing from the Mankayan and Bontoc sectors. The rear guard defense, well supported by fire power and acting as covering force implies that the enemy is attempting to gain time in order to effectively deploy these troops. In the Highway 4 sector, after occupying Kiangnan, the advance northward toward Banaue was resumed by elements of the 6th Division. With the exception of mopping up of small scattered groups, no opposition was encountered during the operations astride Highway 4.

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The enemy's withdrawal from Mankayan and Bontoc toward KP 90, covered by a fairly strong rear guard defense, indicates an attempt at realignment of strength probably on the high ground between KP 90 and the barrio of Loo, where a defense similar to that encountered northwest of Mankayan could well take place. (See Enclosure No. 2).

#### Operations in Japan:

3) Reaction to Coordinated Air Attacks: For the past 10 days, airfields and industrial targets in Japan have been subjected to the heaviest and most sustained air attacks yet made against the Japanese Empire. In these attacks, which are still in progress, for the first time the coordinated effort of all Allied air power--carrier aircraft, B-29s, B-24s & B-25s, P-47s and P-51s--from all of our forward bases, has been brought to bear against the enemy homeland. These intensive attacks, extending from Southern Kyushu to Tokyo and Hokkaido, and challenging all-out combat, have, according to latest reports received, met with but inconsequential air opposition. In only one or two instances during the numerous strikes made have aggressive interceptions been encountered.

Reports received up to this hour indicate the following enemy reaction to the several phases of our operations.

No reports have been received on the carrier and bombardment operations except for the first three of seven strikes against the Tokyo airdromes on 10 July. Only 9 enemy aircraft were encountered airborne during these strikes and during the period covered by this report, no enemy air attacks were made against our naval forces. Photographs and pilot reports, however, indicated a total of 868 aircraft on 24 Tokyo airfields.

Iwo Jima P-51s strafed and rocketed the Tokyo airfields on the following dates in the following numbers: 4 July 132, 5 July 103, 6 July 120, 8 July 110. On the 9th and 10th respectively, 105 and 104 of the Iwo P-51s attacked Osaka and Nagoya airfields. In only one of these attacks was any significant opposition encountered. On the 8th, 47 enemy interceptors made effective use of cloud cover in attacking our aircraft at low level. Seven P-51s were lost on the strike. During the attack on the 9th 40 to 50 unaggressive and inexperienced interceptors were encountered. Twelve were shot down with 4 probables and 10 damaged.

On 7 July, when 510 B-29s bombed Honshu urban areas, 61 interceptors made only 4 unaggressive passes. Fifty eight other B-29s raiding the Maruzen oil refinery encountered 9 to 13 interceptors which closed but did not fire.

On Kyushu, efforts of our Okinawa based bombers and fighters at large scale attacks have been seriously hampered by weather. Enemy reaction has been definitely limited but weather here may have been largely responsible. Due to weather, these strikes for the most part have been confined to coastal airdromes and targets. On the 11th, 155 Corsairs attacking Miyazaki, one of the enemy's principal airdromes on the east coast of Kyushu, met with no air opposition. On the 12th, 32 P-51s attacking Tomitaka and Karasehara airdromes to the north also met no opposition. On 9 July, 43 B-24s escorted by 60 P-47s carried out the first heavy bomber strike from Okinawa. The target was Omura airdrome, in the Sasebo area, the enemy's strongest fighter base on Kyushu at present. No report has been received as to opposition encountered by the B-24s. A report that escorting fighters destroyed 12 planes with 4 probable indicates that sizeable opposition may have been encountered. On 12 July, 58 B-25s escorted by 124 P-47s and F4Us attacked Kanoya airdrome, formerly the strongest of all of the enemy's airbases on Kyushu, from which many attacks were staged against our Okinawa operations. The fact that frag and GP bombs were dropped through the clouds indicates the possibility that weather may have been responsible for lack of enemy interceptions.

These extensive operations, according to latest reports, have produced no change in the enemy's air strategy. They definitely confirm a policy of conserving aircraft presumably for use against our final assault against the homeland. The Tokyo carrier strikes leave no doubt that the enemy still has large numbers of aircraft available. Reports from our China airforces indicate that a back log of aircraft is being built up by the enemy in Manchuria. It is possible that fuel shortage, either present or

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prospective, may be partially responsible for recent limited opposition. Nevertheless, interceptions have occurred in sufficient numbers to indicate the enemy's capability and willingness under favorable conditions to undertake aggressive and effective opposition. In all probability such interceptions will continue. At the same time, it is not believed that any serious opposition will be offered to our large scale attacks, with possible exception of suicide attacks against our naval units. The enemy, by progressive experience, has learned that these attacks inflict massive aircraft losses with little to show for such opposition. The reports of large numbers of enemy aircraft closing on the B-29s without firing would seem to confirm, to a certain extent, the enemy's interest in a face saving show to impress the Japanese public with the spirited opposition being offered against the invaders.

b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Withdrawal from the Balikpapan Area: Absence of resistance, except northeast of Mt Batochampar, along the Balikpapan-Samarinda road, the only practicable escape route, strongly suggests that a delaying action is covering the withdrawal of the bulk of enemy troops previously reported in that area, and at the same time holding up the Allied movement to the oilfields in Samarinda.

2) Delaying Actions Lower Cordilleras, Northern Luzon: The enemy's withdrawal from Mankayan and Bontoc toward KP 90, covered by a fairly strong rear guard defense, indicates an attempt at realignment of strength probably on the high ground between KP 90 and the barrio of Loo, where a defense similar to that encountered northwest of Mankayan could well take place.

3) Reaction to Coordinated Air Attacks: A continuation of enemy strategy of general conservation of aircraft, with frequent aggressive interceptions, is indicated by his reaction to heavy Allied air strikes.

V MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

Military Opinion of Situation in Empire Rear Areas:

A Lt. Col. PW, professional soldier with 20 years service who surrendered his unit on New Guinea, emphatically infers that the home islands can be spared no reinforcement potential from Manchuria. Abrogation of the Sino-Japanese non-aggression Pact by Russia has since greatly increased the enemy's calculated risk previously undertaken by the reinforcement of Philippine areas with first-line Manchurian troops. That increased calculated risk lends credence to the PW's estimate.

Skirmishes between Soviet and Japanese border garrisons have on two occasions developed into major battles.

The first was at Changkufeng, on the Korean-Soviet frontier south of Vladivostok, in August 1938. On the Jap side the bulk of the fighting was done by 19 Div, based on Ranan, North Korea, (including in its artillery, Takenaga, then Captain). Towards the end of the battle one battery of medium artillery from Kwantung Army came as reinforcements. It was a full scale battle on a narrow front, lasting about 10 days. The Russians used many tanks and aircraft, while the Japs had none of either. Jap losses were probably the heavier, being about 800 killed and two or three times that number wounded.

Russian tanks put on such a bad show at Changkufeng that the Jap high command underestimated the value of tanks and the strength of the Soviet Army. This had disastrous results the next year (1939) when non-mechanized Jap forces were caught in open, semi-desert country at Nomonhan on the Manchuria-Mongolia frontier (Terrain quite different to the hills and swamps at Changkufeng). PW did not participate in this action himself, but states that Japanese losses at Nomonhan were 15,000 in killed alone and 1500 airplanes lost (he stuck to these figures even when asked were such losses possible). The Kwantung Army command took a long time to realize the seriousness of the incident and kept sending in forces piecemeal, over a period of three months, until two whole divisions had been destroyed. Things were getting serious and the Japs started to concentrate the main strength of Kwantung Army, but just at that time the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed and it was believed that the Germans used their influence with

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the Russians to call the thing off. One result was that the Kwantung Army commander and his Senior Staff Officer (Operations) were removed.

These events seem to have given the officer - PW a healthy respect for the Red Army. When discussing weapons and equipment, he repeatedly stated that the best trained Jap forces and the best equipment could not be spared from Manchuria. At another time, when discussing the probable length of the war, he said that if the Russians came in the Jap Government would put up its hands within two months.

#### POLITICS:

##### a. Bombing of Japan:

The Japanese people would of course be very angry at the destruction of their homes, but as this was the first time Japan had been bombed and as it was on such a terrible scale, the feeling of fear would be greater than their anger and they would want to end the war. Unfortunately however, big business and the military clique (Zaibatsu and Gunbatsu) would want to fight to the end, even though it meant the destruction of Japan and their property too, for if the war were lost the Zaibatsu and Gunbatsu would lose all power and standing in the country.

##### b. Emperor as Means of Surrender:

PW inquired anxiously if the Imperial Palace had been hit. If the Emperor were killed, the whole Japanese nation would fight to the very end. However if the Jap government made peace, and outlying Jap armies received orders from the Emperor (or from Military Headquarters in Japan) to cease fighting, there is no doubt they would do so. The Allies need have no fear about independent armies continuing the fight after the surrender of the home government.

#### Korea:

PW wanted to know whether there had been news in our newspapers about any rising against the Japs by the Korean Independence Movement. He said there probably would be before the end of the war. No trouble was likely in Formosa, but the Japanese did not trust the Koreans.

#### General:

When fighting the Russians, supplies had come flowing up. Fighting the Chinese was a pleasure, like maneuvers, so much so that Jap commanders had grown careless in their tactics. New Guinea had been nothing but agony. Interrogation of PW Takenaga, Masaharu alias Takeshita, Gore, Lt-Col, originally of 3 Bn, 41 Mtn Arty Regt - recently, CO of 1 Indep Mixed Bn. Captured at Womgrer, New Guinea, 3 May 45, surrendered with remainder of 1 Ind Mixed Bn, 42 all ranks. From First Aust Army ATIS Advanced Echelon Preliminary Interrogation Report.

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To Accompany Encl No. 1  
Daily Summary No. 1196

EXPLANATORY NOTES


On 12/13 Jul:

1. On the W side of Balikpapan Bay, 8 enemy were killed by patrols approximately 4 miles W of Penadjam. Other patrols report coastal area from Penadjam S and W to the Toenan River (approximately 18 miles) clear of enemy.
2. Abandoned enemy seaplane base discovered on the E shore of Balikpapan Bay, 14 miles NNW of Balikpapan, by an overwater patrol; aircraft and photographic equipment had been destroyed.
3. Enemy positions 1,500 yards NW of Mt Batochampar were shelled by our artillery. Patrols searching SE from Soember-Kiri reached the Balikpapan-Samarinda road 1,000 yards behind the enemy without contact.
4. 32 manually operated enemy torpedoes found in the Manggar area.
5. Without opposition, elements of the 2/27th Bn reached positions 2,000 yards NNW of Bangsal (8 miles NE of Manggar) on the Manggar-Sambodja road.

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To Accompany Encl No. 2  
Daily Summary No. 1196


EXPLANATORY NOTES

On 12/13 Jul:

1. Two estimated enemy platoons contacted by 37th Div patrols along Dummun R,  $7\frac{1}{2}$  miles E of Gattaran.
2. Scattered contacts E of Highway 5, generally in the areas between Tuguegarao and San Mariano, and along Ilagan-Palanan Bay trail.
3. Over 25 Japs were killed or captured as our patrols continued mopping up in Jones area.
4. Against scattered resistance 6th Div troops captured Kiangnan, while other elements of the Div continued their drive northward astride Highway 4 (2,700 yds E of the town).
5. Unestimated number of enemy are defending position E side of Highway 11,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles NE of Camp 30. Two small night attacks in this sector were repulsed.
6. Japs continue withdrawal from Mankayan area covered by rear guard elements employing MGs, grenades and mortars.
7. Against moderate opposition, Philippine Army troops continue advancing southward astride Highway 11; position 12 miles N of KP 90 reached.

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No.

1195

DATE

12/13 Jul 1945

I GROUND:

SOLOMONS:

1. Bougainville; 11 Jul: Hvy opposn continued 1500 yds NNW Wearnes Hill; minor en contact & arty fire rcvd vic Shishigatero; transport activity rptd N of village.

NEW GUINEA:

2. Wewak; 11 Jul: En night bayonet charge 2000 yds E Mt Shiburangu repulsed, 14 Japs killed; patrol contacts 1000 yds NE & 200 yds SE Ulupu; against hvy opposn, posns 1800 yds NNE & 2200 yds NE Yamil occupied; strong en posns rptd 9½ & 14 mi SE Maprik.

BORNEO:

3. Balikpapan; 12 Jul: En posn 2 mi N Manggar contacted; 40 en killed as posns 2000 yds NE Mt Batochampar occupied.
4. Brunei Bay; 12 Jul: Stubborn en resistance continued 4 mi ESE Beaufort along the Beaufort-Tenom Railroad.

PHILIPPINES:

5. Mindanao: Sarangani Bay; 12 Jul: Only est Jap squad opposed landing vicin Buayan; en ground fire rcvd by a/c in Tupi area (25 mi NW of Buayan); nil opposn as PA units advancing S reached point 3000 yds S Kabayawa (33 mi N Buayan). NW of Davao; 12 Jul: Minor contacts continue Kibangay area. Agusan Valley; 12 Jul: Scattered patrol clashes in Waloe, Sagunto, and Binucayan areas.
6. Luzon: Central section; 12 Jul: Scattered patrol contacts in Sibul Springs-Infanta area, 278 Japs killed & found dead. Central sector; 12 Jul: Engagement with 200 en vicin Hucab continued; 1t en resistance overcome as posns 1700 yds SSE & 2700 yds E Kiangnan captured; nil resistance to occupation of barrio 4 mi S Sabangan; Mankayan captured by PA troops; Jap concentration 1 mi SE Mankayan engaged by arty fire with unrptd results.

II AIR:

CELEBES:

1. Kendari; 12 Jul: 2 poss u/s S/E Fs obsvd S of #2 r'way by 6 B-24s; 1120-1130I.

BORNEO:

2. Kuching; 11 Jul: 1 S/E F prob u/s fired by 3 P-38s; 1210-1320I.

FORMOSA:

3. Toshien; 12 Jul: En AA shot down 1, dam 2 of 7 B-24s bombing oil storage tank; 1200I.
4. Suo Bay; 11 Jul: En AA shot down 1, dam 3, of 4 B-25s over Kokuko Pt.

INDO CHINA:

5. Vinh; 11 Jul: 4 S/E F intcptd 1 F6F; 1 en a/c shot down, 1 dam by covering P-51s.
6. Phulang Thuong; 10 Jul: 4 en a/c intcptd 2 P-38s; 1 en a/c dam, 1 P-38 dam.

NANSEI SHOTOS:

7. Okinawa; 12 Jul: 1 T/E B shot down by night F6F 100 mi WNW Bolo Pt; 0420I.

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## JAPAN:

8. Kobe-Osaka: 10 Jul: 1 en a/c shot down, 13 en a/c dest on grd & 4 dam by 99 P-51s; 3 P-51s lost, 14 dam.
9. Tokyo: 6 Jul: 1 en T/E a/c shot down Yokosuka Area.
10. Kyushu: Prelim rpt: 12 Jul: a) Intcptn of 32 P-51s by unstated nbr en a/c. b) 1 T/E B shot down W of Miyazaki by N-F; 0420I.

## III NAVY:

## CELEBES:

1. Binongko: 11 Jul: 4 schooners, 57 prahus.
2. Gulf of Bone: 11 Jul: 1 schooner destroyed, 11 damaged at Watampone.

## BORNEO:

3. Kuching: a) 11 Jul: 9 unfinished hulls damaged, 1 freighter (150/300T) destroyed, 1 freighter (150/300T) probably destroyed. b) 12 Jul: 1 freighter (300/1000T) sunk, 2 freighters (150/300T) damaged.

## LESSER SUNDAS:

4. Alor Is: 11 Jul: 2 luggers bombed & strafed with nil damage observed.

## SOUTH CHINA SEA:

5. Natoena Is: 11 Jul: 1 steel barge, 1 schooner damaged; smoke observed from derelict freighter-tpt.

## FRENCH INDO CHINA:

6. Quinhon: 11 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) heavily damaged.

## HAINAN:

7. Hoihow Bay: a) 11 Jul: 1 lrg, 4 sm luggers, 1 junk. b) 12 Jul: 1 lrg tug, 2 luggers anchored.
8. Yulin: 11 Jul: Sev sm craft anchored.

## FORMOSA:

9. Takao: 12 Jul: 1 3-masted junk damaged, 45 mi W.
10. Tainan: 12 Jul: 1 junk sunk, 35 mi WxN.

## CHINA COAST

11. Amoy: 11 Jul: Ground sources reported 1 destroyer in area, but air searches could not locate.
12. Swatow: 11 Jul: 15 junks strafed, 30 mi S.
13. Sanchau: a) 11 Jul: 2 steam launches, 1 cargo barge destroyed, 1 barge left sinking, 20 mi NNW. b) 12 Jul: 1 lugger anchored.
14. Shanghai: a) 11 Jul: 1 destroyer, 10 sm freighters in Yangtze River, 35 mi N. b) 12 Jul: 3 transports (7/8000T), 2 freighter-tpts and 1 poss freighter-tpt unsuccessfully bombed. c) 11 Jul: 5 sunken ships in Yangtze River.
15. St. John Is: 12 Jul: 2 powered lighters sunk.
16. General: 12 Jul: HongKong, Ft. Bayard and Amoy empty.

## NANSEI SHOTO:

17. Amami-O-Shima: 12 Jul: 1 sm tanker.

## KOREA:

18. S. Coast: 11 Jul: 1 destroyer escort, crs NExE, spd 10.

## JAPAN:

19. Kobe-Osaka Area: 10 Jul: 1 freighter (300/850T) and 2 sm craft destroyed.
20. General: a) 10 Jul: 3 freighters (150/300T) damaged in Empire waters. b) 11 Jul: 2 freighters (880T), 4 freighters (150/300T) and 1 picket boat damaged. c) 10 Jul: Allied subs sank 1 lrg subchaser, 1 tanker, 2 sm craft; damaged 2 subchasers, 1 sm craft.
21. E. Kyushu: a) 12 Jul: 1 freighter (300/1000T) strafed at Tomitake; 13 sm boats strafed at Makurazakie. b) 12 Jul: 7 sm tpts at Saeki.
22. SE Kyushu: 12 Jul: 1 400' carrier, crs SEXS.
23. NE Honshu: 12 Jul: Allied sub sighted enemy sub.
24. Tsu Is Area: 11 Jul: 1 freighter (6600T), crs W; 1 freighter (880T) destroyed; 1 freighter (150/300T) left burning; 1 freighter (150/300T) damaged; 1 destroyer escort moored in cove.

## IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

## 1. Summary of the Enemy Situation:

a. Activities in Forward Areas:Northern Philippines (Luzon):

East of Manila: Widely scattered patrol contacts continued

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throughout Sibul Springs-Infanta area.

Kiangan: Enemy offering only light resistance Highway 4 area.

Bontoc: The enemy is continuing his withdrawal south in this sector; resistance is light and appears disorganized.

Mankayan: No significant opposition this area; one troop concentration reported south of Mankayan.

Southern-Central Philippines (Mindanao):

Sarangani Bay: Only slight opposition to our landing Sarangani Bay near Buayan; evidence of a recent enemy withdrawal from beach defenses. Guerrillas report enemy troop concentrations of 300 at Polomok and 600 in vicinity Maligu (12 miles northwest and 8 miles north of Bauyan).

Northwest of Davao: Scattered enemy groups were contacted in the Kibangay area.

Agusan Valley: Scattered patrol clashes continue in the Waloe, Sagunto and Binucayan areas.

Borneo:

Balikpapan: No significant resistance; scattered enemy groups continue to be contacted Mt Batochampar-Manggar area.

Brunei Bay: Enemy is offering stubborn resistance southeast of Beaufort along Beaufort-Tenom railroad. 1 a/c fired by P-38s at Kuching.

b. Activities in Rear Areas:

Celebes: 2 poss u/s a/c S of Kendari #2 r'way.

Formosa: En AA shot down 1 B-24, 1 B-25, dam 2 B-24s, 3 B-25s over Toshien & Suo Bay.

Indo China: 4 en a/c intcptd F6F over Vinh; 4 en a/c intcptd 2 P-38s Phulang Thuong.

Okinawa: 1 en a/c shot down by night F6F off Bolo Pt.

Honshu: 1 en a/c shot down, 13 en a/c dest on grd & 4 dam by 99 P-51s.

c. Identifications: None.

d. Weather: Hampered strikes Wasile Bay & Miti areas.

**2. Conclusions:**

a. Enemy Capabilities:

Operations on Borneo

1) Troop Alignment

a) Current Operations

b) Troop Dispositions

Operations in the Philippines

2) Continued withdrawal in the Cordillera Mts, N. Luzon.

Operations on Borneo:

1) Troop Alignment:

a) Current Operations: In the Mt Batochampar area, northeast of Balikpapan, enemy opposition continued to be sporadic and light; stubborn resistance was limited to areas 2,000 yards north northwest and 1,200 yards northeast of the mountain which were reached yesterday by elements of the 25th Brigade. Other troops patrolling 4 miles north northwest of Mt Batochampar encountered an enemy group of undetermined strength and inflicted some casualties before he withdrew towards the east.

In Northwest Borneo, no opposition has developed along the Beaufort-Jesselton road although elements of the 24th Brigade have reached a point 22 miles northeast of Beaufort. However, a second column swinging southeast astride the Beaufort-Tenom railroad, following the Padas River, is encountering stubborn resistance from enemy occupying defensive positions. There have been no combat identifications as yet, but elements of the 56th IMB probably have been committed to defend this approach. Previous estimates have mentioned a defense of the Padas River and Tenom itself since this small town, situated at the southern opening of the Keningau Valley, to a large extent controls this natural inland L of C to Ranau and Jesselton to the north. A strong defense thereof may develop.

The Brunei-Miri area remains fairly quiet; no significant contacts are being made although patrolling has been extensive and reconnaissance has reached from 20 to 25 miles inland in three areas. Enemy movement inland from the Brunei sector to the southwest has probably ceased.

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b) Troop Dispositions: With minor exceptions, enemy unit dispositions on Borneo have by now become fairly well defined. Present estimated status of principal organizations are as follows:

Unit	Location	Remarks
25th IMR	Jesselton-Ranau	Hq and 2nd Bn - Jesselton; 1st Bn - was at Beaufort, present location not known; 3rd Bn - Ranau.
432nd II Bn	Jesselton	Organized Jesselton Nov 44; believed still in area.
552nd II Bn	Jesselton	Located Jesselton Apr 45. Probably formed from elements 40th Ind Grd Bn.
20th Ind MG Bn	Jesselton	Documents indicate unit included in defense of Beaufort-Ambong Bay Sector.
56th IMB	Tenom-Keningau	Bulk of brigade completed move from E coast; 370th II Bn reportedly remained at Tawao. Elements of 366th and 367th Bns in Brunei area may have moved S during evacuation following our landing.
71st IMB	Possibly Kuching	Documentary evidence indicates probable presence of main strength at Kuching.
553rd II Bn	Kuching (?)	Captured document dated 21 May relieved 553rd Bn of defense of Miri and directed movement to Kuching.
22nd Naval Base	NE of Balikpapan	1st and 2nd Bn identified in Balikpapan area; other two Bns unlocated. One may be at Samarinda-Tiram, the 4th at Bandjermasin?
454th II Bn	N-NE Manggar	Reorganized from 376th Bn at Tarakan; moved to Balikpapan Apr 45.
555th II Bn	Tarakan	Destroyed
554th II Bn	Beluran-Sandakan	Organized from 41st Ind Grd Bn early 1945; may be identified with Force.

By the location of strategic areas themselves, the enemy was forced to scatter his Borneo garrison. Areas of development were not mutually supporting, being connected by extremely poor communications. Thus he has opened himself to defeat in detail. Some desperate attempts may be made to consolidate, e.g. Kuching, but, cut off from reinforcements, supplies and escape and faced by a superior force, his only significant capability is to offer limited resistance in the form of delaying actions while the bulk of his forces eventually withdraws to relative secure inland sectors for physical survival. (See Enclosure No. 1)

#### Operations in the Philippines:

##### 2) Continued Withdrawal in the Cordillera Mountains (Northern Luzon):

Following a heavy artillery concentration on enemy defensive positions south-east of Mankayan, elements of the 66th Philippine Army Infantry terminated the fifteen-day period of stubborn resistance on Lepanto ridge by attacking southeast and occupying Mankayan. Other Philippine units in Sabangan and Bontoc moved south on Highway 11 against light opposition, reaching Luglug, 4 miles south of Sabangan. Ground observers report that the enemy is withdrawing from the north along Highway 11 toward KP 90, 3 miles southeast of Mankayan. Mopping up along roads and trails between Camp 30 on Highway 11, and Aritao on Highway 5, continues without significant contacts. In the

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Kiangan sector enemy resistance has practically ceased as elements of the 6th Division, pushing northwest astride old Highway 4, reached a position 1 mile south southeast of Kiangan; other troops of the division moving northward on new Highway 4 reached the Imbulao River, 2,700 yards east of Kiangan. An undetermined number of Japanese are being engaged at this latter point. A late report states that Kiangan has been occupied. The previously reported pocket of resistance consisting of about 200 enemy,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles south southeast of Kiangan, is still being engaged by guerrilla troops. Over 400 enemy troops were killed or captured during the 24-hour period in operational areas west of Highway 5.

Elimination of the formerly stubborn enemy pocket of resistance 1,500 yards northwest of Mankayan, culminating in the seizure of that barrio, and our advance toward Kiangan without significant opposition astride both branches of Highway 4, indicates a gradual disintegration of the enemy's combat strength west of Highway 5. Continued enemy attempts to further delay our advances are likely, but his heavy daily losses from our combined air and ground strikes forecast little significant opposition along the natural avenues of attack. The enemy will probably be forced to evacuate, his remnants to the high ground between Highway 4 and Highway 11 with the main effort directed towards prolongation of his survival, rather than attempting to carry out any further concerted counter missions the facilities for which have been practically lost. (See Enclosure No. 2)

b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Troop Alignment (Borneo): Some desperate attempts may be made to consolidate, e.g. Kuching, but, cut off from reinforcements, supplies and escape and faced by a superior force, his only significant capability is to offer limited resistance in the form of delaying actions while the bulk of his forces eventually withdraws to relative secure inland sectors for physical survival.

2) Continued Withdrawal in the Cordillera Mountains (Northern Luzon): The enemy will probably be forced to evacuate his remnants to the high ground between Highway 4 and Highway 11, with the main effort directed towards prolongation of his survival, rather than attempting to carry out any further concerted counter missions the facilities for which have been practically lost.

## V MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

### 1. Sample of Japanese Administration in Occupied Areas:

A classic illustration not only of every administrative failure in occupied areas, but also of the reason for that failure, is found in the following captured report. The riot's cause, rather than the blandly arrogant assumption below, probably was precisely the converse; enemy inability to understand or even decently treat other nationalities, due to the Japanese illusion of racial divinity uniquely mixed with a sense of inferiority, is notorious. On the other hand, Chinese through long experience understand Japanese administration only too well.

At the third meeting of the Intelligence Committee held on 15 December (TN Year not stated.), Police Chief Okura made the following report on the Jesselton Incident:

On 9 October, Chinese communists incited the residents around Jesselton Area, resulting in the deaths of Japanese, Chinese and local inhabitants. The Japanese Army immediately intervened to quell the riot; but though the rioters were ordered to desist, no heed was taken. Consequently, airplanes were used to bomb them and one whole village was demolished. Several rioters were arrested. The above incident may be attributed to the lack of understanding of our Army administration by the local inhabitants. Extracts from mimeographed, carboncopied and handwritten miscellaneous file, presumably belonging to Brunei Branch Office, East Asia Association. Dated 1 Dec 43 - 4 Nov 44. 30 pp. Captured at Brunei - 20 Jun 45. Recd 1 Aust Corps - 23 Jun 45. Recd AFA - 27 Jun 45. From Australian Forces ADVATIS BULLETIN NO. 22, Translation of Document No. 90205, Item 1, 6 Jul 45.

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**DECLASSIFIED****2. More Empire Invasion Fears:**

The Chief significance of postcard extracts reproduced below is an apparent extension of civilian defense measures to virtually all home - island areas.

"There is no telling when Shikoku may become a combat zone and the civilians are becoming resolute for all out defense." Extracts from a postcard, post-marked 7 Aug 44, addressed to Yoshigi of Morita Unit, Philippines Expeditionary I 12519 Force from member of his Family in Ehime Ken. Captured Santa Inez, Rizal, Luzon - 13 Jun 45. Recd 164 Lang Det, XI Corps - 18 Jun 45. Recd ATIS SWPA - 20 Jun 45. From ATIS BULLETIN NO. 2112, translation of Document No. 606305, Item 9, 7 Jul 45.

**3. Confirmed Withdrawal of Labuan Garrison, Borneo:**

The following communication captured at Labuan Island, northwest Borneo confirms previous estimates regarding enemy withdrawals from this area:

"Should the battle become unfavorable, communications disrupted, rations exhausted and weapons useless, you must, in accordance with circumstances, escape either to the West Coastal Province (TN Jesselton Area.) or to Brunei.

The above must be kept strictly to yourself."

Full translation of handwritten communication from COC Tsuranuki Group (Heidam). Maj Gen Akashi to CO Okuyama Bn (371 Indep Inf Bn). Dated 7 Jun, presumably 45, at Brunei HQ. (Fully translated in 1 ACAET 0020, Item 4). Captured at Labuan - 21 Jun 45. Recd 1 Aust Corps ATIS Adv Ech - 24 Jun 45. Recd AFA - 25 Jun 45. From Australian Forces ADVATIS BULLETIN NO. 19, translation of Document No. 90164, Item 2, 3 Jul 1945.

Special care must be taken to insure the secrecy of this document. Information contained herein will not be circulated or reproduced beyond the Staff Section to which it is addressed. When not actually in use, this document is to be kept in a safe and is chargeable to the custody of an Officer. See AR 380-5, 15 March 1944, and Standing Operating Procedure Instructions No 14, 14 March 1944, regarding security Classifications.

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EXPLANATORY NOTES:


To Accompany Encl No. 1  
Daily Summary No. 1195

1. Without resistance, Australian troops, moving NE from Kimanis along the Beaufort-Jesselton road, continued their advance towards the Papar River, 22 miles NE of Beaufort. Other troops moving SE along the Beaufort-Tenom railroad met stubborn opposition 4 miles ESE of Beaufort. Captured documents dated 1 April 1945 show that the 25th IMR, 20th Ind MG Bn were responsible for the defense of NW Borneo from Beaufort to Ambong Bay (28 miles NE of Jesselton); at the same time the 432nd II Bn was indicated to be in Jesselton.
2. Cumulative evidence from native reports and aerial observation indicate that the evacuation of personnel from Brunei-Miri sector south to Kuching is still in progress and that the Japs are making use of pre-established bases and food dumps along the route.
3. Documentary evidence confirms the probable presence of the main strength of the 71st IMB at Kuching in May 1945.
4. Enemy positions NW and NE of Mt. Batochampar were attacked and occupied by our forward elements, while patrols made scattered contacts approximately 2 miles N of Manggar. Two Bns of the 22nd Naval Base Force have been identified as comprising the bulk of the garrison troops in the Balikpapan area. The entire 454th II Bn has been identified in the Manggar area; reports indicate that this Bn has been charged with the responsibility for the defense of Manggar-Sambodja.
5. Land and waterborne patrols and PT boats continue the elimination of remaining Japanese stragglers on Tarakan Island.
6. The 554th II Bn was organized from the 41st Ind Ground Bn in early 1945 and may be identical with the Otsuka Force now in the Beluran-Sandakan area.

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
Enclosure No. 1

**BORNEO**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff

COMBINED GROUND SITUATION  
To: 24001/12 Jul 45  
Mags To: 12004/13 Jul  
For Summary No. 1195



J A V A S E A

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To Accompany Encl No. 2  
Daily Summary No. 1195


EXPLANATORY NOTES:

On 11/12 Jul:

1. PA troops after occupying Sabangan and Bontoc, turned S of Highway 11 and seized Pingad and established outposts in the vicin of Luglug (4 miles S of Sabangan). No opposition encountered as the enemy continued its withdrawal to the S.
2. Following heavy artillery concentration on enemy defensive installations SE of Mankayan, PA troops captured and secured this barrio.
3. 200 Japanese holding out 5,500 yds SSE of Kiangon are still being engaged by guerrilla troops attached to 6th Div.
4. Against light resistance, forward elements of 6th Div pushed to within 1 mile of Kiangon on old Highway 4.
5. Other elements of 6th Div advancing N astride new Highway 4 reached a point 2,700 yds E of Kiangon, where an undetermined number of Japs are being engaged in the thickly wooded ravine between the Highway and the Imbulao River.

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**N. LUZON APPROACHES**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA  
Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff  
**COMBINED GROUND SITUATION**  
To: 24001/11 Jul 45  
Msgs To: 12001/12 Jul  
For Summary No. 1195

Enclosure No. 2





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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

I-III: DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE  
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION  
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No.  
1194

DATE  
11/12 Jul 1945

I GROUND:

SOLOMONS:

1. Bougainville: 10 Jul: Patrol ambushed 12 Japs 1 mi W Ruri; hvy opposn met 1 mi NW Wearnes Hill; 20 Japs killed in ambush 1 mi SE Katsuwa; 2 en strongpoints supported by arty located 2 mi SE Shishigatero.

NEW GUINEA:

2. Wewak: 10 Jul: En posns SE Sauri engaged; posns in Ulupu overrun and village captd; 2 en posns rptd at Kulauru Mission; Jap movements observed 2 mi NE Yamil.

BORNEO:

3. Balikpapan: 11 Jul: Strong en resistance met  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mi NE Mt Batochampar; nil opposn as posns along Samarinda Rd 6 mi NE Manggar reached; 2 en posns generally 2 mi N Manggar cleared.

PHILIPPINES:

4. Mindanao: NW Davao: 11 Jul: Minor contacts vicin Lascom Plantation and in Tamogan-Kibangay area. Sarangani Bay: 11 Jul: Nil en opposn as beach 2000 yds E Dadjangas secured by rcn party; Philippine Army troops reached posns 13000 yds SW Malalag without opposn.
5. Luzon: Northern Sector: 11 Jul: Minor contacts in E Cagayan Valley; scattered en resistance overcome and posns reached 1300 yds ESE Kiangnan; an undetermined en engaged 200 yds S Imbulao R crossing of new Highway 4; against scattered resistance, several barrios 4000 yds SW Bontoc captd; opposn continued NW Mankayan.

II AIR:

CELEBES:

1. Mandai Area: Night 10/11 Jul: 1 u/i a/c obsvd over Limboeng a/d.
2. Sidate A/D: 10 Jul: R'way poss serv.

FORMOSA:

3. N Formosa: 11 July: a) Only visible a/c on Shinchiku a/d dest by 22 B-24s. b) 1 T/B shot down by 2 P-51s 40 mi off Shinchiku.

MALAYA:

4. Singapore: 10 Jul: Nil a/c obsvd on Singapore a/ds; 1345-14151.

FRENCH INDO CHINA:

5. Vinh: 8 July: 1 T/E B dest on Vinh a/d by 14th AF a/c.

CHINA:

6. Canton: Night 10/11 Jul: Lone en a/c dam in intcptn of B-24 over Canton.

EMPIRE:

7. Kyushu: a) 11 Jul: 2 a/c on Miyazaki a/d dam by F4Us. b) 9 Jul: All of 10 yellow biplanes over S Kyushu shot down by 8 P-47s.
8. Honshu: 9 July: 12 en a/c shot down, 4 prob & 10 dam in aerial cbt; 4 dest & 1 dam on grd by 105 P-51s attacking Nagoya & Osaka a/ds; 1P-51 lost.

III NAVY:

CELEBES:

1. Gulf of Bone: 10 Jul: 1 schooner damaged on NE shore.
2. Wowoni Id: 10 Jul: 1 of 2 schooners damaged.

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3. Sindjai: 10 Jul: 6 schooners damaged by strafing.

**BORNEO:**

4. Bandjermasin: 10 Jul: Only luggers sighted.

5. Laoet Id: 10 Jul: 3 barges sunk, 1 damaged.

**MALAY PENINSULA:**

6. Trengganu: 10 Jul: 2 of 8 freighters (150/300T) were strafed without visible dam.

7. Singapore: 10 Jul: 2 hvy cruisers in usual posns; 2 destroyers (2-stacks) off mouth of Seletar R; 1 lrg prob tanker, 13 freighters (150/300T) & 6 u/i vsls.

**FRENCH I. DO CHINA**

8. Vinh Area: 8 Jul: 1 steamer (60'), 16 junks & sampans destroyed; 1 lrg steamer, 2 power boats (75'), 2 schooners (75'), 10 junks & sampans damaged.

9. Quinhon: 11 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T).

10. Saigon: 11 Jul: 3 direct hits on freighter-tpt (5500/7500T), 5 mi SE; 1 freighter (150/300T) strafed, 40 mi upstream Makong R.

11. Cape Padaran: 11 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) & 2 barges destroyed; 6 barges damaged.

**PHILIPPINES ISLANDS:**

12. Luzon: a) 11 Jul: Allied destroyer-escort attacked sub contact, 280 mi NEXN of San Bernardino Strait. b) 11 Jul: Sub contact 300 mi E of Tolosa.

**FORMOSA:**

13. Suo Bay: 10 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) (loaded with fuel) destroyed; 3 freighters (150/300T) & 5 barges under construction destroyed or badly damaged.

14. Keelung: 11 Jul: 1 freighter-tpt (300/1200T).

15. Toseki: 11 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T).

**CHINA COAST:**

16. Amoy: 11 Jul: 1 freighter-tpt (300/1200T), 2 freighters (150/300T), 6 sm craft.

17. Sanchau: 11 Jul: 1 of 3 motor boats left sinking, 25 mi NNW.

18. HongKong: Night 10/11 Jul: 1 of 10 junks damaged.

19. Hoe How: Night 10/11 Jul: 6 lrg junks strafed.

20. Luichow Penin: 11 Jul: 1 freighter-tpt (300/1200T).

**KOREA:**

21. S Coast: 11 Jul: 1 destroyer escort on cse ExN, spd 15.

**JAPAN:**

22. Kure Area: 7 Jul: Photos show: 2 subs, 2 LSM, 9 merch vsls (37,500T total) at Ujima, & 1 carrier hull at Kurahashi Shima.

23. NE Shikoku: 7 Jul: Photos show: 1 escort carrier (Kobe type) damaged at Shido Wan, & 1 carrier hull (Ikoma) at Ikeda Wan.

24. General: 9 Jul: 4 freighters (1500/2500T), 9 luggers sunk; 1 picket boat, 1 freighter -tpt (5500/7500T), 1 freighter-tpt, 2 freighters (150/300T), 2 sm craft damaged in Empire waters.

25. S Kyushu : 11 Jul: 3 lrg prob warships.

**IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:****1. Summary of the Enemy Situation:****a. Activities in Forward Areas:****Northern Philippines (Luzon):**

Cagayan Valley: Scattered minor patrol contacts Eastern Cagayan Valley.

Highway 4: Scattered enemy resistance overcome as elements reached positions less than a mile east southeast of Kiangnan. An undetermined number of enemy engaged in vicinity new Highway 4 Imbulao River Crossing.

Cervantes: Against minor enemy resistance, several barrios southwest of Bontoc seized. Continued strong enemy opposition Mankayan sector.

**Southern-Central Philippines (Mindanao):**

Northwest of Davao: Minor enemy contacts vicinity of Lascom Plantation and in Kibangay-Tamogan area.

Sarangani Bay: No enemy opposition encountered as a landing beach east of Dadjangas secured by reconnaissance party. To the north, Philippine Army troops, continuing their overland march southwestward toward Sarangani Bay, reached positions more than 7 miles southwest of Malalag without contact.

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**DECLASSIFIED****Borneo:**

Balikpapan: Stubborn opposition encountered as Allied troops made continued advances northward in Mt Batochambar-Manggar Area. Nil enemy resistance met as positions 6 miles northeast of Manggar along Samarinda coastal road were reached.

**b. Activities in Rear Areas:**

Celebes: 1 u/i a/c obsvd airborne.

Formosa: 2 en a/c dest.

Singapore: Nil a/c obsvd on grd.

Canton: Lone en intcptr dam by B-24.

Kyushu: 10 biplanes shot down.

Honshu: 31 en a/c dest, prob dest or dam by P-51s.

**c. Identifications: None.****d. Weather: Hampered Kyushu strikes.****2. Conclusions:****a. Enemy Capabilities:****Operations on Borneo:**

1) Withdrawal from the Balikpapan area.

**Operations in the Philippines:**

2) Troop alignment on Highway 11, Northern Luzon.

**Operations on Borneo:**

1) Withdrawal from the Balikpapan Area: Yesterday, increasing enemy resistance was encountered in the areas northeast of Balikpapan and north of Manggar, as Allied troops continued the attack inland and along the coastal road. An estimated enemy company was engaged by artillery supported elements of the 25th Brigade astride the Balikpapan-Samarinda road  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles northeast of Mt. Batochambar. Other troops, using flame-throwing tanks against strong opposition, continued the attack commenced the previous day, on enemy positions 3 miles north northwest of Sepinggang-Besar. Three Jap positions were encountered 2 miles inland and generally north of Manggar; two were cleared, resulting in the capture of two 20mm guns and several other items of light ordnance. Elements of the 2/27th Battalion, without opposition, moved along the coastal road reaching a point 6 miles northeast of Manggar.

The development of stronger resistance along the inland road from Balikpapan northward, previously estimated as the escape route from the present operational area, suggests that the enemy may be employing a delaying group at this point to cover the withdrawal of his main force. Earlier reports indicated this route was in use and that approximately 1,000 troops were observed at points 50 to 75 miles north of Balikpapan. That the withdrawal is taking place inland instead of over the coastal road may be inferred by the absence of resistance and observed troop movements on this road during our advance which has now reached a point approximately 20 miles from Balikpapan.

**Operations in the Philippines:**

2) Troop Alignment on Highway 11, Northern Luzon: Aside from insignificant small-scale patrol clashes, the situation in areas east of the Cagayan River remained quiet. Substantial advances made by Philippine Army units south west of Bontoc and seizure of several barrios along Highway 11, between Bontoc and Sabangan (7 miles to the south) plus an indicated enemy retirement toward Mankayan, suggests an alignment with troops all ready committed in the defenses northwest of Mankayan. Such a move would be readily understandable particularly in view of the importance to the enemy of the Mankayan and Loo Sector, the loss of which would signal the imminent collapse of his defenses west of Highway 5. Only small arms fire was encountered as elements of the 63rd Infantry continued their attack along old Highway 4 to a point  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles east of Kiangang; whereas other troops of the regiment advancing astride the new Highway 4, reached a position 3,200 yards northwest of Hucab against moderate opposition. Several infiltration attacks against our supply installations in the vicinity of Bolog were repulsed.

Along Highway 4, a 200 yard stretch of the road 3 miles northwest of Bolog was found to contain five tank traps all mined. These traps were approximately 6 feet deep and 10 feet wide, some blasted out of solid rock. The mines were improvised consisting of sacks containing 15 to 20 blocks of explosives, with hand grenade detonators attached. Elaborate defensive works

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coupled with numerous caves and tunnels along the highway, indicates not only the extent of the enemy's preparations to impede our penetration towards the Kiangnan sector, but since they were overrun with comparative ease, illustrate once again the absence of sufficient troop commensurate with established defenses.

While indications of a weakening of defenses along Highway 4 are discernible, an alignment of troops along Highway 11 may be in progress, involving troops from the Bontoc vicinity and directed at strengthening those positions in the Mankayan area, confronting our troops attacking from the northwest. Such a move would to some extent, provide stronger security for the important lateral between Kiangnan and the Mankayan sector. (See Enclosure No. 1)

b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Withdrawal from the Balikpapan Area: That the withdrawal is taking place inland instead of over the coastal road may be inferred by the absence of resistance and observed troop movements on this road during our advance which has now reached a point approximately 20 miles from Balikpapan.

2) Troop Alignment on Highway 11, Northern Luzon: While indications of a weakening of defenses along Highway 4 are discernible, an alignment of troops along Highway 11 may be in progress, involving troops from the Bontoc vicinity and directed at strengthening those positions in the Mankayan area, confronting our troops attacking from the northwest. Such a move would to some extent, provide stronger security for the important lateral between Kiangnan and the Mankayan sector.

#### V MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

1. Formation of Javanese Suicide Units:

Credible evidence exists that the enemy is forming suicidal Special Assault Units (Kamikaze) of natives in Java. Despite high flown Japanese claims of these natives "confidence in Japan", it appears that the familiar enemy Hoko System of family hostages was used to coerce these "volunteers".

Extracts on the Formation of a Suicide Unit Among Native Javanese.

The unswervingly loyal activities of our Special Attack Unit have had much effect among the natives of Java. A feeling of confidence in Japan, and zeal to defend their homeland has emerged among the natives, to the extent that they have conceived the idea of organizing a suicide unit.

Make use of the details given in Nada Propaganda report number 3 concerning anti-British outbreaks among the natives of Horeo vicinity (northeast of Chittagong), and base your propaganda on the emergence of the idea of the solidarity of the Asiatic peoples 1 - under the domination of the British Army, and 2 - under Japanese Military Administration. --- and, moreover, the indomitable loyalty of the Japanese has kindled the fervent spirit of 50,000,000 people. For example: more than one thousand youthful aspirants are responding to the Kamikaze Special Assault Unit and have already vowed to die together. The motivating source of this activity further incensed over one thousand men, and is continuing to attract adherents to this cause in such provinces as Madoera, Semarang, Surabaya, Banjoemas, Buhaki\*, Pekalongan, Malang and Djokjakarta. Organizing a Suicide Unit.

Realizing that the supreme moment has come to translate into action their long standing antipathy to the white race and their sincere desire to assist the Japanese, the leaders of Ngawi Prefecture have compiled and circulated among the people an oath consisting of five articles, and encouraged them to subscribe to it.

Selective Examination for Volunteers.

The selective examination for 625 volunteers of Ngawi Prefecture was held on 21 and 22, December, under stringent interrogation by Moenandar. The questions were as follows:

1. Why did you volunteer for the suicide unit?
  2. Explain the reason why you wish to annihilate the British, the Americans, and the Dutch.
  3. What family difficulties do you have?
- (Comment: This is basic to the Hoko System.)

Extracts from bound mimeographed file concerning the formation of a suicide

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Unit among native Javanese. Dated 26 Feb 45, and issued by Nada Group HQ (Shudan) C of S (37th Army HQ, Sabon, Borneo). Classified "Most Secret". Bears seals of Kohashi, and Noguchi. 6 pp. Captured at Brunei - 15 Jun 45. Recd 1 Aust Corps ATIS Adv Ech - 22 Jun 45. Recd AFA - 23 Jun 45. From Australian Forces ADVATIS BULLETIN NO. 16, Translation of Document No. 90134, Item 1, 29 Jun 45.

2. Contemplated Use of Gas Warfare:

Reportedly reliable PW testimony, of which a portion appears below, adds nothing specifically new to facts already known concerning enemy experimentation with and possible limited use of chemical warfare. Its omnipresent threat is recognized.

"PW Muto, Yoshimichi, 65th Regiment, 13th Division, was told by instructors at N.C.O. School at Nanking, that Gas Warfare will be used when annihilation appears inevitable. - "Sintic" Item 306 (HQ, USAF China) 15 May 1945

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To Accompany Encl No. 1  
Daily Summary No. 1194

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

On 10/11 Jul:

1. Against moderate to heavy resistance elements of 63rd Inf advanced to positions 1,300 yards ESE of Kiangon on old Highway 4 and 4,000 yards E of Kiangon on New Highway 4.
2. An enemy infiltration attempt during night 9/10 July against our positions was repulsed 1,800 yards NW of Bolog.
3. Elements of 32nd Division made scattered contacts in Dupax-Pingkian areas and dispatched patrols 7 miles NE of Pingkian without opposition.
4. Stubborn resistance NW of Mankayan continued for the fourteenth consecutive day.
5. Without opposition elements of Philippine Army units seized barrios of Gonogan, Malitep and Dantay, all along Highway 11, between Bontoc and Sabangan.

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SAN FERNANDO-ILIGAN

ENCLOSURE NO. 2


Military Intelligence Section  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

COMBINED GROUND SITUATION

To: 2400/I, 11 July 45  
Msgs To: 1200/I, 12 July  
For Summary No. 1194

Scale 1:500,000

0 2 4 6 8 10 Miles



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

I-III: DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE  
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION  
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No.  
1193

DATE  
10/11 Jul 1945

I GROUND:

SOLOMONS:

1. Bougainville: 9 Jul: En counterattack repulsed vicin Shishigatero with 34 Japs killed; other clashes 3½ mi N, 1500 yds SSW and along Killens Track S of Shishigatero.

NEW GUINEA:

2. Wewak: 9 Jul: En occupying posns 500 yds W and 400 yds NE Soanin; 2 en posns 2000 yds S Koigin cleared; 28 Japs killed as area N Ulupu overrun; en posn located 2500 yds NE Yamil; posn 1800 yds SSE that town captured.

BORNEO:

3. Balikpapan: 10 Jul: En equipment captd in extensive patrolling Telok-epang Peninsula and Djinabora vicin; no sign recent occupancy these areas; en withdrawing fr Mt Batochanpar and Manggar sectors.

PHILIPPINES:

4. Mindanao: NW of Davao: 10 Jul: Minor en contacts in Kibangay-Tamogan area. Agusan Valley: 10 Jul: Sm en grp encountered 1000 yds W junction of Agusan and Kayanan Rivers.
5. Luzon: Northern Sector: 10 Jul: Scattered en contacts rptd 13 mi NE Tuguegarao and along the Paret and Dummun Rivers; sm gains made against stubborn en defenses SE Kiangnan; Bontoc occupied after en garrison withdrew S; en cont'd strengthening defenses Mankayan area.

II AIR

S CHINA COAST

1. Hainan Id: 10 Jul: Single en Tpt a/c sighted at Kiungshan a/d by search a/c; 1200I.

FORMOSA AREA

2. Toko Hbr: Night 9/10 Jul: 2 en N-Fs enctrd by Navy search a/c; nil engagement.
3. Tainan A/d: 9 Jul: 3 serv a/c dest on grd by 9 B-24s.
4. Pescadores: Night 9/10 Jul: 3 en N-Fs followed search a/c, made 1 pass without firing.

KOREA AREA

5. SW Korea: 9 Jul: 2 en F/Ps sighted by search a/c off SW tip; nil engagement.
6. Saishu Id: 9 Jul: Lone T/E F escaped attack by PB4Y-2 SW of Id; 0742L.

EMPIRE

7. Kyushu: 9 Jul: 1 of 2 intercptg en F/Ps dam by PB4Y-2 off NW Kyushu; 0845I.
8. Honshu: 10 Jul: Tokyo Area: Prelim rpt for first 3 strikes: a) 72 en a/c dest & 80 dam on grd; only 9 en a/c obsvd in air; b) Photos reveal 693 a/c on 17 a/ds; visual rpts add 175 more on 7 other a/ds in area; c) Surface force reconnoitered by en a/c; 2 T/E a/c shot down by CAP; noon.

III NAVY:

LESSER SUNDAS:

1. Soela Id: 8 Jul: 1 barge.

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## CELEBES:

2. Pare Pare Area: 9 Jul: 1 sea truck.
3. Pomelaa: 9 Jul: 2 freighters (150/300T), 1 schooner ' sev u/i vsls, 60 mi NW.
4. Salajar Id: 9 Jul: 1 torpedo boat (Chidori class) unsuccessfully bombed, on cse SWxW, spd 17-20, 35 mi S.
5. C Boetong: 9 Jul: 1 schooner bombed & strafed with nil obsvd results, 15 mi SW.
6. Tomea Id: 10 Jul: 1 barge.

## MALAY PENINSULA:

7. Singapore: 10 Jul: 2 hvy cruisers, 2 destroyers, 1 freighter (1500/2500T)

## FRENCH INDO CHINA:

8. Haiphong: 9 Jul: 1 riverboat destroyed.
9. Saigon Area: 9 Jul: 1 small u/i vsl anchored in Soirap on Nha R.

## HAINAN:

10. Kiungshan: 9 Jul: 1 tug, 1 lugger, 4 launches anchored at Hoi How Bay.
11. Hainan Straits: 10 Jul: 1 destroyer on cse NW, spd 20, unsuccessfully bombed.

## FORMOSA:

12. Keelung: 10 Jul: 1 sm freighter-tpt (300/1200T), 2 freighters (150/300T), 1 motor launch anchored.

## PESCADORES:

13. Hoko Id: 10 Jul: 1 junk damaged.

## CHINA COAST:

14. Amoy: 8 Jul: Photos show: 1 poss destroyer & 1 subchaser moored at piers.
15. Swatow: 10 Jul: 3 freighters (150/300T) anchored.
16. Ft. Bayard: a) 9 Jul: 1 lugger strafed & damaged, 25 mi SE. b) 9 Jul: Nbr lrg junks, 5 mi E; 30 very lrg junks, 45 mi ENE.
17. Huiling Id: 9 Jul: 20 junks on cse NE.
18. Tsing Tao: 10 Jul: 1 sm patrol craft (100') bombed & strafed.
19. Shanghai: 10 Jul: 3 lrg freighters (150/300T) left burning furiously, 55 mi ExN.

## NANSEI SHOTO:

20. Amami Gunto: 7 Jul: 1 sm sub strafed, 4 coastal freighters burned, 1 cap-sized.
21. Sakashima Area: 10 Jul: 1 sm boat (40') left burning.

## KOREA:

22. Tsu Id: 10 Jul: 4 freighters (300/850T), 5 freighters (150/300T) anchored; 1 freighter (150/300T) on cse SWxS, spd 8, sunk; left 1 of 3 freighters (150/300T) burning; 1 lugger left burning.
23. SW Coast: 10 Jul: 1 destroyer escort & 1 barge on cse NNE, spd 15; 1 lrg destroyer on cse NNE, spd 10; 1 freighter (150/300T) & 1 lugger sunk; 1 freighter-tpt (2/4500T) beached, decks awash; 3 freighter-tpts (5500/8500T) or u/i freighters & 1 picket boat anchored.

## JAPAN:

24. Kure Area: 5/6 Jul: B-29 photos show 1 Battleship (Haruna) moored SW of hbr with steam up, 1 converted battleship-carrier (Ise class), 2 carriers (Amagi & Katsurage), 1 sm carrier (Ryuho), 1 carrier hull (Aso), 4 old hvy cruisers, 1 light cruiser (Kuma or Natori class), 1 lt cruiser (Oyodo), 1 destroyer (Terntsuki class), 3 old destroyers, 2 frigates, 1 sub, 1 aux, 2 merch vsls (11,000T total). Other units prev rptd obscured or not photographed.
25. SW Fukuyama: 5/6 Jul: B-29 photos show: 5 LSM, 25 merch vsls oper, bldg & repairing (77,000T total).
26. SE Honshu: 5/6 Jul: B-29 photos show 1 poss old destroyer, 7 subs, 1 LSM, 7 merch vsls (6000T total) at Takuyama Wan. 1 frigate, 1 minesweeper, 6 merch vsls (19,000T total) at Senzaki; 2 destroyer escorts, 3 merch vsls (14,000T total) at Susa.
27. Shimonoseki Straits: 5/6 Jul: Photos reveal: 2 destroyers, 1 destroyer escort, 3 frigates, 1 minesweeper, 1 cable ship, 78 merch vsls oper & repairing (147,600T total).

## CENTRAL PACIFIC:

28. Saipan: 8 Jul: Sub contacted, 200 mi ExS.
29. Truk: 10 Jul: 2 subs W end Dublon Id, strafed, results undetermined.

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Summary 1193 - Cont'd

IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

1. Summary of the Enemy Situation:

a. Activities in Forward Areas:

Northern Philippines (Luzon):

Cagayan Valley: Only scattered minor contacts in area northeast of Tuguegarao and in the Dummun and Paret River Valleys.

Kiangan: Stubborn enemy defense astride Highway 4 southeast of Kiangan, continues.

Cervantes: Enemy forces withdrew southward from Bontoc, as Philippine Army elements occupied town. Enemy continues to strengthen defenses in Mankayan sector.

Southern-Central Philippines (Mindanao):

Northwest of Davao: Scattered minor patrols only enemy contacts Kibangay-Tamogan area. Civilians report 1,000 Jap troops and over 5,000 Jap civilians in Mt Upian area two weeks ago; enemy critically short of food, badly wounded being killed. Many Jap civilians and enlisted men allegedly wish to surrender, but officers kill any attempting escape.

Agusan Valley: Small enemy group west of Agusan and Kayanan River Junction only contact in extensive patrolling in Agusan Valley area.

Borneo:

Balikpapan: No sign of recent enemy occupancy as Teloktepang Peninsula and Djinabora (north and northwest of Balikpapan) were patrolled extensively. Enemy withdrawing from Mt Batochamper and Manggar sectors probably over escape route which reportedly has been prepared northwestward towards Asa and Melak.

b. Activities in Rear Areas:

Hainan: Lone Tpt a/c sighted.

Formosa: Minor N-F activity; 3 en a/c dest at Tainan.

Korea Area: Minor F/P patrols; nil engagements.

Empire: 74 en a/c dest, 80 dam (Prelim Rpt of Carrier strike in Tokyo area).

c. Identifications: None.

d. Weather: Adverse conditions prevented scheduled strikes agst Kyushu & Formosa.

2. Conclusions:

a. Enemy Capabilities:

Operations in Japan:

1) Defensive Preparations on the Home Islands.

a) Development of Anti-Tank Ordnance.

Operations on Borneo:

2) Withdrawal from the Balikpapan Area.

Operations in the Philippines:

3) Inland Defense, Kiangan-Mankayan Sector, N. Luzon.

Operations in Japan:

1) Defensive Preparations on the Home Islands: A wealth of captured documents, PW interrogations, and expatriate advice now permits certain preliminary conclusions regarding the Japanese reaction to combined operations against their homeland. Analysis of Empire terrain and increasing aerial photo coverage thereof, add to the picture. Allied occupation of Germany and the well-directed intelligence search there have bared many details of Axis collaboration on home-defense plans, ordnance research, and secret manufacture of new weapons. A number of these latter details, already previewed during the European assault, afford profitable studies of potential Empire defenses particularly in view of their proved assignation to the Japanese.

Behind the fluid tactical framework of combat units now deploying for Empire defense, about which little can be ventured as yet, lie a people and contemporary society possessing perhaps more decisive potential effect upon eventual course of Empire operations than the Japanese Army itself. With them rests the question of whether their anachronistic divinely ordained world conquest, having failed amid retributory devastation of their sacred homeland, will be redeemed in national suicide or constructively repented under Allied military government. By "the people", of course, is meant the Emperor tradition to which the minds and hearts of all the people

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are by Constitutional provision completely sublimated, and the militarily-inculcated Shinto philosophy by which subjects have no mind apart from the will of the Emperor and the dictates of ancestral worship. Whether this historically unique national obedience will continue to be bent by a fanatic military intent on its own preservation, and if so to what extent it will contribute to an all-out civilian-military defense of the Empire against invasion, are fundamental questions bearing upon future operations.

In a contemplated series of discussed relative probabilities, the first of which appears as paragraph (a) below, the foregoing fundamentals of Japanese Empire background, terrain, ordnance trends, etc., aided by the fruits of Axis collaboration, will be analyzed from time to time as material becomes available. Into that strategic background, in time, will fit tactical details of organized military-civilian deployment for defense.

a) Development of Anti-Tank Ordnance: Effectiveness of Japanese anti-tank weapons has markedly increased during the past year. There most notable improvement is in the performance of the Type 1 (1941) 47mm gun. An improved armor-piercing high explosive round issued for this weapon has good armor-piercing characteristics, and in combat the gun has destroyed our Sherman medium tanks at ranges up to 500 yards. It is an accurate weapon, highly mobile, and capable of a good rate of fire. It is issued to independent anti-tank units and armored organizations. The same gun, with minor modifications but identical performance, is now encountered as the main armament of the Type 97 (1937) Medium Tank (Improved). When test-fired from its mount in a captured Japanese medium tank during the northern Luzon campaign it effected clean penetrations of the turret on a U.S. M4A3 medium tank at 350 and 500 yards; turret armor on this tank has a maximum thickness of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  inches.

Another effective weapon is the Type 90 (1930) 37mm gun (mobile version), which was not encountered until the Leyte campaign, and shortly afterward in Burma. The mobile version is equipped with a high-speed mount, and has lately made its appearance in a self-propelled mount first encountered in the Balete Pass area of Northern Luzon. An armor penetration of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  inches at 250 yards, and 2.8 inches at 1,000 yards, is claimed for the armor-piercing high explosive round of this weapon. The mobile version is issued to independent field artillery regiments.

The provision of hollow-charge armor-piercing rounds for all artillery pieces from 70mm to 150mm has also increased the capabilities of Japanese artillery against armor. This round gives the low-velocity pieces, such as the 70mm Battalion Howitzer and the 75mm Regimental Gun, a new lease on life. These two weapons are so widely distributed in the Japanese Army that their increased effectiveness against armor cannot be disregarded.

The original Japanese antitank weapon, Type 94 (1934) 37mm Gun, has not been considered a serious threat to our medium tanks. At point blank ranges, however, its armor-piercing high explosive round has a penetration of over 2 inches, and when used as an ambush weapon its fire can be effective against tank suspensions. The piece has a wide distribution, being an organic weapon of Japanese infantry regiments.

The first Japanese antitank mines did not contain enough explosive to seriously damage our medium tanks; however, such mines are now encountered in combination with bulk explosive, torpedo warheads, airplane bombs or other large charges. In the defense of Okinawa, such combinations proved highly effective against our tanks. Later models of mines have larger bursting charges, and a wide variety of what might be termed "anti-tank grenades" also have recently made their appearance. Practically all of these are hollow-charge types. Several anti-tank rifle grenades of this kind are now in use by the Japanese, all being copies of German designs. A number of suicide weapons of this nature have been captured; these contain fairly large charges which, as in the case of the well-known "lunge mine", must be slammed directly on the armor by the infantryman, resulting in his certain death. One recent type consists of 15 or 20 pounds of explosive contained in a wooden box or a pack, which is strapped to the man's back. He conceals himself near the path of an approaching tank and when it has arrived at a suitable distance, he rushes out and throws himself beneath its tracks, detonating the charge by means of a pull igniter.

All of these devices show a Japanese appreciation of the effectiveness of our armored fighting vehicles. Enemy efforts in this field as yet are mostly makeshifts, designed to fill the gap until more effective anti-tank weapons are available. The bulk of these weapons are expected to be recoilless like our Bazooka, but based on German designs.

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Operations on Borneo:

2) Withdrawal from the Balikpapan Area: The enemy broke contact at Mt Batochampar and Manggar late 9 July, probably a forecast of a general withdrawal toward the north and northwest. During the day, a position on the high ground  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles north northeast of Manggar was captured by the 2/14th Battalion following a naval and air bombardment. In the 21st Brigade area, an attack 3 miles north of Sepinggan-Ketjil caused forward elements of the 2/16th Battalion to withdraw temporarily, but the position was later retaken with assistance of artillery support. Troops of the 25th Brigade, after clearing a mined area, penetrated the previously indicated main defense sector and moved to a point  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile east of Mt Batochampar on the Samarinda road. Further to the northwest, the area in the vicinity of Soember-Kiri, 5 miles north of Balikpapan, was occupied without opposition. Across the bay to the west, active unopposed patrolling continued in the Penadjam-Djinabora areas.

Following the report that the enemy had broken contact at Mt Batochampar and Manggar, previously indicated troop assembly and defense sectors, field reports suggest that possibly an escape route has been prepared through Boeat (40 miles north northwest of Balikpapan), towards Asa and Melak (110 and 100 miles respectively northwest of Balikpapan), with ultimate destination at Kuching, on the west central coast, approximately 500 miles from Balikpapan. That this escape route is in operation at the present time is substantiated to some extent by another report that 700 Japanese are in the vicinity of Mt Lysak and 300 more with a supply dump are at Kaman (55 and 75 miles respectively north of Balikpapan), both along this route. An attempt to move a garrison across Borneo via tortuous routes appears both inconceivable and remote; chances of survival are slim. Yet the shifting of troops over long distances in Northern Borneo (the 56th IMB and the 25th IMR) is illustrative of a policy that the enemy is without reluctance to initiate. The overland migrations in New Guinea attest to this.

With slight significant changes in previously indicated trends having developed, estimates of withdrawal inland appear to be confirmed. Whether an attempt will be made to reach Kuching on the west coast cannot be conclusively determined from available information, but regardless of the action taken, the enemy has lost the capability of seriously interfering with operations in the Balikpapan sector.

Operations in the Philippines:

3) Inland Defense, Kiangnan-Mankayan Sector, Northern Luzon: An inability to withstand constant pressure was evidenced by the Philippine Army troops seizure of Bontoc, a key link in the enemy's Kiangnan-Bontoc-Mankayan triangle. Further reflecting the enemy's dissipated strength was his complete abandonment of this key point and apparent hurried withdrawal southward along Highway 11 towards Mankayan. With the Highway 4 and Highway 11 road junction at Bontoc, under our control the enemy has been further compressed and is thoroughly confined to this relatively small mountain pocket. His deployment is delimited by Highway 11, with the bulk of the strength in the Mankayan area and by Highway 4, with troops disposed generally west of this road between Kiangnan and Banaue. The only developed connection that now remains between these two forces is the hazardous trail between Loo and Kiangnan, the latter presently threatened with envelopment by elements of the 6th Division attacking north along Highway 4. That the enemy is contemplating abandonment of present positions in the Mankayan and Kiangnan sectors and withdrawal to the high ground between Highway 11 and Highway 4 is not believed likely at the present time in view of the long period of fairly stubborn resistance evidenced at these two points. Over twenty defensive positions and twice as many caves and tunnels found on the high ground west of Highway 4, in vicinity of Bolog, further strengthens the probability that the enemy rather than withdraw toward the center of this inner defense sector will attempt to defend and delay our attack from successive and well fortified positions. Yet attrition is heavy and the withdrawal from Bontoc foreshadows an eventual and similar course of enemy action in other active areas of the Cordillera Mountains.

Even though the enemy has relinquished Bontoc, apex of his triangle of defense, resistance in other sectors continues, as yet without visible signs of weakening, the basic contention remains unchanged, viz: the enemy is determined to retain the bulk of his mass in place for defense of presently occupied and well organized positions, although further consolidations will probably take place to accomplish maximum delay. (See Encl No. 1)

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Summary 1193 - Cont'd

b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Defensive Preparations on the Home Islands: Developments of Anti-Tank Ordnance show a Japanese appreciation of the effectiveness of our armored fighting vehicles. Enemy efforts in this field as yet are mostly makeshifts, designed to fill the gap until more effective anti-tank weapons are available. The bulk of these weapons are expected to be recoilless like our Bazooka, but based on German designs.

2) Withdrawal from the Balikpapan Area: With slight significant changes in previously indicated trends having developed, estimates of withdrawal inland appear to be confirmed. Whether an attempt will be made to reach Kuching on the west coast cannot be conclusively determined from available information, but regardless of the action taken, the enemy has lost the capability of seriously interfering with operations in the Balikpapan sector.

3) Inland Defense, Kiangnan-Mankayan Sector, Northern Luzon: Even though the enemy has relinquished Bontoc, apex of his triangle of defense, resistance in other sectors continues, as yet without visible signs of weakening, the basic contention remains unchanged, viz: the enemy is determined to retain the bulk of his mass in place for defense of presently occupied and well organized positions, although further consolidations will probably take place to accomplish maximum delay.

## V MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

Eminent PW Opinion of Empire Surrender Tendencies:

Preliminary interrogation of one of the most valuable Japanese PWs captured to date, in elaborating on the known rift between Imperial Army and Navy, illumines the mounting home-front official pressure being exerted to depose military leaders currently persisting in a war leading only to national destruction.

"PW was Adjutant and close friend of the present Assistant Chief of Staff of the Japanese Navy, Admiral Onishi, Takejiro, as well as a personal friend of the present Chief of Staff, Admiral Ozawa of the Japanese Navy. Prisoner's family resides at Hamamatsu. His father is the general manager of the Kawasaki Dock Yards in Kobe. His elder brother is Rear Admiral Yoshioka, Commanding Officer 23 Naval Guard Unit, Ceibes Area.

In a discussion with the Interrogating Officer, PW put forth the views held by Admiral Onishi in the conferences which took place prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. He quoted Admiral Onishi as saying in late November 1941 that it was extremely foolish to attack Hawaii and to enter into a war with the United States as in his, Onishi's, opinion the United States could never be made to surrender.

In January 1945 PW had a series of discussions with Admiral Onishi at Clark Field, P.I., prior to the latter's departure for Japan. Admiral Onishi at that time stated clearly that he was resigned to the defeat of Japan and would recommend an unconditional surrender. Admiral Onishi's views were based on the fear of a complete Japanese collapse and a subsequent tendency towards Communism. Admiral Onishi stated that Japan had only two courses open to her, either to accept an unconditional surrender to the United States and to work towards a better relationship with the United States, or to be thrown on the mercy of Russia.

PW attributed to Admiral Ozawa, present Chief of Staff, Japanese Navy, sentiments along the same line. Both Admirals, it appeared, showed great bitterness towards the army and would attribute any further hopeless resistance of Japan against the United States as due to the narrow-mindedness of the army clique. PW himself generally showed contempt for the army.

PW might presumably be important in considerations affecting the post war situation in Japan and her post war government." Interrogation of PW Yoshioka Tadakazu, Commander 26 Air Flot. ATIS Preliminary Interrogation, (subject to confirmation).

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To Accompany Encl No 1  
Daily Summary No 1193

EXPLANATORY NOTES

On 10/11 Jul:

1. 58 Japs were killed in minor scattered contacts grouped mainly in Paret River Valley (3 miles SE of Baggao).
2. Only scattered enemy encounters developed along Dummun River, 20-25 miles below the north coast-Aparri area and in the jungle-mountain area 13 miles NE Tuguegarao.
3. An estimated 200 Japs engaged in area  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles SW of Hucab by Philippine Army units resulting in 129 Japs killed, and the remainder dispersed.
4. Enemy continued to defend from positions astride Highway 4 ENE of Kiangnan. Over 80 Japs were killed or captured in this area during 24 hour period.
5. Over 55 defensive positions (type unreported) were found abandoned on the west side of Highway 4, between Hucab and present positions; over 20 caves were located all of which had been closed by air and artillery strikes.
6. The enemy Bontoc garrison withdrew southward and the long contested key road junction barrio was occupied by USAFIP troops.
7. Observers report enemy continues to strengthen his defenses in Mankayan-Loo areas. Stubborn resistance in this sector persists.
8. Mopping up between Bokod-Bambang areas resulted in over 60 Japs killed or captured.


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**ENCLOSURE NO. 1**  
**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS**  
**SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA**  
Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff  
**COMBINED GROUND SITUATION**  
To: 2400/I, 10 July 45  
Mags To: 1200/I, 11 July  
For Summary No. 1193

SCALE 1:1,000,000  
0 10 20 30 40 MILES



NORTHERN LUZON

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

I-III: DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE  
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION  
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No.  
1192

DATE  
9/10 Jul 1945

I GROUND:

SOLOMONS:

1. Bougainville: 8 Jul: Patrol clashes 3500 yds WNW Berry's Hill; en counter-attacks in the Shishigatero area repulsed.

NEW GUINEA:

2. Wewak: 8 Jul: En cleared fr posns E Ulupu; "strong" Jap forces rptd Naramuko (4000 yds S Ulupu).

BORNEO:

3. Balikpapan: 9 Jul: Night infiltration attempts to CP area repulsed with hvy Jap losses; stiff en resistance along Balikpapan-Manggar front where Japs have 150mm, 70mm, 37mm and 20mm guns well dug in, some in tunnels; sm en grp contacted 3½ mi N Sepingang Besar; no opposn to landing Djin-abora (4 mi N Penadjam); moderate to strong resistance encountered 4 mi W Penadjam.

PHILIPPINES:

4. Mindanao: NW Davao: 9 Jul: En snipers vicin Tamogan R bridge only contact Tamogan-Kibangay area. Sarangani Bay: 9 Jul: No opposn to patrol landing Sarangani Bay 300 yds E Dadjangas. Bukidnon-Agusan Valley: 9 Jul: No en contacted in patrolling Halipatan-Langasian and Pinamola-Sanipon areas.
5. Luzon: Northern Sector: 9 Jul: Minor attack by 35 Japs repulsed 6 mi E Iguig; en grps encountered 8 mi NE Iguig; strongly defended posns 3000 yds NW Hucab, along Old Highway 4, limited our advances to small gains; moderate en resistance overcome as Otukan (8 mi SW Bontoc) and posn W Mt Amo occupied; against strong resistance high ground 100 yds NE Mankayan seized.

II AIR:

CELEBES:

1. Kendari: 9 Jul: 2 poss S/E a/c sighted on Kendari airstrip; 0924I.

FORMOSA:

2. Pescadores: Night 8/9 Jul: En plane with running lights on sighted by night B 30 mi NW Mako.

CHINA:

3. Amoy: Night 8/9 Jul: 2 en Fs shadowed PBM for 30 mi.

NANSEI SHOTOS:

4. Sakashima: 8 Jul: 1 operational a/c obsvd Hirara airfield.

JAPAN:

5. Kyushu: Photos 9 Jul: Omura A/d: Pre-strike cbt operational a/c total 60 (incl 17 S/E trainers); post-strike minimum a/c burning, 7 S/E & 1 T/E; loose stores & hgrs burning; airfld operable.
6. Honshu: a) 8 Jul: Tokyo Area: 5 en planes dest, 1 prob dest & 1 dam in air by 110 P-51s attacking Hyakurigahara & Tokorozawa airflds; on grd, 28 en a/c dest, 4 prob & 6 dam; 7 P-51s lost, 3 pilots rescued; noon.  
b) 7 Jul: General: Nil rptd air opposn to 605 B-29s attacking Akashi area, Chiba (Tokyo), Kofu, Shimizu, Maruzen oil refinery (Osaka).

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Summary 1192 - Cont'd

III NAVY:

MOLUCCAS:

1. Halmahera: a) 7 Jul: 6 prahus & 15 canoes destroyed off SW Coast. b) 8 Jul: 2 barges, 20 mi WNW Galela.

LESSER SUNDAS:

2. Tijger Is: 8 Jul: 4 trading schooners, 52 prahus sighted; 1 schooner prob sunk, 2 schooners left smoking & 2 barges strafed.
3. Soembawa: 8 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T), & 2 schooners on E Coast.
4. Timor: 8 Jul: 2 freighters (150/300T) on N Coast.

CELEBES:

5. W Coast: 8 Jul: 1 motorboat sunk, 1 schooner sunk, 1 schooner fired & 5 barges sighted.

FRENCH INDO CHINA:

6. Tonkin Gulf: 7 Jul: 1 steamer (200-250'), 1 steamer (150-200'), 1 prob 200' floating dock, 1 power launch (50'), 19 junks, sampans & barges, unstated nbr of 75' power launches sunk. 1 power boat (160'), 1 power boat (40'), 11 trp carrying sampans & barges, 19 junks sampans & barges damaged.
7. C St Jacques: 9 Jul: 1 hospital ship headed for Saigon.

HAINAN:

8. Hainan Straits: 9 Jul: 1 destroyer escort, 1 2 stack ship (17/19,000T) & 4 u/i vsls anchored.
9. Yulin Bay: 9 Jul: 4 u/i vals anchored.

CHINA COAST:

10. Yellow Sea: 9 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) sunk, on crs N x W, spd 5.

NANSEI SHOTO:

11. Okinawa: 7 Jul: Allied vs1 contacted sub.

JAPAN:

12. Honshu: Night 6/7 Jul: 1 u/i vs1 damaged in Suruga Bay.
13. Yokohama: 6 Jul: Photos reveal: 1 escort carrier (non-oper), 1 prob destroyer outfitting, 6 merch vsls (29,000T total), 4 merch vsls (23,500T total) outfitting, 2 merch vsls (13,500T total) bldg.
14. Tokyo Area: a) 8 Jul: 1 vs1 (250') damaged. b) 8 Jul: 1 freighter (300/100T), 1 lugger sunk off O Shima. c) 9 Jul: 1 picket (125') slightly damaged, 1 freighter-tpt (5500/7500T) seriously damaged.
15. Sasebo Area: 8 Jul: 2 freighters (300/850T), 2 luggers & 1 freighter-tpt (2000/4500T) sunk; 6 luggers, 1 trawler, 2 freighters (150/300T) damaged.
16. General: 8 Jul: Allied subs sank 1 freighter-tpt (2000/4500T), 2 freighters (300/1000T), 1 freighter (150/300T) & 4 sm craft.
17. Nagasaki: 9 Jul: 1 frigate, merch vsls totalling 14,700 tons, 1 freighter-tpt (2000/4500T), 1 freighter (6600T), 1 freighter (2300T), 1 sm tanker, & 5 freighters (300/850T).
18. S Coast Shikoku: a) 9 Jul: luggers & sm freighters (150/300T). b) 9 Jul: 2-masted schooner, crs ENE, spd 5. c) 9 Jul: 1 freighter (2200T) bombed & strafed on crs ExN, spd 10, left smoking & heading for beach.
19. Honshu: 9 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) strafed in cove.

IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

1. Summary of the Enemy Situation.

a. Activities in Forward Areas:

Northern Philippines (Luzon):

Cagayan Valley: Minor attack by approximately 35 Japanese repulsed east of Iguig, and northeast of that town an enemy force of unreported strength was contacted.

Highway 4: Strongly defended enemy positions confined our westward advances towards Kiangnan to slight gains.

Cervantes: Continued moderate to strong enemy opposition northeast of Bauko and on ridges northwest of Mankayan.

Southern-Central Philippines (Mindanao):

NW of Davao: Only contacts in Kibangay-Tamogan area occurred in vicinity Tamogan River bridge. Civilian reports approximately 600 Japs in Bau area north northwest of Kabakan. Other civilians claim elements of the 100th Division and naval remnants north and west of Kibangay are suffering many deaths daily due malnutrition and lack of medical supplies and care; they have no radio communication.

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Summary of the Enemy Situation - Cont'd Summary 1192 - Cont'd

Sarangani Bay: No enemy opposition to the landing of a patrol east of Dadjangas.

Agusan Valley: Numerous groups of 25-30 Japanese observed along Umayan River Canyon by air observers.

Borneo:

Balikpapan: Several night infiltrations to command post areas repulsed; considerable resistance along Balikpapan-Manggar front where enemy is employing artillery and machine gun fire from excellent positions. No enemy opposition to landings at Djinabora (4 miles north Penadjam). Enemy concentrations of 600 northeast of Manggar and 1,200 in vicinity Mt Batochampar reported. Nil enemy air activity.

b. Activities in Rear Areas:

Celebes: 2 poss S/E a/c on Kendari a/d.

Sakashima: 1 operational a/c on Hirara airfield.

Kyushu: 60 a/c photo'd on Omura a/d.

Honshu: Nil rptd airborne opposn to 605 B-29s; 33 en a/c dest by P-51s attacking 2 Tokyo a/ds.

c. Identifications: Officer identifications indicate elements of 166th II Bn in Bau area, NNW Kabakan, Mindanao; by civilians.

d. Weather: Nil rptd interference with principal air operations.

2. Conclusions:

a. Enemy Capabilities:

Operations on Borneo:

1) Defense of Mt. Batochampar, Balikpapan Area.

Operations in the Philippines:

2) Delaying Actions in Bontoc-Mankayan-Kiangan Triangle, Northern Luzon.

3) Defense of Sarangani Bay Area, Southern Mindanao.

Operations in Japan:

4) Aggressive Air Opposition.

Operations on Borneo:

1) Defense of Mt Batochampar, Balikpapan Area: In the Balikpapan and Manggar areas, enemy resistance continued to increase along the 12 mile front. Several small enemy night attacks were repulsed north of the Manggar airfield, resulting in heavy enemy losses. West of Balikpapan Bay, one company of the 2/9th Battalion, made an unopposed landing at Djinabora, approximately 4 miles north northwest of Penadjam; some 600 Chinese and Malayan personnel were found there. Natives confirmed previous reports that the enemy troop at Penadjam and Djinabora were withdrawing to the Riko area, 11 miles inland.

The tempo of the operation has somewhat quickened. Increasing resistance and numerous enemy contacts along the 21st and 25th Brigade fronts strongly suggest that a withdrawal has taken place as previously estimated and that the enemy has concentrated his troops in the Mt Batochampar area and north and northeast of Manggar. For the first time, artillery fire of several calibers is being encountered; some weapons appear to be well emplaced. Further evidence of troop concentrations comes from our field forces, who now estimate the enemy disposition as follows; 1,200 in the vicinity of Mt Batochampar (possibly elements of the 22nd Naval Base Force), 650 north and east of Manggar (454th Independent Infantry Battalion?) and 180 west of Penadjam, across the bay from Balikpapan.

With increased opposition and indications of prepared defensive positions, it appears that we are approaching an outer line of resistance, fronting probable troop concentrations and other defenses centered on Mt Batochampar. Stubborn resistance may develop as vigorous probing of this indicates defense sector takes place, yet available intelligence does not support a change in the previously estimated principal enemy capability of defense of inland positions coupled with infiltration and harassing attacks directed against both our front line positions and rear area installations. (See Enclosure No. 1).

Operations in the Philippines:

2) Delaying Actions in Bontoc-Mankayan-Kiangan Triangle, Northern Luzon: While activity in the foothills of the Sierra Madre

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mountains, eastern Cagayan Valley, have been confined to local clashes, the stubborn resistance in the Cordilleras to the southwest, principally in the Bontoc-Mankayan-Kiangnan triangle, continues. The crest of Lepanto Ridge, 1,100 yards northwest of Mankayan, was occupied by Philippine Army troops when the enemy, with an estimated strength of 1,000, was forced to relinquish a part of this long defended position. This wedge into Lepanto Ridge may considerably shorten the duration of the tenability of his present defensive line northwest of Mankayan, since it flanks positions immediately to the west of the ridge. However, when this line yields, it is possible the enemy has developed a secondary line anchored on the high ground short of Mankayan. (See Daily Summary No. 1181). East and southeast of Bontoc, several more barrios have been occupied preceded by moderate to heavy resistance and some minor enemy counterattacks. Artillery pieces firing previously on our forces in the Sagada area have been located 3 miles southwest of Bontoc.

On Highway 4, although enemy resistance has decreased somewhat, only slight gains were made during the period. Here, as on the Villa Verde Trail, the restrictions to our advance is attributable more to difficult terrain rather than enemy action. Nevertheless, the two-pronged advance along both the old and new Highway 4 now places elements of the 6th Division in a position from where they are capable of outflanking Kiangnan from the east, the loss of which would probably aggravate any further enemy delaying actions between Kiangnan and Banaue. In addition, the seizure of this key point would greatly contribute to the opening of the entire flank of his eastern defenses on the high ground between Highway 4 and Highway 11, as well as open another avenue of approach to Highway 11 from the east.

With the enemy confined to a relatively small area in the Bontoc-Mankayan-Kiangnan triangle, his defense, while hopeless, will probably continue to be stubborn. Existing terrain offers him the opportunity to develop it in characteristic fashion to effect such a defense with limited forces. (See Enclosure No. 2).

3) Defense of Sarangani Bay Area, Southern Mindanao: Ground reconnaissance of inner Sarangani Bay shores from Buayan through Dadjangas to Makar and up the Buayan River, plus converging overland guerrilla penetrations toward the Bay from Davao Gulf and the Koronadal Highway, disclose little evidence of significant enemy defensive activity. No such development probably exists, since this isolated harbor has long been garrisoned by minor 100th Division and naval service elements with an estimated strength of only 500.

However, evidence of scattered minor enemy occupation continually appears. Much new construction of an undefined nature along the Bay's east coast below Buayan, particularly near the Little Lun River has been observed from the air. The Buayan River's west bank is lightly outposted. Persistent enemy A/A fire is encountered from a canyon  $7\frac{1}{2}$  miles north of Dadjangas. Japs are patrolling the Koronadal Highway northwest from the Bay through Tupi, a known munition-supply depot, to the vicinity of guerrilla road block southeast of Lake Buluan.

The enemy, faced with troops and communications inadequate either to defend Sarangani Bay or to prosecute effective inland delaying action, has widely dispersed for attempted survival. Although his areas of visible activity now parallel roads and river valleys offering easy movement inland from the Bay, his subsequent movements upon contact probably will be toward areas progressively more remote.

#### Operations in Japan:

4) Aggressive Air Opposition: Opposition encountered by Allied aircraft over Japan the past few days, although limited in scope, has been aggressive, skillful and effective. Day before yesterday 7 P-51s were lost when 114 of the Iwo Jima fighters attacked two Tokyo airfields. The day before, one of our long range search planes (PB4Y-2) was intercepted by enemy fighters off Sasebo. After destroying one of the fighters, the Privateer was shot down, with surviving crew members believed captured. The next day 8 P-47s from Okinawa escorting another Privateer on a search for the crew shot down the day before, were attacked by 8 or 9 Tojos and Georges--latest type enemy fighters. One P-47 was shot down, the pilot believed killed, and 3 other of the P-47s damaged, for the loss of one enemy fighter. In contrast with these interceptions, however, the B-29s on recent large scale raids have reported little or no airborne opposition.

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Although recent enemy encounters have been too limited to establish a definite air pattern, several features of these interceptions seem to throw some light on enemy capabilities and present tactics.

In recent engagements, enemy pilots have been skilled, contrasted with the earlier unaggressiveness and inaptitude encountered by our pilots over Japan. It is not believed that the pilot performance encountered of late, however, reflects the skill of the average Japanese pilot at the present time. These attacks, considering the prolonged earlier period of unsuccessful and mediocre effort, have the appearance of special attacks, carried out probably by pilots who are a part of the relatively small group remaining of the enemy's well trained and experienced airmen. This recent display of skill may have resulted in large part from the use of experienced combat pilots recalled over a period of the past several months for the defense of the homeland from various combat areas.

The more aggressive and effective opposition offered recently is no doubt also partially accounted for by the use of the enemy's latest and best type interceptors in the hands of these skilled personnel. Lately our pilots in attacks on enemy planes, both in the air and on the ground, have increasingly reported that the enemy aircraft are harder to burn. Better armor plate and sealed fuel tanks are no doubt responsible for this result particularly insofar as airborne aircraft are concerned. Furthermore, these late type fighters with greater horse power, heavier armament and better armor, are well adapted for short range low level attacks such as those recently carried out by the enemy.

The location of the Kyushu interceptions may also be significant. These engagements took place over North Kyushu, where the bulk of the enemy's Kyushu fighter strength is concentrated at present. As yet the enemy has made no serious effort to defend South Kyushu. Other missions over North Kyushu have encountered no airborne opposition at all. These facts would seem to indicate that the enemy in Kyushu, as in his past stages of declining capability in other areas, has been careful in choosing conditions favorable to combat. Although weather and faulty communications may have been responsible for lack of opposition in some cases, combat on a large scale seems to have been deliberately avoided.

The overall aspects of these recent interceptions seem to tie in with a pattern of general conservation of aircraft interspersed with frequent small scale but vigorous attacks under favorable conditions. The enemy no doubt, from past experience, fully appreciates the disastrous effect which continuing uncontested air attacks would produce on homeland morale, both civilian and military. This incentive together with his urgent need for conserving aircraft for a final defense of the homeland have no doubt contributed to the middle-of-the-road tactics recently followed.

Allied moves in any quarter, considered by the enemy as foreshadowing actual invasion would in all probability be met with greatest opposition. The enemy's present tactics, insofar as they may be evaluated, together with past experience, would also seem to indicate that initial attacks of North Kyushu by B-24s and B-25s would encounter large scale and aggressive opposition.

b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Defense of Mt Batochampar, Balikpapan Area: Stubborn resistance may develop as vigorous probing of the indicated Mt Batochampar defense sector takes place, yet available intelligence does not support a change in the previously estimated principal enemy capability of defense of inland positions coupled with infiltration and harassing attacks directed against both our front line positions and rear area installations.

2) Delaying Actions in Bontoc-Mankayan-Kiangan Triangle, Northern Luzon: With the enemy confined to a relatively small area in the Bontoc-Mankayan-Kiangan triangle, his defense, while hopeless, will probably continue to be stubborn. Existing terrain offers him the opportunity to develop it in characteristic fashion to effect such a defense with limited forces.

3) Defense of Sarangani Bay Area, Southern Mindanao: The enemy, faced with troops and communications inadequate either to defend Sarangani Bay or to prosecute effective inland delaying action, has widely dispersed for attempted survival. Although his areas of visible activity now parallel

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roads and river valleys offering easy movement inland from the Bay, his subsequent movements upon contact probably will be toward areas progressively more remote.

(4 Aggressive Air Opposition: Aggressive interception by skillful pilots and improved fighter types may be encountered by B-24s and B-25s in initial attacks on North Kyushu targets.

#### V MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

##### Japanese Control Over Formosan Natives:

Probably through some adaptation of the Hoko System the enemy has brought completely within his control civilian activity, at least along Formosa's north coast in the Taka Sago-Area, according to the following PW testimony:

Prisoner stated that Allied airmen who might be forced down in Taka-Sago country would surely end up in the hands of the Japanese. He stated that this was because over a period of 40 years the Taka-Sagons had been taught to submit all their problems to the Japanese police officials in their particular areas. This was a routine strictly adhered to by them. As an example he related that game taken from the mountains was always carried to the local police station and checked through police officials before it was consumed by the hunters.

The number of these officials at each station varied from six to twenty according to the size and population of the area to be controlled.

Prisoner stated that although the Taka-Sagons were a very war-like people, their present relationship with the Japanese was extremely amicable.

Prisoner stated that shot down flying personnel should indicate their friendly intentions toward the Taka-Sagons by remaining passive when discovered, and making presents of red cloth, cheap jewelry, watches, medicines, etc.

Prisoner was questioned as to what he would do if he were an Allied flier and forced down in Taka-Sago country. He answered that it would be impossible to remain out of Japanese hands if once taken in by the Taka-Sagons. He stated that his only chance would be to hide in the mountains and hope for rescue by friendly forces.

Interrogation of PW Jinnai Haruo (Kotakan Shobu Spec Const Unit). Answers to queries tendered by Briefing Officer. ATIS Preliminary Interrogation, (subject to confirmation).

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
EXPLANATORY NOTES:

On 9 Jul:

1. Supported by Naval bombardment, one company of the 2/9 Bn made an unopposed landing at Djinabora, 4 miles NNW of Penadjam.
2. Allied patrols in the Riko R area located several enemy positions 5 miles WNW Penadjam, where forward troops estimate there are 180 Japs occupying dug-in positions.
3. Estimated 1,200 troops of the 22nd Naval Base Force in vicinity of Mt. Batochampar.
4. Considerable enemy resistance throughout the 21st-25th Brigade fronts; the Japs have 150mm, 70mm, 37mm and 20mm guns well dug in, some of them in tunnels. Suicidal infiltrations to CP areas were repulsed with heavy Jap losses.
5. Small enemy party contacted by elements of the 2/7th Cav Regt patrolling  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles N of Sepinggang Besar village.
6. Three small enemy night attacks N of the Manggar airfield were repulsed by the 2/14th Bn. Information from the field indicates 650 enemy located N and NE of Manggar.



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ENCLOSURE NO. 1

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC  
AND  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
COMBINED GROUND SITUATION  
To: 2400/I, 9 July 45  
Msgs To: 1200/I, 10 July  
For Summary No. 1192

BALIKPAPAN

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To Accompany Incl No. 2  
Daily Summary No. 1192

EXPLANATORY NOTES:


On 8/9 Jul:

1. Elements of 37th Div repulsed minor enemy infiltration attempts in Penablanca area.
2. Scattered contacts only were made by 6th Div patrols mopping up in Jones area.
3. Only slight gains as elements of 63rd Inf resumed its two-prong attack on enemy position astride Highway 4, 3,000 yds NW of Hucab.
4. An estimated 30 Japs 6,000 yds WNW of Camp 30 were placed under artillery fire by elements of 127th Inf with unknown results.
5. Against strong enemy resistance elements of 66th Inf (USAFIP) advanced to a position 1,100 yds NE of Mankayan.
6. Moderate resistance met by other elements of PA units who drove NE of Bauko and seized Otukan ( $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles NE of Bauko).
7. Enemy positions with artillery were located 3 miles SW of Bontoc. Moderate opposition was met 4,700 yds W of Sabangan while the enemy launched strong but unsuccessful attacks against our leading elements S of the town.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

I-III: DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE  
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION  
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No.  
1191

DATE  
8/9 Jul 1945

GROUND:

SOLOMONS:

1. Bougainville: 7 Jul: En cleared fr Wearnes Hill; 40 Japs contacted 2500 yds N Shishigatero; en along beach fr Kieta to Arawa engaged.

NEW GUINEA:

2. Wewak: 7 Jul: En attack 2200 yds SW Koigin repulsed; en movement 3000 yds S Sauri rptd.

BORNEO:

3. Balikpapan: 8 Jul: En using drums of burning oil as rd blocks; 200 x 500 lb bombs found 3 mi NW Penadjan.

PHILIPPINES:

4. Mindanao: NW of Davao: 8 Jul: Minor en contacts W Moab (2400 yds W Kibangay) and 3200 yds SE Tamogan. Sarangani Bay: 8 Jul: Only scattered Jap outposts encountered by grd rcn toward bay; Dadjangas free of enemy. Agusan Valley: 8 Jul: Nil en contacts to continued patrolling Waloe and Sagunto; slight opposn to advance to posns 2000 yds S Sagunto.

5. Luzon: Northern Sector: 8 Jul: Increasing en resistance to patrols in area N Gonzaga and 10,000 to 15,000 yds E Highway 5 in Central and Southern Cagayan Valley; scattered contacts in Baler Bay area and vicin old Spanish Trail; without opposn en posn 2500 yds NW Hucab secured and advance continued another 500 yds towards Kiangnan against sm arms fire; en continues to oppose advances towards Bontoc fr posns located on commanding ground; en posn supported by arty located 3 mi SW Bontoc.

II AIR:

CELEBES:

1. Mandai: 6 Jul: 1 prob T/E B & 1 prob S/E F nr r'way obsvd by 6 B-24s; airstrip prob u/s.

2. Makassar: 6 Jul: 1 poss S/E F obsvd airborne by 6 B-24s; nil contact.

BORNEO:

3. Kuching: 7 Jul: 1 T/E B, 2 Fs all prob u/s obsvd by search a/c; 1255I.

4. Pontianak & Belawai a/ds: (photos) 7 Jul: R'ways rough but serv; nil serv a/c.

5. Brunei Bay: 6 Jul: 1 en a/c dropped 3 bombs; nil dan.

FORMOSA:

6. Shinchiku: 8 Jul: Sev en a/c prob dest on grd by 43 B-24s; 3 en a/c airborne failed to intcpt.

FRENCH INDO CHINA:

7. Vinh: 6 Jul: 1 en a/c shot down by 18 P-51s & 12 P-38s.

CHINA:

8. Amoy: Night 7/8 Jul: 1 en a/c indic off coast; nil contact.

NANSEI SHOTOS:

9. Sakashima Gunto: 7 Jul: 2 T/E a/c dest in revets Hirara a/d by TBFs & F4Us; 1645I.

JAPAN:

10. Kyushu: a) 8 Jul: 8-9 en Fs intcptd 8 P-47s over Uku Shima; 1 en F shot down; 1 P-47 shot down, 3 dan; 1545-1645I. b) 7 Jul: 1 en a/c shot down W of Sasebo by Navy search a/c.

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Summary 1191 - Cont'd

**MOLUCCAS:**

1. NW Halmahera: 7 Jul: 1 vs1 (30') & 2 barges strafed & hit, 1 barge prob sunk; 1 prahu fired.

**LESSER SUNDAS:**

2. Flores Area: 7 Jul: 2 sailboats sunk.

**CELEBES:**

3. Southern Area: 7 Jul: 2 schooners damaged.
4. Kendari: 8 Jul: 2 barges in hbr.

**BORNEO:**

5. Kuching Area: 7 Jul: 3 camouflaged freighters (150/300T) destroyed, 18-20 others in caves of river to N.

**FRENCH INDO CHINA:**

6. General: 8 Jul: Cape St Jacques, Camranh Bay & Tourane empty.
7. Quinhon: 7 Jul: 1 barge (60') destroyed, 1 sm lugger damaged.
8. Cape Padaran: 8 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) heavily damaged, 8 barges damaged.

**HAINAN:**

9. Kiungshan: 8 Jul: 1 sm freighter-tpt left burning & sinking & 1 motor launch damaged.
10. Yulin Bay: 8 Jul: 3 u/i ships anchored.

**FORMOSA:**

11. General: 8 Jul: Keelung & Takao empty.

**CHINA COAST:**

12. Wenchow: 7 Jul: 1 sm u/i vs1 left sinking, 50 mi SSE.
13. Hsilien: 8 Jul: 2 luggers & 1 trawler bombed & strafed, 45 mi N.

**NANSEI SHOTO:**

14. Sakashima: 8 Jul: 1 subchaser, 1 torpedo boat, crs E, spd 8, 60 mi SE of Miyako Id.
15. Okinawa: 7 Jul: 1 lugger carrying oil drums, left burning & sinking, 170 mi NW.

**KOREA:**

16. W Coast: 8 Jul: 1 lugger left burning.
17. SW Coast: 8 Jul: 1 lugger (80') sunk.

**JAPAN:**

18. Kure Area: 5 Jul: B-29 photos show: 1 battleship-carrier (ISE class), 1 sm carrier (prob Hosho), 1 hvy cruiser, Aobo, 2 destroyers, 3 subs. Battleship Haruna had moved fr customary moorings; other units obscured by clouds.
19. SW Honshu: 5 Jul: B-29 photos show 7 merch vs1s (42,500T total), 30 mi ENE Okayama.
20. E Kyushu: 5 Jul: 1 prob destroyer, 4 freighters (300/1000T) at Saeki.
21. S Honshu: a) Night 6/7 Jul: 3 ships, 150 mi S of Cape Shiono. b) 8 Jul: 1 freighter (300/1000T) sunk at Miyoki Id.
22. Nagoya: 8 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) destroyed, 70 mi SSW.
23. Tsushima Str: 8 Jul: 3 freighters (150/300T) crs W, spd 8; 1 destroyer anchored.

**IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:**

**1. Summary of the Enemy Situation.**

**a. Activities in Forward Areas:**

**Northern Philippines (Luzon):**

Cagayan Valley: Increased enemy resistance to our patrolling northeast of Gonzaga and east of Highway 5 in the southern and central areas. Approximately 400 Japs were reported in the valley 10 miles northeast of Tuguegarao.

Highway 4: After securing enemy position without opposition, substantial gains toward Kiangan made against small arms fire.

Cervantes: The enemy continued to oppose our advance towards Bontoc from strong positions, supported by artillery, strategically located on favorable terrain.

**Southern-Central Philippines (Mindanao):**

NW of Davao: Minor scattered enemy contacts continue west of Kibangay and southeast of Tamogan.

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Sarangani Bay: Only weak enemy outposts encountered during ground reconnaissance toward the bay. Dadjangas reported free of Japs.

Agusan Valley: Light enemy opposition overcome in advance westward to positions south of Sagunto.

Borneo: 1 en a/c dropped 3 bombs Brunei Bay.

Balikpapan: The enemy is using drums of burning oil as road blocks against our armored vehicles. An unestimated number of Japanese reported at Riko (11 miles northwest of Penadjan).

b. Activities in Rear Areas:

Celebes: 1 poss S/E F obsvd airborne over Makassar.

Formosa: Sev en a/c dest on grd at Shinchiku.

Indo China: 1 en a/c shot down N of Vinh.

Sakashima: 2 T/E a/c dest in Hirara revet.

Kyushu: 8-9 en Fs intcptd 8 P-47s over Uku Shima. 1 en a/c shot down W of Sasebo.

c. Identifications: Entire 454th Independent Infantry Battalion near Manggar, northeast of Balikpapan; by documents.

d. Weather: Hampered Clark Field search a/c, and Formosa & E Celebes harassing missions.

2. Conclusions.

a. Enemy Capabilities:

Operations on Borneo:

1) Defense of Mt. Batochampar.

Operations in the Philippines:

2) Maintenance of Defensive Positions, Northern Luzon.

Operations on Borneo:

1) Defense of Mt. Batochampar: Extensive patrolling with minor contacts continued throughout the Balikpapan area. An enemy position was located  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles north of Sepinggang Ketjil, while in the northwest, the Netherlands East Indies company, encountering small arms fire, moved north 1,000 yards to occupy the village of Sumbir Tengah,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles north of the Pandansari Refinery.

The pattern of the enemy's defenses in the Balikpapan area is more clearly developing. The Yamada unit, previously reported in the Manggar area, has been identified as the 454th Independent Infantry Battalion. This unit may possibly have been converted from the 367th Battalion, re-organized and redesignated at Tarakan Island in March 1945, moving to Balikpapan in April. Elements of the 381st Naval Air Unit, known to have been at Manggar in January 1945, may also be included in the defense of the Manggar sector. Certain types of automatic weapons, normally equipment of Naval Air Units, have been captured or destroyed in this area.

At the present time there is no clear indication of the dispositions of the 22nd Naval Base Force, major Balikpapan unit, but the headquarters has been tentatively located approximately 5 miles northwest of Manggar. Since only the Base Force has been identified in the area north and east of Balikpapan, perhaps the large concentration observed in the vicinity of Mt Batochampar,  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles northeast of Balikpapan, comprise elements of that unit. Further information comes from a captured map outlining a defense of Mt Batochampar, employing a five company organization. Since the estimated strength in the vicinity is comparable to this number of units and recent activities indicative of defensive preparations have been noted, resistance may yet develop in the Mt Batochampar area upon which withdrawal from Balikpapan proper may have been focused. (See Enclosure No. 1).

Operations in the Philippines:

2) Maintenance of Defensive Positions, Northern Luzon: In disposing troops for defense of the principal approaches to the high ground between Highway 11 and Highway 4, the enemy has triangularized his deployment of strength, concentrating it generally in the following areas: southeast and east of Kiangnan, west of Bontoc and northwest of Mankayan. The dislodgement of pockets of resistance, 2,500 yards north of Hucab, 3 miles east of Kiangnan, after an air-artillery mortar preparation, with a 500 yard advance further northwest without opposition astride Highway 4, together with previous opposition in the Payawan Resthouse area, establishes an enemy pattern along this approach, viz: stubborn delaying actions from successive positions

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supported by automatic weapons. There is yet no positive evidence of occupation of defensive positions short of Kiangnan or further north between Kiangnan and Banaue. However, in view of the importance of Kiangnan to the enemy in this sector, similar strong delaying actions prior to our seizure of the village are likely to be encountered. In the Bontoc area, withdrawal has been noted and the enemy's reluctance to vigorously engage in combat has become apparent, but resistance continues, sporadically supported by artillery fire from an area  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles southwest of Bontoc. The stubborn defense of positions 1,500 yards northwest of Mankayan continues without visible signs of weakening. This passive ground defense has been maintained despite our air bombardment which has accurately devastated enemy rear area installations and supply dumps. Counter-battery fire and pin-pointed air strikes have not as yet softened elaborately developed terrain features interdicting this route of advance. In the area south of Mankayan and Kiangnan and north of Highway 5, patrolling continues; activity has been limited to encounters between small enemy groups. Resistance against our probing patrols is stiffening north of Tuguegarao, generally 5 to 8 miles east of Highway 5, indicating that the enemy will react as our troops begin to close in on probable concentration areas. (See Enclosure No. 2).

b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Defense of Mt. Batochampar: Documentary evidence and indications of defensive preparations suggest resistance may yet develop in the Mt Batochampar area upon which withdrawal from Balikpapan proper may have been focused.

2) Maintenance of Defensive Positions, Northern Luzon: Stiffening resistance met by patrols probing close to enemy concentration areas east of the Cagayan Valley perhaps foreshadows the development of small-scale clashes and delaying actions along the trails and stream beds of the Sierra Madre foothills.

V MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

1. Empire Emergency Draft in Event of Allied Invasion Threat:

Although evidence is vague as yet, the emergency conscription described below appears to be a compulsory adjunct to the already operative Citizens' Volunteer Corps. The indicated brevity of training, disregard of age, and postponement of conscription until an emergency in certain areas actually arises, will probably preclude the conscriptees' role from being any more integral within the Army than civilian volunteers.

Defense Call-up (Boei Shoshu) This was commenced Aug 44 due to danger of possible Allied Landings on the Japanese homeland. Under this system all able-bodied men between the ages of 17 and 50 would be called if the necessity arose to defend certain areas.

Personnel were drawn through Regimental Conscription Areas in the same manner as active duty men.

No previous training was given to these recruits and the younger men only had the military training which they received while at school. General training of any sort which might be given would take place after mobilization and when landing by Allies was imminent.

In prisoner's opinion, training which would follow such a mobilization would be along the following lines. The first and most important would be in Seishin Kyoiku (Spiritual training), and would be followed by as much training as possible in bayonet drill, physical exercise, firearms, defense against airplanes and general tactics.

Personnel drawn through this call-up would be assigned to various newly formed infantry regiments and independent battalions. Seasoned troops from regular infantry units in Japan would be split up to take command of this new army. In this way the original strength in defense forces would be increased perhaps tenfold. Officers to take charge of such an increased army would come from reserve lists.

Interrogation of PW Uchiyama Takeshi, Capt, Manila Air Depot. ATIS Preliminary Interrogation, subject to confirmation.

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## 2. Use of Trainers and Obsolete Aircraft:

It has been previously estimated that trainer and obsolete a/c types, employed as suiciders, will be extensively committed against invasion of the Empire. The PW testimony below corroborates this intention. However, his statements alleging an enemy inability to produce sufficient first-line a/c require qualification: viz, enemy a/c production recently has been somewhat higher than formerly believed; due to restricted air operations, his recent losses have been extremely low; total estimated combat strength for Japan, Korea and Manchuria at present is 4,000 a/c.

Enemy Methods

"Use of Old Type Fighters: When prisoner flew to PI early Jan 45, the Topsy in which he was travelling was accompanied by six old type unidentified fighters which he understood were to be used on suicide missions. He did not know in what way, if any, these airplanes were altered for this new task but understood that an attachment to carry a bomb was to be fitted after arrival at PI. The six fighters in question landed at Clark Field but prisoner could not identify their unit. It was customary for these fighters to assemble at Kakogawa, Gifu, Tachikawa and Nitta Bara before finally leaving for overseas.

Airplane Shortage: Due to the increasing demand for airplanes and the importance attached to suicide missions, together with the inability of factories to produce sufficient first line airplanes, training airplanes were drawn from units in Japan in an attempt to meet front line requirements.

Prisoners estimated that three out of every five training airplanes were being conditioned into top shape and assembled at the points mentioned above, from where they were flown overseas by ferry pilots. It was recognized that this type of airplane could not be expected to match Allied airplanes in combat, but that it could serve a good purpose when used for suicide attack." Interrogation of PW Uchiyama Takeshi, Capt, Manila Air Depot. ATIS Preliminary Interrogation, (subject to confirmation).

Special care must be taken to insure the secrecy of this document. Information contained herein will not be circulated or reproduced beyond the Staff Section to which it is addressed. When not actually in use, this document is to be kept in a safe and is chargeable to the custody of an Officer. See AR 380-5, 15 March 1944, and Standing Operating Procedure Instructions No. 14, 14 March 1944, regarding security Classifications.

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To Accompany Encl No 1  
Daily Summary No 1191

**EXPLANATORY NOTES:**


On 8 July:

1. 200 x 500 lb bombs were located in old Jap camp, 3 miles NW Penadjam. Japanese in this area have been observed concentrating in the vicinity of Riko, 11 miles NW of Penadjam.
2. In unreported sectors of the Balikpapan area, burning oil from 44 gal drums is being used by enemy as road blocks against Allied tanks.
3. Captured map shows wire positions for a five company defense to be established in the Mt Batochamper area.
4. The entire 454th II Bn has been identified in action near Manggar, 13 miles NE of Balikpapan.
5. Headquarters 22nd Naval Base Force reported approximately 5 miles NW Manggar airfield.

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Enclosure No. 1

Military Intelligence Section  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
COMBINED GROUND SITUATION  
To 2400I 8 July 1945  
Msgs To 1200I 9 July 1945  
For Summary No. 1191

BALIKPAPAN



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To Accompany Encl No 2  
Daily Summary No 1191


EXPLANATORY NOTES:

On 7/8 July:

1. Enemy resistance increased to our patrolling 5-8 miles E Hwy 5 and NE of Gonzaga.
2. Approximately 500 Japs were reported in the Valley 10 miles NE of Tuguegarao.
3. Small enemy parties were engaged by 6th Div patrols in the vicinity of Cabatuan and 2200 yds NE of San Mariano, with results unreported.
4. Enemy defensive position 2500 yds NW of Hucab was secured by 63rd Inf, following an air strike and artillery-mortar preparation. Without further opposition elements of the 63rd Ind advanced to a point 3000 yds NW of Hucab, where they encountered enemy small arms fire.
5. Minor patrol contacts were reported in the Bayombong-Bagabag area, resulting in 25 Japs killed and 23 Japs and Formosans captured.
6. Enemy continued to oppose our eastward assault on Bontoc with strategically located groups on favorable terrain; Jap positions supported by artillery were located 3 miles SW Bontoc; his losses in this area during the period were 269 killed and 2 captured.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

I-III: DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE  
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION  
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No.  
1190

DATE  
7/8 Jul 1945

I GROUND:

SOLOMONS:

1. Bougainville: 6 Jul: Patrol contacts 1500 yds N Ratsua; en posns 2300 yds NW Wearnes Hill encountered; en shelled posns E Mibo R along Buin Rd; en ambushed 3000 yds N Shishigatero.

NEW GUINEA:

2. Wewak: 6 Jul: Patrol clashes 2 mi W Yarabos and 4 mi SSE Boiken; nil rptd en opposn to capture of Ulupu and Kwambikum (4½ mi S Ulupu).

BORNEO:

3. Balikpapan: 5/6 Jul: Sev small-scale en night infiltration attempts N Balikpapan repulsed; 7 Jul: nil rptd en opposn as posns reached 500 yds N Manggar airstrip and 1 of 2x37mm dual purpose guns there destroyed; under en fire, Soember R crossed N Baroe-Hoeloe Peninsula.
4. Brunei Bay: 7 Jul: Hvy losses inflicted on est en co S Miri on Riam Rd.

PHILIPPINES:

5. Mindanao: Sarangani Bay: 7 Jul: Scattered en contacts Moab; 20 Japs killed in ambush 2 mi S Marbel. Agusan Valley: 7 Jul: Two en grps contacted, 2000 yds N and 2000 yds W Waloe.
6. Luzon: Northern Sector: 7 Jul: Scattered contacts made with unaggressive Japs E Cagayan Valley; en continues stubborn resistance from high ground 2500 yds NW Hucab (3 mi E Kiangan); against moderate opposn en pocket 1500 yds W Bauko eliminated and Bauko captured; no rptd opposn to occupation Pingad and Bonayan (2½ and 2 mi S Sibangan).

II AIR:

N.E.I.:

1. Timor: Photos 6 Jul: Nil a/c on 3 Timor a/ds.

BORNEO:

2. General: Photos 6 Jul: 2 serv a/c on 5 Borneo a/ds.

JAVA:

3. Soerabaja: Photos 5 Jul: 3 serv S/E a/c & 2 u/i a/c on Malang a/d.

FORMOSA:

4. Pescadores: Night 6/7 Jul: 1 en a/c sighted by B-24.
5. N. Formosa: 7 Jul: 3 en Fs ineffectively intcptd 24 B-24s over Matsuyama a/d.

CHINA:

6. Canton: Night 6/7 Jul: 1 en F made 1 non-firing pass agst B-24.

NANSEI:

7. Sakashima Gunto: 6 Jul: 2 S/E a/c on Hirara a/d fired by F4Us.
8. Amami Gunto: a) 7 Jul: 12 poss serv a/c on Tokuna a/d of which 4 dest by strafing; a/d under repair. b) 6 Jul: 24 non-operational a/c obsvd on Tokuna a/d.

KOREA:

9. S. Korea: 6 Jul: 1 D/B shot down by Navy search a/c off Saishu Is.

EMPIRE:

10. Honshu: 6 Jul: 98 P-51s sweeping 3 Tokyo a/ds shot down 1 en a/c & dam 6 in air; 6 dest, 1 prob & 19 dam on grd; 156 a/c sighted on various Tokyo a/ds.

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Summary 1190 - Cont'd

## III NAVY:

### MOLUCCAS:

1. N. Halmahera: 5 Jul: PTs sank 7 prahus.

### CELEBES:

2. Kendari Area: 6 Jul: 1 poss freighter (150/300T), 1 poss barge, 20/30 prahus.

### BORNEO:

3. Sandakan: 5 Jul: Natives report 10-12 suicide boats at entrance to hbr.

### FRENCH INDO CHINA:

4. Haiphong Area: 6 Jul: 1 75' loaded power junk sunk, power launch exploded, 10 lrg craft strafed, 4 150' tugs heavily strafed, 1 300' camouflaged freighter damaged, power launch strafed, 2 loaded coal barges bombed, 2 200' freighters strafed, 2 steamers bombed (1 damaged), 2 poss boats strafed, 82 junks and sampans strafed & damaged.

### HAINAN:

5. Yulin Bay: 7 Jul: 2 freighters (150/300T) and 1 u/i sm craft.
6. Hoihow: 7 Jul: 2 lrg, 6 sm luggers.

### FORMOSA:

7. Toseki: 6 Jul: 1 junk attacked, 35 mi NNE.

### CHINA COAST:

8. Hangchow Bay: 5 Jul: 2 freighters (300/1000T) sunk, 2 trawlers damaged.
9. Sanchau: 6 Jul: 1 lugger.
10. Wenchow Area: 7 Jul: 1 sm vs1 left burning & sinking.

### NANSEI SHOTO:

11. General: 6 Jul: 2 poss freighter-tpt (5500/7500T) hit, explosions seen; 2 25' boats destroyed; 1 freighter-tpt (150/300T) rocketed and strafed, 12 others sighted.

### KOREA:

12. Saishu Is: a) 6 Jul: 1 freighter-tpt (2/4500T), 1 freighter-tpt (1/1500T) sunk in hbr. b) 6 Jul: 2 freighter-tpts (2/4500T), crs SxIV, spd 8.

### JAPAN:

13. Yokosuka: 4 Jul: Photos show 1 battleship (Nagato), camouflaged and in same position, 3 destroyers, 2 old destroyers, 1 submarine, 3 frigats (1 in drydock), 4 subchasers (1 in drydock), 1 minesweeper, 3 attack tpts, 1 tanker, 2 LSM (1 in drydock), 2 merchant vessels (2800T total).
14. S. Coast Honshu: 6 Jul: 1 hospital ship, crs NNW, spd 10.
15. Osaka: 4 Jul: Photos show 1 destroyer, 1 destroyer escort outfitting, 1 frigate building, 2 LSM (1 building), 32 merchant vessels (54,000T total), 3 merchant vs1s building (8400T total), 3 merchant vs1s outfitting (6400T total), 1 merchant vs1 repairing (1000T).
16. Inland Sea: 4 Jul: 1 aircraft carrier hull at Ikeda Wan.

### CENTRAL PACIFIC:

17. Wake Is: 6 Jul: Allied destroyer intercepted enemy hospital ship after departure and found 974 bonafide patients.

## IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

### 1. Summary of the Enemy Situation:

#### a. Activities in the Forward Areas:

##### Northern Philippines (Luzon):

Cagayan Valley: Scattered contacts made with small unaggressive enemy groups in eastern Cagayan Valley.

Highway 4: Enemy continued stubborn defense of commanding ground east of Kiangnan. Intense Jap fire repulsed an attempt to flank strong-point.

Cervantes: Against moderate enemy resistance Philippine Army troops made limited gains south of Sibangan but captured Bauko.

##### Southern-Central Philippines (Mindanao):

Sarangani Bay: Scattered enemy contacts reported in the Moab vicinity; 20 Japs killed in ambush south of Marbel. Reports indicate the enemy re-inforcing Tupi and patrolling highway in that area.

Bukidnon: An estimated 150 Japs reported by guerrillas Northeast Lumbayao.

Agusan Valley: Two enemy groups contacted, north and west of Waloe. Estimated 200 Japs bivouacked vicinity Pagatpatan (14 miles Southwest Waloe) are constructing huts and cultivating land.

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**DECLASSIFIED****Borneo:**

Balikpapan: Several minor enemy night infiltration attempts north of Balikpapan were repulsed. No enemy opposition as positions north of Manggar airstrip were reached. Under enemy fire, elements of Netherlands East Indies forces crossed Soember River from Baroe-Hoeloe Peninsula to Kariango Area.

Brunei Bay: Heavy losses were inflicted on an estimated enemy company during clash south of Miri on the Riam Road. 2 serv a/c on 5 a/ds.

**b. Activities in Rear Areas:**

Timor: Nil serv a/c on 3 a/ds.

Java: 5 serv a/c on Malang a/d.

Formosa: Ineffective intercept by 3 en a/c.

Nansei Shotos: 7 en a/c dest on 2 a/ds.

Korea: 1 D/B shot down.

Tokyo: 33 en a/c dest, prob dest or dam by P-51s.

**c. Identifications: None.****d. Weather: Cancelled 7 July P-51 sweep of Tokyo a/ds.****2. Conclusions:****a. Enemy Capabilities:****Operations on Borneo:**

1) Inland Defense at Balikpapan.

**Operations in the Philippines:**

2) Delaying Action in Northern Luzon.

3) Scattered Resistance in Southern Mindanao.

**Operations on Borneo:**

1) Inland Defense at Balikpapan: Troops of the 7th Australian Division made only minor contacts, but observed several enemy movements while carrying out extensive patrolling throughout the Balikpapan area.

On the west side of Balikpapan Bay, the enemy ambushed a cavalry reconnaissance troop, searching 6 miles southwest of Penadjam; one section of the patrol was reported missing. North of Balikpapan town, several enemy movements were observed in the area approximately 3,500 yards east of Baroe village. Enemy fire from a position 1,000 yards north of the Sumbir River was delivered on elements of a NEI company crossing the river from the Baroe-Hoeloe Peninsula.

The enemy movements in the area northeast of Baroe village observed by patrols yesterday, while not fully described by reports from the field, is the first indication of enemy ground activity near the Allied lines since the landing. These troops may be elements of a concentration previously reported astride the road in the vicinity of Mt Batochamper,  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles northeast of Balikpapan, sent out to hold up Allied advances by harassing or delaying actions, while the main body develops or improves defensive positions. It is not yet clear whether the enemy withdrew inland to more favorable terrain for a defense or evacuated from the area in an effort to join other forces reported at Samarinda to the north or Bandjermasin in the southwest. However, continued but small scale employment of artillery and numerous but minor and scattered enemy contacts in the operational area denotes that a consolidation of enemy forces for a protracted defense in the Mt Batochamper area is still an enemy capability. (See Enclosure No. 1).

**Operations in the Philippines:**

2) Delaying Actions in Northern Luzon: In eastern Cagayan Valley, elements of the 37th Division continued to mop-up along the trails and stream beds of the Sierra Madres foothills with negligible resistance; over 50 Japs were killed in scattered contacts yesterday. There was little change in the situation in more active areas further to the south. Following the two-hour skirmish along the Lamut River, 4 miles northwest of Ibung, contact was completely broken by the enemy and our troops continued patrolling 1,000 yards north and northwest without further contact. High ground astride Highway 4, 3 miles east of Kiangnan, continued to be the focal point in this sector. Due to difficult terrain, tanks with the 6th Division were unable to maneuver as attempts were made to dislodge the enemy strongpoint. Elements of the 63rd Infantry temporarily withdrew in order to permit placing an artillery concentration on enemy positions. In the Bontoc area, a delayed report states that

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Sagada (5 miles west of Bontoc) has been occupied by Philippine Army troops with the enemy garrison moving  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles southeast toward Dantay. Enemy troops in this area showed no aggressiveness or inclination to fight. The barrios of Bonayan and Pingad on Highway 11 (2 and  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles south of Sabangan respectively) were occupied without opposition. After repulsing a counterattack 1,500 yards west of Bauko, Philippine Army units drove east along Highway 4 and seized the barrio against moderate enemy opposition. Northwest of Mankayan, some ground has been relinquished, but only under strong pressure. Aggressive enemy patrolling in this area suggests possible screening of extensive defenses in depth southeast of Mankayan.

The enemy at the present time displays no intention to relinquish positions to the west of Highway 5, although some shifting of troops continues to take place west of Banaue. A vigorous defense will probably continue to be effected where developed terrain permits the maximum benefits from limited facilities. (See Enclosure No. 2).

3) Scattered Resistance in Southern Mindanao: Northwest of Davao along the Kibawe-Talomo Trail, only scattered enemy contacts are encountered from heretofore strongly defended positions north and west of Kibangay. There is some indication that the shattered 100th Division's staff and an unestimated number of divisional troops have withdrawn northward along the trail as far as Upian, although the trickle of escapees southward toward Mt Apo also continues. Native reports of 2,000 Jap troops and 3,000 Jap civilians near Masawayan, north of Kibangay, are no more than greatly exaggerated affirmations of known evacuations inland along the Davao River without any well-defined destination; none probably exists. (See Enclosure No. 3).

In the Sarangani Bay area, our air reconnaissance and local guerrilla offensives have uncovered considerable enemy activity. Northwest from the Bay, the enemy is now patrolling the highway between Buntong and Tupi. Some evidence of large calibre artillery has been observed at Tupi, and guerrillas report a number of extensive buried arms and supply dumps in the adjacent forest. Jap communications of a rudimentary sort are maintained, in this remote undeveloped area, by collaborating native runners (Manobos). As is the case everywhere else on Mindanao, the small isolated garrison at Sarangani Bay has no defensive capability beyond a scattered attempt at its own local security from guerrilla harassment.

#### b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Inland Defense at Balikpapan: Continued but small scale employment of artillery and numerous but minor and scattered enemy contacts denotes that a consolidation of enemy forces for a protracted defense in the Mt Bato-champer area is still an enemy capability.

2) Delaying Actions in Northern Luzon: The enemy at the present time displays no intention to relinquish positions to the west of Highway 5, although some shifting of troops continues to take place west of Banaue. A vigorous defense will probably continue to be effected where developed terrain permits the maximum benefits from limited facilities.

3) Scattered Resistance in Southern Mindanao: As is the case everywhere else on Mindanao, the small isolated garrison at Sarangani Bay has no defensive capability beyond a scattered attempt at its own local security from guerrilla harassment.

#### V MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

##### Abortive Efforts to Employ Piloted Rocket Bombs in Luzon:

A credible explanation of the enemy's failure to employ Baka, his piloted suicide rocket encountered in small numbers off Okinawa, during the Luzon campaign is given by PW testimony. In all major details this testimony checks with known air battle order and ship sinkings; viz a) 721st Naval Air Unit, equipped with Bettys bearing necessary Baka attachments, was earmarked to proceed from the Empire to Luzon but was forestalled by a disintegrating ground situation at the latter; and b) a Japanese carrier was sunk, in the indicated area at the indicated time, by an Allied submarine.

"Prisoner claimed that he was looked on as an ordnance specialist and was selected to do a special ordnance course at Yokosuka Naval Air Unit, commencing 24 Oct 44. During this time he received training in the use and

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maintenance of Cho Ogata rocket bombs. He was posted to the Philippines to prepare for the use of this missile from Clark Field and claimed to have a full knowledge of it."

Although prisoner did not know of any target date that had been set for the use of the Baka Bomb from Philippine bases, arrangements for its use were well advanced. The bombs were to be handled through Manila Army Air Depot with whom liaison was effected by prisoner, who was to arrange for their transport from Manila to Clark Field. 14 specially constructed trailers to transport the bombs arrived at Clark Field on 22 and 23 Dec.

An unidentified aircraft carrier, carrying approximately 70 Bakas left Japan mid Dec 44 and was sunk en route to Manila. He was unable to state cause of sinking.

An unidentified vessel carrying approximately 50 Bakas left Japan for Manila late Dec 44, but as Clark Field was rendered unserviceable by Allied air attack and prisoner evacuated to the hills early Jan 45, he did not hear whether or not this vessel arrived in Manila.

The Betty airplanes of 721 Naval Air Unit were scheduled to come to Clark (at a date unknown to prisoner) for use with the Baka. When he left Japan this unit had a strength of only four airplanes, but he heard that it was to be built up to 20 or 30 and that these additional airplanes were then being fitted with the necessary attachments."

Interrogation of PW Ishida Mitsuo, Ensign, North Philippine Naval Air Unit. Captured in the vicinity of Kamiri while asleep on the roadside 29 Apr 45. ATIS Preliminary Interrogation, subject to confirmation.

Special care must be taken to insure the secrecy of this document. Information contained herein will not be circulated or reproduced beyond the Staff Section to which it is addressed. When not actually in use, this document is to be kept in a safe and is chargeable to the custody of an Officer. See AR 380-5, 15 March 1944, and Standing Operating Procedure Instructions No. 14, 14 March 1944, regarding security Classifications.

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Accompany Encl No. 1  
Daily Summary No. 1190

## EXPLANATORY NOTES:


On 7 Jul:

1. Enemy ambushed Cav Rcn troop patrolling SW to Sesoempeo River, 6 miles SW Penadjam; one section of troop was reported missing. Small enemy craft sighted  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles NW of Penadjam.
2. Enemy fire from position 1,000 yds N of Sumbir River was delivered on company of NEI troops crossing river from the Baroe-Hoeloe Peninsula. 15 small enemy craft were engaged and dispersed near the mouth of the Sumbir River.
3. Enemy movements in the vicinity of Kapak village, 3,500 yds NE of Baroe were reported by several patrols.
4. The area between Sepinggan-Besar and Manggar-Besar Rivers, for a distance of 3,500 yds inland is now clear of enemy.
5. Two enemy 37mm dual purpose guns located 1,500 yds NNE of the Manggar airfield by elements of 2/14th Bn; one gun had been destroyed by naval bombardment.

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ENCLOSURE NO. 1

Military Intelligence Section  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

COMBINED GROUND SITUATION  
TO: 2400/I, 7 JULY 45  
MSG TO: 1200/I, 8 JULY  
For Summary No. 1190

BALIKPAPAN



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EXPLANATORY NOTES:

On 6/7 Jul:


1. Scattered contacts with small unaggressive enemy groups E of Cagayan Valley resulted in 24 Japs being killed.
2. Remaining remnants along the Lamut River (4 miles NW Ibung) have been nopped up; our patrols 1000 yds N and NW of the barrio made no contacts.
3. Stubborn enemy defense astride Highway 4, 2,500 yards NW of Hucab continues. Attempts by elements of 6th Division to flank this outpost were repulsed. Difficult terrain precluded employment of tanks. Troops of 6th Division withdrew to permit artillery fire to be placed on the positions.
4. Against light opposition elements of Philippine Army Units occupied barrios of Bonayan and Pingad (2 miles and 2½ miles S of Sabangan).
5. Aggressive patrolling throughout the Bambang-Daklan A/d area resulted in 36 Japs killed and 6 captured in minor contacts.
6. Patrols of 32nd Division contacted estimated 30 Japs with MGs and a mortar 3 miles W of Camp 30.
7. Little progress has been made by Philippine Army elements advancing toward Manakayan. Enemy continued to stubbornly defend from the high ground 1,500 yards NW of barrio.
8. Repulsing a counterattack PA troops continued to attack E along Highway 4 and occupied Bauko against moderate resistance on 5 July.
9. A delayed report states that on 4 July PA units occupied Sagada (5 miles W Bontoc). The enemy garrison of this barrio withdrew to Dantay (2½ miles SE of Sagada), showing little inclination to fight.



**ENCLOSURE NO. 2**  
**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS**  
**SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA**  
**Military Intelligence Section**  
**General Staff**

**COMBINED GROUND SITUATION**  
**To: 2400/I, 7 July 45**  
**Mgs To: 1200/I, 8 July**  
**For Summary No. 1190**

SCALE 1:1,000,000  
0 10 20 30 40 MILES



NORTHERN LUZON



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To Accompany Enc. No. 3  
Daily Summary No. 1190

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

1. 7 Jul: Enemy column ambushed 2,500 yards south-east of Marbel, 20 Japs killed.
2. 7 Jul: Enemy resistance decreased from heretofore strongly defended positions within  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mile radius north and west Kibangay.
3. 4 Jul: Lieutenant General Harada, Hiro, Commanding General 100th Division, was last seen at Upian with undetermined number of Japs, according to natives reporting through guerrillas. The general was described as very weak and was carried by native bearers.
4. 6 Jul: Only light enemy resistance encountered in our advance along Kibawe-Talomo trail to a point  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles south Pinamola.


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ENCLOSURE NO 3

Military Intelligence Section  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES  
IN THE PACIFIC

COMBINED GROUND SITUATION  
TO: 2400I, 7 JUL 1945  
MSG TO: 1200I, 8 JUL  
FOR SUMMARY NO. 1190





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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

I-III: DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE  
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION  
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No.

1189

DATE

6/7 Jul 1945

I GROUND:

SOLOMONS:

1. Bougainville: 5 Jul: En posns 1600 yds N Wearnes Hill engaged by arty fire; en shelled posns 1000 yds N Rusei; sev strong Jap counterattacks repulsed vicin Shishigatero; en concentration rptd 2500 yds NW Kanaia.

NEW GUINEA:

2. Wewak: 5 Jul: En posns 1600 yds WNW and 900 yds ESE Mt Shiburangu overrun; strong en posns 100 yds N and 4600 yds S Ulupu engaged; native rpts strong en forces located in villages 4-10 mi S Ulupu.

BORNEO:

3. Balikpapan: 6 Jul: No en contacts as advances made N towards Soember Estuary; fire fr en coast defense gun located approx 1 mi N Manggar rcvd by our forces near Manggar airstrip; sporadic fire fr estd 75mm piece only resistance Penadjam Peninsula.

PHILIPPINES:

4. Mindanao: NW of Davao: 6 Jul: En resistance cont 1½ mi W Kibangay. Bukidnon 6 Jul: No en contacts to patrolling 10 mi E Dalawangan and to junction of Atugan and Tagaloan Rivers. Agusan Valley: 6 Jul: Nil en contacted by patrols in Halapitan, Sagunto, and Valoe areas.
5. Luzon: Central Sector: 6 Jul: Frequent en contacts vicin Sibul Springs. Northern Sector: After 2 hr fire fight en posns 2500 yds SW Payawan captd; stubborn resistance contd fr strong point 2500 yds NW Hucab (3 mi E Kiangon); PA units continue to receive stiff opposn 3000 yds NW Mankayan.

II AIR:

CELEBES:

1. Limboeng: Night 4/5 Jul: Lone u/i a/c sighted over area by night raiding PBYS.

BORNEO:

2. Balikpapan: 4 Jul: Lone en F/P made rcn of area.
3. Bandjermasin: 4 Jul: Single T/E a/c sighted 110 mi SW; 1515I.

HAINAN:

4. Kiungshan A/d: 5 Jul: Single Tpt a/c sighted on a/d; 1140I.

FORMOSA:

5. Heito: 6 Jul: 2 prob u/s a/c & "a nbr" of dummies and/or u/s a/c were dest on a/d by 23 B-24s.
6. Toyohara: 5 Jul: 1 en a/c fired on grd by 14 B-24s & 6 P-51s.

EMPIRE:

7. Honshu: a) 6 Jul: i) 5 en a/c dest & 10 dam, all on grd, by 103 P-51s sweeping a/ds in Tokyo area under adverse weather conditions. ii) 3 en Fs attack & dam search a/c on rescue mission off Chiba Peninsula; a/c crashed Iwo; nil cas. b) 4 Jul: 1 en a/c dest in air; 8 dest, 4 prob dest & 20 dam on grd, by 132 P-51s striking a/ds at Kasumigaura, Mobara & Ako; 1 P-51 lost.

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**LESSER SUNDAS:**

1. Tijger Grp: 5 Jul: 3 of 15 prahus strafed, 1 of 3 prahus sunk; 2 barges bombed.
2. Lomblem Id: 4 Jul: 2 luggers.

**BORNEO:**

3. Bandjermasin: 5 Jul: 1 freighter (300/1000T) sunk, 1 freighter (300/1000T) left sinking, & 1 freighter (150/300T) damaged.
4. Balikpapan: 4 Jul: Poss sub wake moving ENE.

**JAVA:**

5. Sourabaya: 5 Jul: Search plane rptd usual shipping.

**FRENCH INDO CHINA:**

6. Saigon: 5 Jul: 2 sm cargo vsls, 200 mi W.
7. Haiphong Area: 5 Jul: 1 junk (150'), 11 sampans destroyed; 1 boat (120') prob destroyed; 1 junk, 2 barges, 18 sampans, 4 boats (150'), 1 power boat (75'), 1 launch (60'), 12 junks, 3 u/i ships, 165 mi NW.

**HAINAN:**

8. Yulin Bay: 6 Jul: 4 freighters (150/300T), 4 u/i sm craft anchored.
9. Kiungshan Area: 6 Jul: 2 lrg luggers & 1 launch, 1 lrg tug or trawler (prob derelict) attacked at Hoi How.

**PESCADORES:**

10. Mako: 6 Jul: 1 subchaser anchored.
11. Hoko: 6 Jul: 1 lrg junk sunk.

**CHINA COAST:**

12. Amoy: a) 5 Jul: 1 prob destroyer escort, 1 freighter-tpt (2/4500T), 3 freighters (150/300T) & 40 junks. b) 6 Jul: 1 cargo barge dam, 40 mi E. c) 6 Jul: 1 subchaser, 3 freighters (150/300T) or lugger.
13. St John's Id: Night 5/6 Jul: 2 lrg junks sunk, 1 left listing, 17 damaged.
14. Shanghai: a) 4 Jul: 2 sm freighters sunk, 30 mi ENE. b) 4 Jul: 2 trawlers sunk, 50 mi ESE. c) 5 Jul: 1 light cruiser (Agano class) on crs WxS, 100 mi E. d) 5 Jul: 1 sm cargo vsl sunk, 65 mi ESE.
15. Chowsan Id: 5 Jul: 1 gunboat & 6 sea trucks.
16. Taichow: 5 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) left listing, 140 mi ExS.
17. HongKong: 6 Jul: 1 subchaser sunk (ident doubtful), 35 mi NE.
18. Swatow: 6 Jul: 1 motor launch dest, 5 mi NE.

**NANSEI SHOTO:**

19. Okinawa: 4 Jul: 3 u/i ships, 165 mi NW.
20. Sakashima: 5 Jul: 2 freighters (150/300T) at Iriomote Id.

**IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION**

**1. Summary of the Enemy Situation:**

**a. Activities in Forward Areas:**

**Northern Philippines (Luzon):**

East of Manila: Frequent contacts made with small enemy groups in the Sibul Springs area.

Kiangan-Banahue: The enemy continues to offer stiff resistance from strong points along the Kiangan and Mankayan routes of approach into the Kiangan-Banaue sector. Stubborn resistance encountered from a pocket in the Payawan area.

**Southern-Central Philippines (Mindanao):**

Northwest of Davao: The enemy continues stubborn defense west of Kibangay.

Bukidnon and Agusan Valley: Nil enemy contacts to extensive patrolling.

**Borneo:**

Balikpapan: Nil enemy resistance to continued northward advances towards the Soember Estuary. Fire received from enemy coast defense gun of unestimated caliber located near Manggar and from probable 75mm artillery piece on Penadjan Peninsula. Meagre en air operations cont, mainly rcn Flights.

**b. Activities in Rear Areas:**

Formosa: Min of 3 en a/c dest on grd at two a/ds.

Empire: a) 15 en a/c dest or dam by unopposed P-51s over Tokyo area, 6 July. b) 29 en a/c dest or dam by P-51s vicin Tokyo, 4 July.

**c. Identifications: None.**



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d. Weather: Adverse weather hampered air operations over Honshu.

## 2. Conclusions:

### a. Enemy Capabilities:

#### Operations on Borneo:

- 1) Withdrawal in the Balikpapan Area.

#### Operations in the Philippines:

- 2) Delaying Action on Highway 4, Northern Luzon.
- 3) Troop Deployment, Babuyan Islands.

#### Operations on Borneo:

1) Withdrawal in the Balikpapan Area: Remaining enemy elements in the Balikpapan sector have yet to interfere with our extension of control over and consolidation within this important objective area. A completely passive enemy attitude still prevails. Patrols searched in the Baroe Peninsula and the area south and east of Mt. Batochampar without contacts. One minor infiltration attempt in the 25th Brigade area was repulsed. In the Penadjam area, on the west shore of Balikpapan Bay, elements of the 2/9th Battalion have advanced approximately 2 miles northwest (capturing one 5 inch gun intact) while other troops reached a point  $1\frac{1}{4}$  miles southwest without opposition. Evidence thus far points to a hasty evacuation. The unopposed landing here on 5 July and subsequent advances inland without contact, suggests that the enemy may be withdrawing in an effort to conserve his available forces for defense inland or, realizing that he does not have sufficient strength to resist the Allied assault, has voluntarily abandoned the ground controlling the entrance to Balikpapan Bay for comparative safety in a long range withdrawal toward Bandjermasin.

The enemy, by giving up the vital area of Penadjam, has relinquished control of the harbor entrance. With the loss of this facility and Balikpapan town area, the enemy's only remaining capabilities are to withdraw inland where he may attempt to harass our troops from isolated strong points or finally move to Samarinda in the north or Bandjermasin in the southwest where other troop concentrations are indicated. (See Enclosure No. 1).

#### Operations in the Philippines:

2) Delaying Action on Highway 4, Northern Luzon: Recent fighting 3,500 yards southwest of Payawan culminating in a sharp two-hour clash before the enemy here was completely destroyed, together with a strongpoint encountered 3 miles east of Kiangnan, well defended by MGs emplaced in pillboxes and caves, further indicates the previously estimated enemy pattern of action along Highway 4; viz: strong localized delaying actions from successive and well exploited positions. Here, too, as in other defensive locales, he is greatly aided at the present time by the adverse weather conditions which at least temporarily prolong the maintenance of his fortifications in the face of our attacks. To date, no counterattacks have materialized which indicates his inability for an open engagement and a thorough commitment to passive action from strongly defended positions. Aggressive enemy patrolling has been noted  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles east of Mankayan by Philippine Army units, while resistance 1,500 yards northeast of the village continues. Some artillery fire was reported in this sector. Patrols along Highway 11 north of Camp 30 and in the vicinity of the Daklan Airstrip are operating without contact. Observers report an increase in enemy strength between Highway 4 and Highway 11, generally west of Banaue; the consistency of these reports have definitely established a regroupment pattern in this area.

It appears that the withdrawal to the high ground between Highway 11 and Highway 4 east of Banaue is continuing, screened by a force of sufficient strength to conduct a fairly effective covering action to the southeast along Highway 4. (See Enclosure No. 2).

3) Troop Deployment, Babuyan Islands: Reliable documentary evidence has established the 61st TMB as the principal enemy unit isolated in the Babuyan Islands. Absence of conclusive evidence, however, precludes an accurate assessment of the enemy's strength on each of the several islands of the group. It is of interest to note that this potentially strong reserve was available as a reinforcement for the enemy's depleted and hard-pressed

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northern Luzon garrison, but no decrease in strength was evinced (even after our Okinawa landing, aiding to some extent in rendering the Babuyan Island tactically impotent), a testimony of the effectiveness of our blockade and an illustration of indecision within the enemy command. That an attempt was to be made by the enemy to move the unit or elements to the south was noted by a reconnaissance party who landed on Fuga Island, 25 miles off the north tip of Luzon, on 19-20 June. Many barges and small launches were found on the beaches destroyed as a result of our air strikes. It is therefore probable that the enemy was in the process of utilizing them for an overwater movement to Luzon; documents have established the presence of brigade elements in the northern Cagayan Valley, strength unknown but possibly approximating a battalion. Since the distance between northern Luzon and these islands is only between 40 to 70 miles, such waterborne movement early in the campaign could have easily been made at night without fear of detection. However, constant surveillance and destruction of his limited means of transportation precluded the transfer of any significant number of troops. Similar conditions in regard to water transportation existed in the Aparri area, restricting movements to the Babuyan Islands. Thus, the troops of this brigade were left to shift for themselves and to forage for food when or where obtainable; their combat usefulness was thoroughly wasted.

The fate of this brigade was from the beginning the same as that of countless other enemy units cut off and by-passed throughout the Pacific areas. Its commitment in the Babuyan Islands presented another lost opportunity; as a tactical force to be reckoned with, it does not exist.

#### b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Withdrawal in the Balikpapan Area: The enemy, by giving up the vital area of Penadjam, has relinquished control of the harbor entrance. With the loss of this facility and Balikpapan town area, the enemy's only remaining capabilities are to withdraw inland where he may attempt to harass our troops from isolated strongpoints or finally move to Samarinda in the north or Bandjermasin in the southwest where other troop concentrations are indicated.

2) Delaying Action on Highway 4, Northern Luzon: It appears that the withdrawal to the high ground between Highway 11 and Highway 4, east of Banaue, is continuing, screened by a force of sufficient strength to conduct a fairly effective covering action to the southeast along Highway 4.

3) Troop Deployment, Babuyan Islands: The fate of the 61st IMB was from the beginning the same as that of countless other enemy units cut off and by-passed throughout the Pacific area. Its commitment in the Babuyan Islands presented another lost opportunity; as a tactical force to be reckoned with, it does not exist.

#### V MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

##### The Baka Bomb:

First credible details describing experimentation with and manufacture of the Baka bomb (piloted suicide rocket projectile launched from another aircraft), are furnished by the following PW testimony:

History Invented by Tech Lt (jg) OTA Hiroshi. In 1944 the pattern of German V-1 was decided upon. Oka bomb was formerly known as Marudai. The factory name for this bomb was MXY-7, i.e., "MX" for Yokosuka Naval Air Technical Dept, "Y" for glider, and 7 for seventh experiment.

Manufacture Mass production started early Nov 44. Complete assembly would only be done at forward bases. The rocket bomb parts were made at the following places:

Fuselage and Rocket Bomb Trailer: Made at Yokosuka Naval Air Tech Dept. Prisoner states approximately 50 fuselage assemblies per day were being produced in Nov 44.

Liquid Chemicals for Rocket and Explosives for War Head: Manufactured at Hiratsuka No 1 Naval Powder Magazine.

Veneer Wood Wings: Manufactured at Nakajima Aircraft Co Ltd at Tokyo-To.

War head and Rocket Bodies: Manufactured by Yokosuka Naval Air Tech Dept, Kamaria Branch. War head was assembled here.

Experiment and Training with Oka Bomb: First flight test was carried out at Konoike Aug 44, using a dummy rocket bomb with warhead and rocket body filled with water. After the rocket was released (with pilot) from the Betty

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it glided to earth. Before landing the rocket bomb pilot opened valves which released the water and made landing easier. The first test was successful but on the second trial water released from valves on belly of the rocket rushed upward due to air currents and water obstructed the pilot's vision. The model crashed and the pilot was killed.

OKA Rocket Bomb Units: Another ten man unit similar to OKA Unit of Northern Philippines Naval Air Unit, Central Clark Detachment, commanded by prisoner, was also formed from 721 Naval Air Unit at Konoike Dec 44. This unit was commanded by Lt. Konishi and was to leave Japan the same time as prisoner but was to go to Takao. This unit was to have joined the Takao Naval Air Unit.

Interrogation of PW Ishida Mitsuo, Ensign, North Philippine Naval Air Unit. Captured in the vicinity of Kamiri while asleep on the roadside, 29 Apr 45. ATIS Preliminary Interrogation, (subject to confirmation).

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To Accompany Report No. 1  
Daily Summary No. 1189

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

On 6 Jul:

1. In the Penadjam area, one company of 2/9th Bn moved approximately 2 miles NW capturing one 5 inch gun intact. Another company reached point  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles SW Penadjam. There were no enemy contacts.
2. Elements of the 25th Brigade moved N toward the Sumbir estuary without contact.
3. During night of 5/6 July a small enemy party unsuccessfully attempted an infiltration in the 2/25th Brigade area.
4. Troops of the 2/7th Cav Regt patrolled to points approximately 1,500 yds S and 2,000 yds E of Batochampar Village, without opposition.
5. Patrols searching in the vicinity of the Manggar airstrip, received fire from a probably coastal gun located approximately one mile NE of Manggar.

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EXPLANATORY NOTES:


On 5/6 Jul:

1. Scattered enemy contacts and minor clashes continue during the progress of mopping up in this sector by troops of 37th Div.
2. Elements of 6th Div launched an attack against enemy pocket 3,500 yds SW of Payawan; objective secured after two-hour fire fight.
3. Stubborn resistance astride Highway 4, 3 miles E of Kiangnan, continues. Enemy is employing MGs firing from pillboxes making our advances difficult and slow.
4. Observers report enemy is dug-in along Highway 4 between Kiangnan and Banaue, in well camouflaged one-man foxholes.
5. Between July 1 and 2 "large" number of enemy moved from Kiangnan to Banaue, thence 4 miles west to Baniki, where a large concentration was previously observed.
6. In addition to stubborn defense 1,500 yds NW of Mankayan, enemy is conducting aggressive patrolling sending patrols as far east as Teteg (4 $\frac{1}{2}$  miles E of Mankayan).

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

I-III: DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE  
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION  
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No.

1188

DATE

5/6 Jul 1945

I GROUND:

SOLOMONS:

1. Bougainville: 4 Jul: En forced to withdraw fr posns  $4\frac{1}{2}$  mi NE Rusei; en preparing defensive posns along Mivo R 4 mi NE Rusei.

NEW GUINEA:

2. Wewak: 4 Jul: Unest nbr en contacted 500 yds W Kulauru Mission; strong en opposn to capture of Nilav and Kwandaning villages ( $9\frac{1}{2}$  mi S and  $4\frac{1}{2}$  mi SE Maprik airstrip).

BORNEO:

3. Balikpapan: 5 Jul: No en opposn to landing on Penajam ( $2\frac{1}{2}$  mi W Balikpapan); scattered en contacts to mopping up in Balikpapan and along rd to Manggar; en equipment captd to date: Balikpapan: 1 tankette, 2 armored cars, 100 other vehicles.

PHILIPPINES:

4. Mindanao: NW of Davao: 5 Jul: Contd strong en resistance 2700 yds W Kibangay; 22 pillboxes destroyed this area. Kibawe-Talomo Trail; 5 Jul: Lt en resistance overcome in advance to posns  $3\frac{1}{2}$  mi S Pinamola. Agusan Valley: 5 Jul: Camota rptd clear of Japs; estd 150 en dug in 2000 yds WNW Halapitan.
5. Luzon: Northern Sector: 5 Jul: In sharp fire fight 5 mi N Norzagary 46 en killed and numerous sm arms captd; no en opposn as Mabtni (10 mi NE Ilagan), Callang (20 mi SE Ilagan) and San Mariano (11 mi NE Ilagan) occupied; lt en opposn as posns along Lamut R 4 mi NE Ibung occupied; 45 Japs killed by arty fire found this area; en astride Hwy 4 contd strong defense employing intese auto weapons fire.

II AIR:

BORNEO:

1. Balikpapan: 5 Jul: Single en plane (believed F/P) dropped 2 bombs in bivouac area wounding 2 personnel; dawn.
2. General: Photos 4 Jul: Nil a/c Ranau, Keningau, Trombol a/ds; r'ways partially serv.

FORMOSA:

3. Pescadores: Night 4/5 Jul: 1 en F made 1 firing pass at night B without dam; 2328I.

JAPAN:

4. Kyushu: a) 5 Jul: 4 en a/c dest & 2 prob dest of 6 encountered by 32 P-51s S of Sasebo; nil other airborne sightings on sweep up E coast & down W coast. b) 2 Jul: (further rpt): 29 en Fs made 18 attacks against Okinawa-based B-24s & escorting Fs; minor dam to 1 B-24.

III NAVY:

MOLLUCCAS:

1. Halmahera: 4 Jul: PTs destroyed 6 canoes, & strafed 1 poss camouflaged barge.

BORNEO:

2. Bandjermasin Area: 4 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) damaged; 1 barge (100')

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fired; 1 lrg riverboat strafed; 20 luggers & freighters (150/300T) & 1 river steamer sighted.

## FRENCH INDO CHINA:

3. Haiphong: 5 Jul: 10 freighters (300/1000T), 4 freighters (150/300T) & 1 patrol boat anchored.

4. General: 5 Jul: C St Jacques, Tourane, Camranh Bay & Quinhon empty.

## HAINAN:

5. Kiungshan Area: 5 Jul: 1 freighter-tpt (3/1200T), 1 freighter (300/1000T), 2 freighters (150/300T), & 1 sm craft at Hoi How.

6. Yulin Bay: 5 Jul: 4 freighters (150/300T), 2 freighters (300/1000T), 1 subchaser, 1 dredge anchored.

7. Tonkon Pt: 5 Jul: 1 lugger sunk; 5 luggers headed for shore, 5 mi SW.

## PESCADORES:

8. Hoko Id: 5 Jul: 1 lugger left burning & sinking, 30 mi S; 1 junk anchored, 25 mi ENE.

## CHINA COAST:

9. Shanghai: a) 3 Jul: 2 destroyers, 1 med freighter-tpt, 1 u/i vsl, 25 mi ENE. b) Night 4/5 Jul: 6 u/i ships, 2 escort size & 1 lrg ship on crs NWxN; spd 10, 175 mi NWxN. c) 5 Jul: 1 sm coastal freighter (300T) sunk, 70 mi ESE.

10. Amoy: a) 5 Jul: 1 freighter-tpt (2/4500T) on crs N. b) 5 Jul: 3 u/i ships, 4 junks anchored, 1 prob destroyer escort entering hbr. c) 5 Jul: 5 lrg junks moving N-ward, 40 mi E.

11. Gulf of Tonkin: 4 Jul: 3 convoys in NE gulf heading E, consisting of 25 boats (50'), 5 mi S of Kisan; 125 boats (50'), 10 mi E of Pakhoi; & 50 junks, 20 mi S of Pakhoi.

12. Yangtze R: 5 Jul: 1 light cruiser (Agano class) on crs WxS, spd 12, in N channel.

## NANSEI SHOTO:

13. Sakishima: 5 Jul: 2 freighters (150/300T) anchored vicin Irimote Id.

## JAPAN:

14. Shimonoseki Str: 2 Jul: B-29 Photos reveal: 2 destroyers, 1 destroyer escort, 2 frigates, 1 cable vsl, 70 merch vsls operational (140,000T total), 2 merch vsls repairing (4,000T total).

15. NE Kyushu: 2 Jul: B-29 photos show 1 escort carrier (Kaiyo & 1 river steamer at Beppu.

16. Fukuoka: 2 Jul: B-29 photos show 2 merch vsls (12,500T total).

17. Sasebo: 2 Jul: B-29 photos reveal: 1 a/c carrier (Kasagi), 1 sm carrier (prob converted Ibuki), 1 a/c carrier (Hayataka), all of which were camouflaged; 1 destroyer in drydock, 1 destroyer building & 1 old destroyer; 7 subs (2 in drydock, 3 building); 2 destroyer escorts in drydock; 1 coastal mine layer; 2 minesweepers (1 in drydock); 5 frigates (2 in drydock); 1 subchaser; 1 high speed transport; 2 LSM; 1 merch vsl (1800T).

## IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

## 1. Summary of the Enemy Situation:

a. Activities in Forward Areas:Northern Philippines (Luzon):

East of Manila: Sharp fire fight north of Norzagary; 46 of an estimated 50 enemy engaged were killed.

Highway 4: Light enemy opposition overcome as positions along the Lamut River 4 miles northeast of Ibung occupied. Enemy's stubborn defense Southeast Kiangnan continued.

Southern-Central Philippines (Mindanao):

Northwest of Davao: Intense fire from pillboxes, small arms and mortars encountered west of Kibangay. PWs report approximately 2,000 soldiers and 3,000 civilians in Masawang area (3½ miles north of Kibangay). PWs further report an 100th Division order dated 10 May directing final stand of the Division at Banas but if unable to hold out to withdraw to Basiao (7 miles west northwest of Kibangay).

Kibawe-Talomo Trail: Light enemy resistance continues.

Agusan Valley: An estimated 150 enemy are dug in west northwest of Halapitan. Camota reported clear of Japs.

Borneo:

Balikpapan: No opposition to landing at Penajam (2½ miles west Balikpapan); enemy formerly in area reportedly withdrew night 4/5 July.

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Scattered contacts Balikpapan area and along road to Manggar. Approximately 2,000 enemy estimated to be between Balikpapan and Samarinda with main strength probably concentrated vicinity of Mt Batochampar ( $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles northeast Balikpapan). Single enemy plane dropped 2 bombs.

b. Activities in Rear Area:

Formosa: Usual intercept night Bs.

Kyushu: 4 of 6 airborne en a/c dest by P-51s.

c. Identifications: None.

d. Weather: Luzon fighter missions cancelled due to weather.

2. Conclusions:

a. Enemy Capabilities:

Operations on Borneo:

- 1) Withdrawal from Balikpapan.

Operations in the Philippines:

- 2) Maintenance of Isolated Points of Resistance, Northern Luzon.
- 3) Defense of the Kibawe-Talomo Trail (Mindanao).

Operations on Borneo:

1) Withdrawal from Balikpapan: Without opposition, the 2/9th Battalion crossed Balikpapan Bay on 5 July and landed at Penadjam,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles west of Balikpapan. Enemy troops in this area reportedly withdrew the night of 4-5 July.

The enemy's dispositions in the Balikpapan area become clearer as additional identifications and troop concentrations are reported. Yesterday, two companies of the Yamada infantry battalion were identified in the Manggar area, approximately 13 miles northeast of Balikpapan. Documentary evidence reveals that this battalion was originally the 376th Independent Infantry Battalion, reorganized and redesignated on Tarakan Island in March 1945 and moved to Balikpapan about the middle of April; as yet the new numerical designation has not been determined. Since this movement was made over water it can be assumed that the losses due to attrition and other causes were negligible and the battalion was close to full strength prior to our landing. Later information discloses that the unit was given the responsibility of the defense of the Manggar-Sambodja area. Earlier the 22nd Naval Base Force was identified in the Balikpapan area, but the source did not reveal the strength or location of any units. New evidence indicates that the organization was originally organized in Japan, consisting of a Headquarters and four battalions, each having three companies with machine gun, anti-tank and artillery units. Captured documents indicate that the headquarters was in Balikpapan in July 1944 with an estimated strength of 2,000, with small detachments in Samarinda and Bandjermasin.

Further information of the enemy defensive plan was obtained from a captured map showing the sub-division of south and east Borneo into five defense zones, the Pontianak, Bandjermasin, Balikpapan and two others not defined; Tarakan was included in one of the latter. The exact boundaries of each were not shown.

Ground forces in the field estimate the remaining effective strength in this area as 2,000, with the main concentration in the vicinity of Mt Matochampar,  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles northeast of Balikpapan. After allowing for the known casualties (approximately 650 to 1200 1/4 July) and indicated enemy withdrawals prior to the landing, this estimate, perhaps is low. However, since the main strength has not been encountered and the intelligence from usual combat forces has been meager, an estimate of the effective troops in the area can not be accurately determined at this time. With no significant changes in previously indicated trends having developed, estimates of withdrawal inland appear to be confirmed. The enemy is in no position to seriously interfere with our occupation and development of the immediate Balikpapan area. (See Encl No. 1).

Operations in the Philippines:

- 2) Maintenance of Isolated Points of Resistance, Northern Luzon:

Extensive patrolling and mopping up of the enemy's small pockets of resistance continues throughout the eastern area of the Cagayan Valley with

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activity mainly confined to contacts with small enemy groups offering only light resistance about 5 miles east of Tamauni and in the vicinity of Baggao. About 100 Japs were killed and numerous small arms captured during these clashes. The barrio of San Mariano, 14 miles east of Ilagan, was occupied without opposition, indicating a previous withdrawal to the east along the Ilagan-Palanan Bay trail, with evacuees possibly concentrating in the Palanan Bay area. West of Highway 5, in the Kiangnan-Banaue sector, stubborn enemy resistance continues, supported intermittently by artillery and automatic weapons fire. Completely sealed in this last remaining defensive area, it is apparent that the enemy is willing to sacrifice perhaps the bulk of his combat strength to impede our advances along the approach avenues. Since some movements toward the center of this sector are still being observed, it is possible that the previously indicated realignment is not complete and more time is needed in order to extricate troops and supplies into more favorable locales between Highway 4 and Highway 11. Accepting this possibility as a fact, it is probable that the present resistance is effected by a small yet well coordinated delaying group working from successive positions and determined to delay our convergence within the Kiangnan-Banaue sector.

Realizing that his principal remaining capability is inland defense to delay our advances to the maximum, the enemy's most logical solution is to be found in delaying actions. By gradually contracting his lines, he will attain more consolidated positions from where he can prosecute his main stand in terrain most suitable to his overall purpose. Present enemy actions all indicate that this course of action will be followed. (See Enclosure No. 2).

3) Defense of the Kibawe-Talomo Trail (Mindanao): Extensive dug-in positions, probably hasty makeshifts, support the enemy's persistent resistance along the Kibawe-Talomo Trail west and north of Kibangay; 22 pill-boxes have been destroyed in our recent advances to that area. PWs locate the 100th Division's last known CP in Banas, 3 miles southwest of Kibangay, but claimed to have seen Divisional orders directing a dispersal to the mountains if an alleged "final stand" at Banas failed. Such an order, if it actually was given, typifies the enemy's recognition of his helpless situation. Even his last despairing efforts to hold along the Kibawe-Talomo Trail evince no tactical plan; uncontested advances down the Trail from Kibawe are now  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles below Pinamola, and eventually will envelop from the rear his entire remaining force left committed around Kibangay. Dispersed flight to neighboring inland mountains is, by the enemy's own probable admission, his only recourse in southern Mindanao.

#### b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Withdrawal from Balikpapan: With no significant changes in previously indicated trends having developed, estimates of withdrawal inland appear to be confirmed. The enemy is in no position to seriously interfere with our occupation and development of the immediate Balikpapan area.

2) Maintenance of Isolated Points of Resistance, Northern Luzon: Realizing that his principal remaining capability is inland defense to delay our advances to the maximum, the enemy's most logical solution is to be found in delaying actions. By gradually contracting his lines, he will attain more consolidated positions from where he can prosecute his main stand in terrain most suitable to his overall purpose. Present enemy actions all indicate that this course of action will be followed.

3) Defense of the Kibawe-Talomo Trail (Mindanao): Dispersed flight to neighboring inland mountains is, by the enemy's own probable admission, his only recourse in southern Mindanao.

#### V MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

##### Japanese Espionage in the Manila Area:

Disturbing evidence exists, in several proven instances, of enemy espionage attempts in the Manila area (for a recent example of his frequent infiltrations for this and sabotage purposes see Sec. V Daily Summary No. 1187). The following Japanese order specifically direct the establishment

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of an organized fifth column and a radio station, which latter might conceivably operate on high frequency to submarines.

20 Jan - Maj Yamaji to command Nammoei Organization (to consist of counterintelligence squad, Kirishima Organization, Takaesaki Organization, a portion of the special intelligence unit, and Kokuchu Society) which will engage in secret activities in Manila Area. "Before the penetration of the enemy, we must endeavor to exterminate extreme pro-Americans ...." and "after the enemy's penetration, emphasis must be placed on the military situation. We must endeavor to gather information in regard to enemy intention so that fifth column activities can be carried out."

Items to be heeded in counterintelligence activities: officers will use secret names; "It will be a general rule that no one except persons concerned will know the composition of the organizations. The commanding officers' residences, and names and appointments will not be disclosed. Assumed names will be employed. Officers will use secret names." Vehicles will not be marked with the insignia of the special organization; secret language (such as mountain, river, valley) will be used to disclose projected moves and names of places. Gives methods of collecting information, intelligence reports. Priests (nuns), doctors, Ganap members, etc, can be used by intelligence organizations operating behind the enemy lines. "A responsible man will be selected for the custody and burning of secret documents and he will be charged with managing these matters. Methods will be quickly devised for burning and disposition of documents of no further use." "Kirishima Organization will continue its present duties in addition to complying with separate instructions. It will remain in Manila and prepare one wireless set for intelligence work."

Bound mimeographed handwritten and carbon-copied file containing operation orders issued 20 Jan - 13 Feb 45 by Nammoei Organization, Okuyama Force and Kawashima Gp (Maj Gen Kawashima, Osamu C/G 82 Inf Brig of 105 Div. in MANILA and IPO Area. Captured at RIZAL, NUEVA ECIJA Province, LUZON - date unknown. Recd 162 Lang Det, Sixth Army - 30 May 45. Recd ATIS SWPA - 10 Jun 45. From ATIS BULLETIN NO. 2093, translation of Document No. 605918, Item 1, 1 Jul 45.

Special care must be taken to insure the secrecy of this document. Information contained herein will not be circulated or reproduced beyond the Staff Section to which it is addressed. When not actually in use, this document is to be kept in a safe and is chargeable to the custody of an Officer. See AR 380-5, 15 March 1944, and Standing Operating Procedure Instructions No. 14, 14 March 1944, regarding security Classifications.

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EXPLANATORY NOTES:

On 5 Jul:

1. The 2/9th Bn landed at Pendajam (across the bay, approximately  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles W of Balikpapan) without opposition, after preliminary bombardment. Enemy reported to have withdrawn during the night of 4 - 5 July.
2. Enemy stores and bivouac area NE of the landing beaches were found evacuated, presumably result of aerial and naval bombardment.
3. "Large" troop concentration reported SE of the road in the Mt Batochampar area  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles NE of Balikpapan.
4. Two companies "Yamada" Inf Bn identified in the Manggar area. Anti-aircraft artillery reported active NE of Manggar.

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To Accompany Encl No. 2  
Daily Summary No. 1188

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

On 4/5 Jul:

1. Without enemy contact elements of 37th Division carried out extensive patrolling E of Gonzaga.
2. Other elements of 37th Division engaged small enemy group S of Baggao. Mopping up continues in this sector without opposition.
3. Sixty-five Japs were contacted 9,000 yards E of Tamauni by elements of 145th Infantry, 37th Division.
4. Without opposition our units captured barrios of Santa Mariano, Mabtni and Callang, all E of Illagan.
5. Stiff resistance supported by intense automatic weapons fire encountered by troops of 63rd Infantry from the series of ridges  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles NW of Hucab, on Old Highway 4 ( $2\frac{1}{2}$  mi E of Kiangnan).
6. Following artillery and air preparation, enemy positions along Lamut River (4 mi NE of Ibung) occupied against light opposition.
7. Overcoming organized resistance at road block 300 yards N of Camp 30, elements of 32nd Division proceeded north along Highway 11.
8. Over 380 Japs were killed or captured in vicinity of Bauko, and NW of Manlayan as Philippine Army units continued their operations in this sector.

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Enclosure No. 2

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA


Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff

COMBINED GROUND SITUATION  
TO: 24001, 5 JULY 45

Mags To: 12001, 6 July 45  
For Summary No. 1188

SCALE 1:1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 MILES



NORTHERN LUZON

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

I-III: DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE  
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION  
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No.  
1187

DATE  
4/5 Jul 1945

I GROUND:

SOLOMONS:

1. Bougainville: 3 Jul: "Lrg" en grp obsvd moving N 2300 yds NE Rusei; sev attacks by 50-60 Japs 2800 yds N Shishigatero repulsed; en concentrations obsvd NNE Bugui and SSW Kagisago.

NEW GUINEA:

2. Wewak: 3 Jul: En posns 900 yds WNW, 2100 yds E and 6000 yds E Mt Shiburangu overrun; our troops capt'd posns 1300 yds NE, 1100 yds ENE and 500 yds SE Ulupu; sev villages 2/9 mi SSE Maprik cleared and occupied.

BORNEO:

3. Balikpapan: 4 Jul: Against lt scattered resistance Balikpapan towmand dock area capt'd; slight en opposn overcome as Manggar airstrip (13 mi E Balikpapan) occupied; en ammo dump 4 mi NE Balikpapan destroyed.

PHILIPPINES:

4. Mindanao: NW of Davao: 4 Jul: En resistance 2500 yds W Kibangay eliminated, but advances N this area limited by strong delaying action; unestd nbr Japs contacted 1½ mi W Unapan. Kibawe-Talomo Trail: 4 Jul: Scattered en contacts NW Pinamolo. Agusan Valley: 4 Jul: Minor en contacts in Waloe and Halapitan area.
5. Luzon: Central Sector: 4 Jul: Frequent en contacts made in Montalban and Ipo Dam areas. Northern Sector: 4 Jul: Moderate en resistance to advances 4 mi SE and 3 mi E Kiangang; approx 100 Japs encountered Tapel (5 mi E Gonzaga); scattered en contacts in Bokod area; rd block covered by 50 en found 300 yds N Camp 30; sm grp en with 2 MGs holding posn across Hwy 11, 20 mi NE Acops Place; stiff en resistance fr MGs in caves 2 mi NW Mankayan.

II AIR:

BORNEO:

1. Balikpapan: 2 Jul (Late rpt): 1 en a/c shot down.
2. Miri: 3 Jul: 1 en a/c dropped 2 bombs & strafed roads in area; nil cas.

FORMOSA:

3. Shinchiku: a) 4 Jul: 3 u/i S/E Fs obsvd heading N; nil contact. b) 3 Jul: 5 u/i S/E a/c obsvd on a/d by search a/c.
4. Mako: 4 Jul: a) 2 en a/c picked up by blind B; nil contact. b) 2 en Fs intcptd other B-24 bombing coaling wharf; nil dam either side; 1144I.

FRENCH INDO CHINA:

5. Saigon: 4 Jul: 1 u/i F sighted off coast by Navy search a/c; nil contact; 1130I.

CHINA:

6. Canton: a) 4 Jul: 1 of 2 airborne en a/c fired on blind B; 0421I. b) 3 Jul: 1 airborne en a/c failed to intcpt Allied Rcn a/c. c) 2 Jul: 3 en a/c sighted by B-24 over Honan area; nil contact.
7. Amoy: 3/4 Jul: 2 T/E en a/c followed Navy search a/c; nil intcptn; night.
8. Nantung: 4 Jul: Ships AA shot down 1 P-47 attacking convoy off China coast.

NANSEI SHOTOS:

9. Okinawa: a) 3 Jul: Air alert 0335-0440I; 1 en F shot down by TAF a/c N of Ie Shima; 0345I. b) 2 Jul: 1 en a/c crashed NW Zampa Misaki after making unsuccessful torpedo run on screening vs1; 0303I.

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10. Sakishima: 3 Jul: 1 S/E a/c dest on Miyara a/d by CAP a/c.

## KOREA:

11. Saishu To: 3 Jul: 1 en a/c sighted; nil contact.

## EMPIRE:

12. Kyushu: a) 4 Jul: 6 u/i a/c obsvd on grd at Izumi a/d. b) 3 Jul: i) 11-15 en Fs interceptd Navy search a/c off W coast; aggressive passes & phos bombs used; 1 en a/c shot down, 1 prob shot down; 1 search a/c dam. ii) 3 T/E Bs & 6 S/E a/c at Kanoya a/d strafed by 26 P-47s; 1200-1400I.  
13. Honshu: 4 Jul: a) 2 u/i T/E a/c sighted along NE coast by Navy search a/c; nil interceptn. b) 1 T/E a/c sighted Suruga Bay area; nil contact.

## III NAVY:

## MOLUCCAS:

1. Halmahera: 2 Jul: 2 prahus, 2 canoes destroyed at Koesoe, 1 type "A" barge & 1 canoe hit at Miti Pt.

## LESSER SUNDAS:

2. Alor: 3 Jul: 1 poss barge & concentration of prahus unsuccessfully attacked at Kalabahi.  
3. Leti Group: 3 Jul: 2 prahus strafed at Kisar Id.

## BORNEO:

4. Kuching: 4 Jul: 2 freighters (150/300T) left burning; shipyard containing 4 half finished freighters (150/300T) fired.  
5. Bandjermasin: 3 Jul: 1 u/i vsl destroyed; 1 vsl (60'), 1 river steamer, 2 barges damaged in Barito R.  
6. Pontianak: 4 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) & 1 river steamer sunk; 2 freighters (150/300T) damaged; 12 other sm craft sighted.

## MALAY PENINSULA:

7. Singapore: 4 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) in E Johore Straits; navy yard not seen due to weather.

## HAINAN:

8. Kiungshan: 4 Jul: 1 patrol craft, 1 freighter (150/300T) anchored.  
9. Yulin Bay: 4 Jul: 2 freighters (150/300T) anchored.

## FORMOSA:

10. Keelung: 4 Jul: 2 freighters (150/300T) anchored.

## CHINA COAST:

11. Amoy: 4 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T), 1 freighter (300/1000T), 1 u/i vsl anchored.  
12. Shanghai: a) 4 Jul: Convoy of 1 damaged lrg freighter-tpt, 1 lrg tpt, 1 lrg freighter-tpt, 2 med freighter-tpt unsuccessfully attacked on crs NWxN, spd 8, 75 mi NE. b) 4 Jul: 1 destroyer on crs S, 55 mi NE. c) 3 Jul: 1 destroyer escort, 2 freighters (300/850T) circling.  
13. Chusan Id: a) 2 Jul: 1 freighter (7000/10,500T) destroyed, 1 freighter-tpt (2/4500T) damaged. b) 3 Jul: 3 freighters (150/300T) anchored.

## NANPO SHOTO:

14. Chichi Jima: 4 Jul: 1 hospital ship on crs NxW, spd 10.

## NANSEI SHOTO:

15. Okinawa Area: 4 Jul: Surfaced sub sighted.

## KOREA:

16. SW Coast: a) 2 Jul: 1 sm tanker, 1 freighter (300/1000T) sunk; 1 freighter (150/300T) damaged. b) 3 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) sunk, on crs NExE, spd 5. c) 3 Jul: 2 destroyer escorts anchored.  
17. Chosen Str: 3 Jul: 2 freighters (150/300T) damaged, on crs W, spd 3. b) 3 Jul: 2 freighters (150/300T) strafed & bombed; 1 left listing on crs SWxW, spd 4.  
18. SE Coast: a) 3 Jul: 1 freighter (300/1000T), 1 tanker (10,000T), 1 freighter (150/300T), & 10 u/i merch vsls in hbr. b) 3 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) strafed.  
19. Saishu Id: 3 Jul: 1 of 2 freighters (150/300T) sunk off N coast.

## JAPAN:

20. S Honshu: a) 4 Jul: 1 freighter-tpt (700/1300T), 1 freighter (150/300T) & sm escort vsl anchored in Suruga Bay. b) 3 Jul: 1 destroyer, 1 destroyer escort, 2 freighters (150/300T) on crs SW, spd 8.  
21. SW Kyushu: 4 Jul: 13 lrg & 17 sm merch vsls near Ushibuku.  
22. NW Kyushu: a) 4 Jul: 3-5 lrg transports, at Lakozaki; 7 lrg naval vsls at Iki Shima. b) 4 Jul: 6-7 freighter-tpts, SE tip Azuchi O Shima.

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c)3 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) prob sunk, 1 damaged.

23. Sasebo: 4 Jul: 1 sm carrier (partially covered by smoke screen) in hbr.

24. Nagasaki: a) 4 Jul: Nbr lrg cargo ships, 1 tanker (10,000T) & 1 tanker (5200T) in hbr. b) 3 Jul: 2 freighter-tpts (2/4500T) strafed on crs E, spd 10, 20 mi SW.

#### CENTRAL PACIFIC:

25. Wake Is: 3 Jul: Allied destroyer intercepted & searched hospital ship enroute to Wake but found no grounds for detaining.

#### MARIANAS:

26. Guam: 1 Jul: 1 poss sub sighted, 210 mi ESE. (C-3 rpt).

### IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

#### 1. Summary of the Enemy Situation:

##### a. Activities in Forward areas:

##### Northern Philippines (Luzon):

East of Manila: Frequent contacts with small enemy groups reported in Ipo dam and Montalban areas.

Aparri: Approximately 100 enemy encountered at Tapel (25 miles east of Aparri).

Highway 4: Moderate enemy resistance as our forces, confined to patrol action because of landslides on road, continued to advance SE of Kiangnan.

Highway 11: Enemy roadblock covered by fire from 30 Japs encountered north of Camp 30, and an enemy strongpoint located 20 miles northeast Acops Place.

Cervantes: Stiff enemy resistance in form of machine gun fire from caves encountered northwest of Mankayan.

##### Southern-Central Philippines (Mindanao):

Northwest of Davao: Enemy resistance west of Kibangay eliminated, however advances north from this area limited to small gains by strong enemy delaying action. Unestimated number of enemy contacted west of Unapan.

Kibawe-Talomo Trail: Scattered enemy contacts continue in Pinamola vicinity.

Agusan Valley: Small enemy groups contacted in Waloe and Halapitan areas.

##### Borneo:

Balikpapan: Against scattered, light enemy resistance Balikpapan town and dock area secured. The Manggar airstrip occupied against slight opposition. Air sightings, PW and native reports indicate approximately 1000 enemy concentrating in the Mt Batochampar area (4½ miles northeast Balikpapan). 1 en a/c bombed & strafed Miri area.

##### b. Activities in Rear Areas:

Formosa: Minor en air activity obsvd at Shinchiku. 2 en a/c intcpt B-24 over Mako.

Saigon: 1 u/i a/c sighted off coast.

China: En air activity over Canton & Amoy.

Okinawa: Sm en sorties carried out.

Sakishima: 1 en a/c dest at Miyara a/d.

Kyushu: 11-15 en Fs intcptd Navy search a/c.

##### c. Identifications: None.

##### d. Weather: Curtailed B & F sorties over Formosa & Luzon.

#### 2. Conclusions:

##### a. Enemy Capabilities:

Operations on Borneo:

1) Withdrawal from Balikpapan.

Operations in the Philippines:

2) Defense of Mankayan, Northern Luzon.

Operations on Borneo:

1) Withdrawal from Balikpapan: The enemy's reaction to the Allied operations on Balikpapan peninsula has not changed materially since the landing; there has been little attempt to impede our extension of contact

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over this important sector. Overcoming light scattered resistance, the 18th Brigade on the left flank has secured the Balikpapan town and dock area, while in the central sector, the 25th Brigade advanced north approximately one mile along the Valley road to occupy positions just east of Baroe village. Elements of the 21st Brigade, after clearing mines and booby traps in Batakan-Ketjil moved eastward against light opposition and captured the Manggar airfield, 13 miles NE of Balikpapan.

After 4 days fighting the enemy troop dispositions in this area still remain obscure. A possible clue comes from prisoners of war and native reports, along with air observation, all indicating that an estimated 1,000 enemy are concentrated southeast of the road area in the vicinity of Mt Batochamper, approximately  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles northeast of Balikpapan. The fact that this information comes from three different sources should be given considerable consideration in determining its reliability. These troops may have withdrawn inland prior to or during the preliminary bombardment and are in process of reorganizing for a coordinated defense in the surrounding high ground. On the other hand, the proximity to the only hard surface road leading north out of the peninsula area could be interpreted as an evacuation from this sector to Samarinda (60 miles NE) or Bandjermasin (320 miles SW); destination of evacuees, however, has not materialized.

The Allied advances in the Balikpapan area, against only light scattered resistance, suggest that the enemy is either incapable of organizing his available forces for a coordinated defense or has withdrawn inland for regrouping for eventual defense from isolated terrain features. Another likely probability is the complete evacuation of the Balikpapan peninsula. (See Encl No. 1)

#### Operations in the Philippines:

2) Defense of Mankayan, Northern Luzon: Despite one week of fighting, air bombardment and artillery concentrations, during which he sustained heavy losses in both men and materiel, the enemy continues to cling to well prepared defenses interdicting the approach to Mankayan and Highway 11. Localized but sharp fighting has been and is still in progress. Reliable sources reveal the enemy is well dug-in and that his defense here consists of numerous caves and tunnels probably stocked with supplies sufficient for a continued defense. Only isolated instances have occurred evincing some weakening of resistance. Enemy command control appears to remain at a fairly high level of efficiency; artillery and other support weapons have been coordinated with localized ground action. Tactical development of the terrain between Mankayan and Highway 11 is indicated to be exceptionally good and the enemy can, aided by heavy rains, maintain his positions for a considerable time before this pocket collapses.

Even though no conclusive evidence presently points to a disintegration of this small defense sector, the continuous attrition resulting from our air and artillery concentrations, and lack of sufficient reserves foreshadows an eventual collapse of the Mankayan defense sector. (See Enclosure No. 2).

#### b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Withdrawal from Balikpapan: The Allied advances in the Balikpapan area, against only light scattered resistance, suggest that the enemy is either incapable of organizing his available forces for a coordinated defense or has withdrawn inland for regrouping for eventual defense from isolated terrain features. Another likely probability is the complete evacuation of the Balikpapan peninsula.

2) Defense of Mankayan, Northern Luzon: Even though no conclusive evidence presently points to a disintegration of this small defense sector, the continuous attrition resulting from our air and artillery concentrations, and lack of sufficient reserves foreshadows an eventual collapse of the Mankayan defense sector.

#### V MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

##### 1. Rear-Area Infiltration:

The dispatch of spies and saboteurs, often disguised as civilians, to attempt infiltrations of our rear areas has been a frequent enemy tactic.

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In future operations the problem will increase in that, from a counter-Intelligence standpoint, our base and rear areas will in fact be combat zones. The following PW interrogation is illustrative:

From FREE PHILIPPINES (NEWSPAPER), Tuesday, July 3, 1945.

"JAP NABBED

A Japanese seen by an M.P. strolling early Sunday morning on the corner of Taft Avenue and P. Burgos, was arrested and turned over to CIC."

CAPTURE

"MIYATA's intention was to reach PACO, South MANILA, where he knew a Filipino family of five (three daughters, ages ranging from 15 to 21 - but names unknown to him). They lived in a house which was located in back of the Golden Taxi Company's building (near the Esko Shoe Manufacturing Company)- the No. 1 Supply Depot (PW's), MANILA Army Air Main Depot, occupied a school building which was across the street from the Esko Shoe Co.

He asserted that he deserted the Army because he wished to live; and what happened to him in the hands of his former Filipino friends, or whether he was killed or captured enroute, was immaterial to him - he wanted food.

He left MONTALBAN with two other Jap deserters (names unknown to him but both from a Southern Army Sig Unit). The party was fired upon twice: once by guerrillas, and on 28 Jun 45 by US troops, in which incident, he was separated from his two comrades.

As regards particulars regarding the two - and he believed that their objectives, as far as he knew, was MANILA - the prisoner gave the following: Both dressed in civilian clothing; one a Sgt, 5 ft 3 in. (approximate), the other an Army civilian employee, 5 ft 4 in.

Furthermore, he stated that he moved only in the dark; and asserted that the above-mentioned attacks took place at night, the final one was just south of SAN MATEO.

MIYATA was arrested in front of the MANILA Police Station, about 0600 hrs, 30 Jun 45, by an USA MP Jeep Patrol - clothed in a shabby and dirty Jap Army summer uniform (pants, regular; upper, fatigue); and famished and emaciated.

PW stated that he was not connected in any way with TOKUMU KIKAN, or any M.P. organizations." Interrogation of PW MIYATA Yoshio, Superior Private, Army Air, Truck Driver. Prisoner appeared to be of below average intelligence - a simple-minded character. Answered questions freely. ATIS Preliminary Interrogation, subject to confirmation.

2. Okinawan Civilians Exhorted to Suicidal Defense:

Except insofar as a devastated and blockaded homeland may crack their traditional national obedience, the civilian reaction on Saipan and Okinawa will be the reaction encountered in Japan. The dangerous extent to which noncombatant organizations and civil bodies are expected to be used as illustrated by the instructions below, will present a major counter-intelligence problem:

"1. Policemen as well as civilians who are not in the Armed forces must realize the fact that to give your life for your country in case of emergency is the people's great duty to our nation. This indoctrination must be thoroughly carried out.

2. Under no circumstances will policeman be captured by the enemy.

3. Cooperation in guerrilla warfare:

a. Disguised policemen or spies who have been selected from the civilians will infiltrate into the areas occupied by the enemy and will reconnoiter the enemy situation.

c. The policemen will cooperate with the army and will participate in battles to the last man. Also government and municipal officials and civilians will demonstrate this spirit and will fight for glory as Japanese.

4. Taking advantage of our men who are now in the enemy's hands they will establish contact with them and they will communicate secretly with our guerrillas. They will assassinate enemy leaders, destroy army barracks, and throw the enemy positions into confusion. After the men are thoroughly trained for the above purpose they must infiltrate deep into enemy territory.

5. A secret investigation of the men who are in the enemy occupied area will be carried out. If any collaborators are found they must be killed or other appropriate measures must be taken.

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6. For civilians especially in the enemy occupied areas, efforts to overcome the enemy propaganda must be made.

7. In defending the Imperial soil not only soldiers are obliged to give their lives but all Japanese should defend this soil with their lives. With only this spirit can we kill every one of the proud American soldiers and defend our Imperial soil." Extracts from "Outline of Battle Activity" (date and date of capture unknown). From TRANSLATION No. 172, A.C. of S., G-2 Headquarters Tenth Army, 19 June 1945.

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
EXPLANATORY NOTES:

On 4 Jul:

1. Overcoming light scattered resistance, the 18th Brigade secured the Balikpapan town and dock area.
2. 68 enemy dead were counted on high ground. 2,500 yds E of Pier 7.
3. Patrols of the 25th Brigade, searching N on the W side of the Valley road contacted small enemy party 1,000 yds NE of Baroe village.
4. Elements of the 2/7th Cav Regt cleared the high ground 2,000 yds NW of Sepinggang airstrip.
5. The 2/14th Bn, advancing E from Batakan-Ketjil, reached the Manggar airstrip encountering only slight resistance. Intermittent 75mm fire was received from unknown location as Bn was consolidating on air strip. Manggar-Ketjil bridge was demolished; Manggar-Besar bridge passable only to foot traffic.
6. PW and native reports plus air sightings indicate approximately 1,000 enemy concentrated SE of the road in the Mt. Batochampar area ( $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles NE Balikpapan).

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Enclosure No. 1

Military Intelligence Section  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
COMBINED GROUND SITUATION  
To 2400I 4 July 1945  
Msgs To 1200I 5 July 1945  
For Summary No. 1187

BALIKPAPAN



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
EXPLANATORY NOTES:

On 4/5 Jul:

1. Observers report enemy is constructing earthworks on high ground west of highway 4 (west of Banaue).
2. Patrols of 6th Division reached a point  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles northeast of Bolog encountered a machine gun position blocking the only trail to Lagawe ( $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles north of Bolog). Landslides on highway 4 precluded the use of larger force for the advance on Kiangnan.
3. Small groups of Japs with machine guns holding a position across Highway 11, 20 miles north of Acops place, were located by patrols of the 32nd Division.
4. Stubborn resistance 1500 yds northwest of Mankayan continues. Japs are armed with automatic weapons and located in caves and tunnels.
5. Intense enemy automatic weapons fire and intermittent artillery concentrations were received by Philippine Army troops 1 mile northwest of Bauko.



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

I-III: DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE  
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION  
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No.  
1186

DATE  
3/4 Jul 1945

I GROUND:

SOLMONS:

1. Bougainville: 2 Jul: En holds posns 1000 yds N Wearnies Hill; two counter-attacks repulsed vicin Shishigataero; "lrg" en force rptd moving N 1000 yds W this village; lt opposn to capt posns 1500 yds SSE Buin Rd Mobial R crossing; en activ rptd Piano Mission (3000 yds N Aku).

NEW GUINEA:

2. Wewak: 2 Jul: Japs occupy posns E, S & W slopes Mt Shiburangu; lt opposn as villages 2000 & 4000 yds S of Yamil occupied; en contacted Nilah (9 mi S Maprik).

BORNEO:

3. Balikpapan: 2/3 Jul: Unest nbr en engaged 2000 yds NE Stalkedo; no opposn to seizure Signal Hill & plateau to N. 300 en dead found 1300 yds NE Klandasan; air observer rptd fires in Sambodja refinery & pumping station (18 mi NW Balikpapan).

PHILIPPINES:

4. Mindanao: NW of Davao: 3 Jul: En stubbornly holding commanding ground 2200 yds W Kibangay; scattered contacts 2 mi SW Unapan & vicin Lacon Plantation. Sarangani Bay: 3 Jul: Considerable truck activ obsvd along rd SE Tupi. Kibawe-Talomo Trail: 3 Jul: Slight en resistance overcome in advance to posns  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mi S Pinamola. Agusan Valley: 3 Jul: Est 200 en with MGs & mortars  $3\frac{1}{2}$  mi SW Waloe.
5. Luzon: Central Sector: 3 Jul: Scattered en contacts Sibul Springs; Northern Sector: 3 Jul: Nil opposn to advances  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mi N & 2 mi NW of Bolog; at latter posn 30 Japs with MGs & mortars contacted; 50 en armed with hvy MGs encountered  $2\frac{1}{2}$  mi SW Ibung; stubborn resistance continues N Mankayan; scattered patrol contacts Cagayan Valley.

II AIR:

NEI:

1. Kai Is: Photos 2 Jul: Letfoear & Faan a/ds u/s; nil a/c.
2. Timor: 2 Jul: Lone en F sighted 25 mi SE Cape Tafara by search PBV; 0806I.
3. Celebes: Photos 2 Jul: Nil a/c on Kendari area a/ds of Tiworo, Ambesia, Witicola, Kendari, & Boroboro; only Kendari #1 & Ambesia R'ways serv.

BORNEO:

4. Balikpapan Area: 3 Jul: 2 en rcn a/c over area, 1 shot down by CVE night F; early morn.

FORMOSA:

5. General Area: Photos 30 Jun: Total of 74 serv a/c revealed on 16 main a/ds (57 Fs, 14 Bs, 2 Tpts, 1 F/P).

NANSEI SHOTOS:

6. Okinawa: 1 Jul: a) 8 bombs dropped on Yontan a/d during single en pre-dawn air attack caused nil dam or cas. b) 1 T/E B shot down during day by TAF.

CHINA COAST:

7. Hangchow Area: 3 Jul: a) 1 en biplane shot down vicin Chusan Id by search a/c. b) 10 F/Ps & F/Bs obsvd at Chod-Yan S/P base, "sev" T/E Bs obsvd at Ting-Hai a/d.

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Summary 1160 Cont'd  
**DECLASSIFIED****EMPIRE:**

- 8.S. Kyushu: a) 3 Jul: 8 en Fs shot down by CAP of 24 Marine F4Us (4 of 20 airborne Fs dest in 1st encounter; 4 of 40 airborne Fs dest during 2nd encounter); en pilots & tactics rptd as "excellent." b) 2 Jul: 18 en Fs intercept 5 photo B-24s; en a/c driven off by escorting P-47s.
- 9.W. Kyushu: 3 Jul: 3 F/Ps dest by P-51s over Fukuoka Hbr; Izumi a/d appeared u/s.

**III NAVY:****MOLUCCAS:**

- 1.Halmahera: 1 Jul: 24 canoes strafed, 2 sunk, in Dodinga Bay.

**CELEBES:**

- 2.Moena Id: 2 Jul: 3 luggers unsuccessfully bombed.

**BORNEO:**

- 3.Samarinda Area: Night 1/2 Jul: 1 vsl (20-40') escaped fr PTs in Bayor R.
- 4.Kuching: 2 Jul: 2 lrg schooners slightly damaged; 1 freighter (150/300T) not attacked; obsvd 6 freighters (150/300T) burned beyond repair.

**MALAY PENINSULA:**

- 5.Kuantan Area: a) 2 Jul: 1 motor launch strafed & sunk. b) 2 Jul: 10 camouflaged freighters (150/300T) (some loaded, others loading) unsuccessfully bombed; however strafed & left 2 burning, 1 prob sunk, remainder damaged at Chukai.

**FRENCH INDO CHINA:**

- 6.Haiphong: 2 Jul: 1 med merch vsl.

**HAINAN:**

- 7.Yulin Bay: 3 Jul: 2 freighters (150/300T).
- 8.Kiungshan: 3 Jul: 5 freighters (150/300T), 1 freighter-tpt (2/4500T), 1 powered junk.

**FORMOSA:**

- 9.Takao: 3 Jul: 1 gunboat, 15 mi SE.
- 10.Keelung: 3 Jul: 3 luggers, 1 freighter (150/300T) anchored.

**PESCADORES:**

- 11.Mako Id: 2 Jul: 1 prob motor launch strafed with unobsvd results, 10 mi E.

**CHINA COAST:**

- 12.Amoy Area: a) 3 Jul: 1 junk, 10 barges damaged; 1 sm patrol craft, & 1 junk attacked, off Wuseu Id. b) 3 Jul: Amer ground sources rpt 2 destroyer-escorts, 7 patrol craft, 1 freighter (150/300T), 1 minesweeper, 2 lrg u/i craft with motorboats going to & fr ships.
- 13.Hangchow Bay: 1 Jul: 1 med freighter, & 1 freighter (150/300T) damaged.

**YELLOW SEA:**

- 14.General: 1 Jul: 2 sm ships sunk, 1 sm ship damaged.

**JAPAN:**

- 15.Hamamatsu: 1 Jul: 4 freighters (150/300T), 1 freighter (2300T), 1 sea-plane hangar destroyed; 1 minesweeper, 1 sea tug, 4 freighters (150/300T) & 2 luggers damaged.
- 16.E. Kyushu: 2 Jul: 1 hvy cruiser & 1 lrg destroyer heading S.

**CAROLINES:**

- 17.Ulithi: 30 Jun: Poss sub sighted, 275 mi W. (Graded C-3).

**MARSHALLS:**

- 18.Eniwetok: 30 Jun: Poss sub sighted, 450 mi W & 750 mi W. (Graded C-3).

**IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION****1. Summary of the Enemy Situation:****a. Activities in Forward Areas:****Northern Philippines (Luzon):**

East of Manila: Scattered enemy groups contacted in the Sibul Springs Area.

Highway 5: Minor enemy contacts to patrolling Cagayan Valley.

Highway 4: Nil enemy opposition north of Bolog along new Highway 4; enemy strongpoint of 30 Japs armed with automatic weapons contacted northwest of Bolog astride old Highway 4.

Lamut River: Strong enemy positions encountered southwest of Ibung along Lamut River.

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Cervantes: The enemy is stubbornly resisting our advances north of Mankayan, probably to gain time to complete consolidation of troops off Highway 4.

**Southern-Central Philippines:**

Northwest of Davao: Stubborn enemy defense of commanding terrain west of Kibangay continues; scattered enemy contacts in Unapan and Lacon Plantation areas.

Sarangani Bay: Considerable enemy truck activity observed along highway southwest of Tupi.

Kibawe-Talomo Trail: Only slight enemy resistance as our troops made continued advances south of Pinamola.

Agusan Valley: Scattered enemy groups, including one of an estimated 200 enemy armed with machine guns and mortars, reported in the Waloe vicinity.

**Borneo:**

Balikpapan: No enemy opposition to seizure of Signal Hill and plateau to the north. 300 enemy were found dead in the area northeast of Klandasan. Unestimated number of enemy encountered northeast of Stalkoedo. Air observer reported fires in Sambodja refinery and pumping station area/ 1 of 2 enemy a/c shot down over Balikpapan area.

**b. Activities in Rear Areas:**

Celebes: Majority of a/ds in Kendari area u/s with nil a/c.

Nansei Shotos: Continued air harassment.

Empire: Increased defensive air patrols over Kyushu, employing 1st line combat a/c & experienced pilots.

**c. Identifications: None.**

**d. Weather: Curtailed air operations over Luzon.**

**2. Conclusions:**

**a. Enemy Capabilities:**

**Operations on Borneo:**

- 1) Defense of Balikpapan.

**Operations in the Philippines:**

- 2) Realignment in the Kibangay-Banaue Sector.
- 3) Defense of the Kibawe-Talomo Trail.

**Operations in the Empire:**

- 4) Air Defense of Southern Kyushu.

**Operations on Borneo:**

1) Defense of Balikpapan: Yesterday elements of the 7th Australian Division, continuing the advance inland against light and scattered opposition, captured the central Balikpapan town area. Ranging reconnaissance groups failed to develop significant contacts or locate potential areas of resistance. Moving east along the coast, troops reached the village of Batakan-Ketjil after encountering only 20 to 30 Japs in the area. Patrols searched about 4 miles inland north of Stalkoedo reaching the track junction 800 yards south-east of the village of Soember-Kanan.

That the Allied forces were able to overrun the beachheads and over half of the Balikpapan town area, previously indicated to be well developed and heavily defended, virtually unopposed, strongly suggests the bombardment prior to the landing completely disorganized the enemy defensive plans, causing his forces to withdraw.

At present there is no clear pattern of withdrawal, but three possible courses in this respect are open to the enemy. First, a movement northeast to Samarinda, approximately 60 miles, where it is estimated approximately 1,500 troops are deployed in this oil and river ship yards center. Secondly, a withdrawal to Bandjermasin, 320 miles southwest (100 miles of this route is a foot track), the only other strongpoint in Southeastern Borneo. The third course open is an evacuation north into the hinterland with ultimate destination in the upper Mahakan River area, where he could live off the land but no longer be considered a threat to our forces. The shortest and easiest escape route would be to Samarinda; but so far there has been no indication of any movement in that direction. Here he would be open to attack from the coast via the Koetai River. A withdrawal south to Bandjermasin may have been planned since there has been some evidence of road construction between Tanahgrogot

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and Sepakoe, however, extent of the movement is not known. The distance and time involved would make such a withdrawal very slow and costly.

The Balikpapan area, regardless of its importance, may have been lightly held; this conclusion is rather tenuous but the completely passive attitude of the enemy does not coincide with the presence of a strong garrison or well defended positions. Meager, information, while not conclusive, implies withdrawal from the operational area; routes followed have yet to materialize. (See Enclosure No. 1).

#### Operations in the Philippines:

2) Realignment in the Kiangnan-Banaue Sector: Hampered by adverse weather conditions, forward elements of the 63rd Infantry continued their unopposed northward advances astride the old and new Highway 4, reaching positions about 3 miles southeast of Kiangnan. Even though our forces have overrun extensive installations flanking Highway 4, reminiscent of suicidal strongpoints elsewhere, there are no indications of our encountering similar strong passive defense tactics here. Rather, evidence implies that the enemy may be withdrawing to high ground to the west overlooking Highway 4 from where he is in a more advantageous position to harass and infiltrate our positions and lines of communication. Reports from observers that the enemy is extricating elements from the Banaue area, moving them west across Highway 4 to high ground between this Highway and Highway 11, supports the implication.

The enemy's continued withdrawal in the face of our advance and abandonment of defensive installations astride Highway 4, coupled with the reported movement of elements from Banaue westward probably forecasts the eventual pattern of action in this sector, viz: search for remote relatively safe sectors permitting continued survival and for isolated positions from where he can carry on guerrilla-type warfare. Development of pockets of resistance is always a possibility, but the enemy has evinced little desire for typical suicidal stands. With his capabilities gradually diminishing, this indicated troop shift in the Banaue area may be a prelude to collapse of organized resistance in the Banaue-Kiangnan sector. (See Enclosure No. 2).

3) Defense of the Kibawe-Talomo Trail: Appreciable enemy resistance continues to be met only in Southern Mindanao northwest of Davao, as the enemy seeks to prevent complete dissection of his remaining elements by defense of the Kibawe-Talomo Trail. Although this trail is not a serviceable military road, at least within the ambit of our current reconnaissance, it is the enemy's only north-south communication line left by his loss of Sayre Highway. Now rendered vulnerable on the north by the collapse of opposition at Pinamola, obviously precipitated by troop strength inadequate to hold even favorable terrain, the trail offers a rapidly diminishing escape avenue for scattered Japanese groups still struggling across country from Bukidnon toward Agusan Valley. The majority of these latter are described by guerrillas as sickly, and those who cannot maintain the march are killed; pilfered root crops and wild fruit are their main subsistence. Despite redoubled enemy efforts, with-in his meagre capabilities, to halt our further advance up the Kibawe-Talomo Trail from the south, i.e., west and north of Kibangay, his potential reward will be slight. Neither extrication of 100th Division remnants from the Kibangay-Unapan sector to temporary refuge around Mt Apo, nor the trickle of 30th Division troops still reaching Agusan Valley from the west, can accomplish any significant tactical results.

#### Operations in the Empire:

4) Air Defense of Southern Kyushu: On 3 July, for the first time since the beginning of air operations over Southern Kyushu, our combat air patrols encountered enemy fighters in strength in this area. Two groups of 20 and 40 hostile fighters were engaged by 24 Marine F4Us. Of each enemy group, 4 aircraft were destroyed; our loss was 1 plane. In another sector of Kyushu, 5 photo B-24s were intercepted by 8 of 18 enemy fighters. P-47s flying cover, dispersed the intercepting enemy. One B-24 was damaged and was followed by 11 enemy fighters for some time without further attack.

Although but meagre results were scored by the enemy, their aircraft were firstline combat planes, and the pilots and tactics were reported as excellent. This is a further substantiation of previous reports that first-line planes and pilots were being conserved for air operations in defense of the Homeland.

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The 78 enemy fighters airborne are but approximately 12% of the estimated fighter strength of the Kysuhu-Kure area, but their presence as the first strong combat air patrols to be encountered over Southern Kysushu may presage the end of the current passive air reaction to our daily fighter sweeps from Okinawa as pointed out in Summary 1185.

b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Defense of Balikpapan: The Balikpapan area, regardless of its importance, may have been lightly held; this conclusion is rather tenuous but the completely passive attitude of the enemy does not coincide with the presence of a strong garrison or well defended positions. Meager information while not conclusive, implies withdrawal from the operational area; routes followed have yet to materialize.

2) Realignment in the Kiangang-Banaue Sector: Development of pockets of resistance is always a possibility, but the enemy has evinced little desire for typical suicidal stands. With his capabilities gradually diminishing, this indicated troop shift in the Banaue area may be a prelude to collapse of organized resistance in the Banaue-Kiangang sector.

3) Defense of the Kibawe-Talomo Trail: Neither extrication of 100th Division remnants from the Kibnagay-Unapan sector to temporary refuge around Mt Apo, nor the trickle of 30th Division troops still reaching Agusan Valley from the west, can accomplish any significant tactical results.

4) Air Defense of Kyushu: Strong enemy combat air patrols encountered for the first time over Kyushu, may presage the end of previous passive air resistance to our fighter sweeps.

#### V MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

##### Earthquake Damage in Japan:

Extreme vulnerability of the enemy home islands to natural disasters from flood, wind and earthquake is again illustrated by an eye-witness report of the previously noted earthquake in December, 1944. Indirect tribute to the disastrous results of our B-29 strikes is found in the PW's comparative statement that the earthquake was even worse:

5 Dec. 44. A severe earthquake, which rocked the east coast on this date, caused a great deal of damage. The area most heavily stricken was from Numazu to Hamamatsu and Ise. Factory buildings constructed of wood on a temporary basis in this area, nearly all collapsed.

In the area from Numazu to Toyohashi hundreds of homes were destroyed and people left destitute. A Nakajima airplane factory building at Nagoya collapsed, and prisoner heard 150 were killed. He further heard that railroad bridges in the Numazu area were destroyed and the East Coast Railway (Tokaido Sen) was not operative between 5 and 20 Dec 44. This greatly hampered production.

Heard also that the destruction caused by this earthquake was even more severe than the Allied B-29 raid on Nagoya, 10 or 11 Dec 44. Interrogation of PW Uchiyama Takeshi, Capt, arrived in Clark Airfield on 8 Jan 45, on board Douglas type transport plane, claimed he was assigned to be the C.O. of Maintenance Branch, Manila Air Depot. Captured at Bayanban, Luzon, 11 Jun 45.

Special care must be taken to insure the secrecy of this document. Information contained herein will not be circulated or reproduced beyond the Staff Section to which it is addressed. When not actually in use, this document is to be kept in a safe and is chargeable to the custody of an Officer. See AR 380-5, 15 March 1944, and Standing Operating Procedure Instructions, No. 14, 14 March 1944, regarding security Classifications.

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
EXPLANATORY NOTES:

On 3 Jul:

1. Central Balikpapan area captured by elements of the 18th Aust Brig after overcoming moderate resistance.
2. Unestimated number enemy were engaged on Hill 77 with unreported results.
3. The 2/27th Bn patrolled to the pumping station NE of Stalkoedo thence to the road junction 3/4 miles E of Stalkoedo continuing along coastal road to Sepinggang without contact.
4. The 2/17th Bn moved to Batakan-Kitijil encountering 15 to 20 enemy in the store area within the village.
5. Air observers reported fires in refinery and pumping station at Sambodja 30 miles NE of Balikpapan.
6. Patrols from N of Sepinggang-Ketjil searched NW to track junction 800 yds SE of village of Soember-Kanan without contact.

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Enclosure No. 1

Military Intelligence Section  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

COMBINED GROUND SITUATION  
To 2400I 3 July 1945  
Msgs To 1200I 3 July 1945  
For Summary No. 1186

BALIKPAPAN




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To Accompany Encl No. 2  
Daily Summary No. 1186

#### EXPLANATORY NOTES

On 3/4 Jul:


1. Without enemy contact elements of 37th Division seized Gonzaga (24 miles east of Aparri).
  2. Mopping up in Baggao sector continues against scattered groups. No opposition reported.
  3. Contact with 30 Japs, armed with automatic weapons made by forward elements of 6th Division at a point on Old Highway 4, 2 miles northwest of Bolog.
  4. Another 50 Japs with heavy machine guns contacted by 6th Division Reconnaissance patrols  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles southwest of Ibung, with unreported results.
  5. Intense small arms fire supported by artillery checked Philippine Army units' advance 8 miles east of Cervantes.
  6. Observers report considerable westward movement from Banaue, probably to the high ground west of Highway 4.
- 



**Enclosure No. 2**  
**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS**  
**SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA**  
**Military Intelligence Section**  
**General Staff**

**COMBINED GROUND SITUATION**  
**To: 24001/3 Jul 45**  
**Msgs To: 12001/4 Jul**  
**For Summary No. 1196**

SCALE 1:1,000,000  
0 10 20 30 40 MILES



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

I-III: DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE  
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION  
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No.  
1185

DATE  
2/3 Jul 1945

I GROUND:

SOLOMONS:

1. Bougainville: 1 Jul: En digging-in 1500 yds SW Ibu; scattered en contacts E & SE Shishigatero; en activity rptd N of Buin Rd between Porror & Silibai Rivers.

NEW GUINEA:

2. Wewak: 1 Jul: No en opposn as Uasinge (3 mi SW Yamil airstrip) reached; Japs holding ridges 1300 yds SSW & 1400 yds SSE of Airstrip.

BORNEO:

3. Balikpapan: 2 Jul: Intense en MG fire encountered in advance to posns 1000 yds E Klandasan R; no en contacts rptd as posns 2000 yds N Stalkoedo reached.

PHILIPPINES:

4. Mindanao: NW of Davao: 2 Jul: En employing mortars & auto-wpns fr commanding ground W Kibangay offering stubborn resistance to our advances. Kibawe-Talomo Trail: 2 Jul: Scattered en contacts as posns 2500 yds S Pinamola taken. Agusan Valley: 2 Jul: 200 Japs 5000 yds NW Waloe rptd by guerrillas, & our troops rpt 200 en with MGs & mortars 5500 yds SW of Waloe; en strongpoints of platoon strength armed with MGs and mortars located 5300 yds W & 400 yds N Sagunto.
5. Luzon: Central Sector: 2 Jul: Scattered en contacts Ipo-Infanta area. Northern Sector: 2 Jul: Minor en contacts N Bolog.

II AIR:

BORNEO:

1. Balikpapan: 2 Jul: Nil air opposn to Allied landings; 1 Carrier a/c downed by Hvy en AA.
2. Kuching: 2 Jul: 1 en F taxiing for takeoff strafed & left burning by PB4Y 1240I.

FORMOSA:

3. Toyohara: 2 Jul: 23 Fs obsvd by B-24s on a/d is largest concentration offered in recent weeks; 2 en a/c airborne did not intercpt Bs or escorting P-51s.

CHINA:

4. Ningpo: 2 Jul: 1 F/P dest on water at Tingnai & 1 u/i a/c on landing strip by P-47s escorting PB4Y in shipping attack.

NANSEI SHOTOS:

5. Okinawa: 1 Jul: Single en plane caused early morn alert; did not close.
6. Miyako: 1 Jul: 8 poss operational a/c seen in revets & on Hirara a/d.

EMPIRE:

7. Kyushu: 1 Jul: 2 T/E Bs shot down by Kyushu CAP & 4 T/E F/Bs dest at Ibusuki S/P Base; sightings by CAP (maintained almost continuously during day) 3 S/E a/c Kushira, 10 at Shibushi, 15 on Kanoya & numerous a/c on Kanoya East, 8/10 yellow T/E a/c on race track NE of Kanoya.
8. Nagoya: 1 Jul: 3 en a/c dest in air, 3 dest & 7 dam on grd by 142 P-51s attacking Hamamatsu a/d; 5 other Nagoya fields scheduled not hit due to severe tgt weather; only 4/6 en a/c sighted; 1 hangar at Hamashima S/P Base dest; 1530/1710I.

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Summary 41185 - Cont'd

**III NAVY:**

**MOLUCCAS:**

1. NW Halmahera: 1 Jul: 1 aux craft destroyed, 2 barges strafed & hit.

**LESSER SUNDAS:**

2. Soembawa: 1 Jul: Boats under construction at Lopok strafed.  
3. Timor: Night 1/2 Jul: Barge off central N coast.

**CELEBES:**

4. Pare Pare: 1 Jul: 2 power barges & 2 of 3 towed sailing craft destroyed.  
5. Moena Id: 2 Jul: 3-4 luggers at Raha.  
6. Kendari: 2 Jul: Bombed lugger undershot, 20 mi ESE.

**BORNEO:**

7. Laoet Id: 2 Jul: 5 aux sailing boats damaged, 80 mi SSE.

**MALAY PENINSULA:**

8. Kuantan: 1 Jul: 30 freighters (150/300T) anchored; 15 sm freighter keels atkd.

**FRENCH INDO-CHINA:**

9. Haiphong: 2 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) left smoking fr strafing.  
10. General: 1 Jul: C St Jacques, Quinhon, & Tourane empty.  
11. Nan Fong Bay: 1 Jul: 2 barges damaged.

**HAINAN:**

12. Kiungshan: a) Night 1/2 Jul: 1 sailing junk damaged, 12 mi NW. b) 2 Jul: 1 subchaser, 2 freighters (150/300T) & 2 luggers.

**FORMOSA:**

13. Keelung: 2 Jul: 1 freighter-tpt (300/1200T) possibly derelict, 2 freighters (150/300T), & 5 luggers.

**CHINA:**

14. HongKong Area: Night 1/2 Jul: 3 junks strafed, 12 mi S of Huiling Id.  
15. Shanghai: a) 30 Jun: 1 hvy cruiser, 1 destroyer, 5 lrg merch ships & other vsls attacked off coast, firing 4 lrg & 5 sm ships. b) 2 Jul: 1 of 2 freighter-tpts (5500/7500T) sunk, off coast. c) 1 Jul: 1 lrg & 1 med tpt, 1 destroyer, 1 destroyer escort on crs NWxW, spd 10-12, 40 mi ENE. d) 1 Jul: 3 freighters (150/300T) on crs WxN, spd 8, 55 mi ExS. e) 2 Jul: Patrol craft on crs NWxW, spd 15, 25 mi SE. f) 2 Jul: 7 freighters (150/300T) anchored; 1 freighter (300/850T) on crs W, spd 6, sunk, 60 mi NE.  
16. Chusan Arch: 30 Jun: 1 lrg tanker, 6-7 freighter-tpts, 1 seaplane tender damaged.  
17. Chowshan Is: 2 Jul: 1 freighter (300/850T), 2 PT boats & 1 other vsl in Tinghai Hbr.  
18. Hangchow Bay: 2 Jul: 1 river steamer on crs NExN, spd 10, destroyed.  
19. Yangtze R: 2 Jul: Strafing run made on 2 destroyer escorts, 2 freighter-tpts (5500/8500T) on crs SSW, spd 5, in mouth of river; 1 destroyer escort left smoking fr rocket attack.  
20. General: 2 Jul: Search planes found Ft. Bayard, HongKong & Swatow empty.

**NANPO SHOTO:**

21. Hachijo Id: 2 Jul: 1 lugger (175') left smoking.

**KOREA:**

22. Chosen Str: a) 2 Jul: 2 u/i med sized ships on crs SEExE, spd 8, unsuccessfully bombed. b) 2 Jul: 1 freighter (150/300T) on crs E, spd 7, destroyed.  
23. W Coast: 1 Jul: 1 destroyer, 1 freighter (150/300T), 1 sm coastal freighter on crs SE, spd 5.  
24. SW Coast: a) 2 Jul: 1 freighter (300/850T) sunk on crs SxExE, spd 6. b) 2 Jul: Convoy of 1 destroyer, 1 freighter (300/850T), 2 freighters (3500/7500T), & 1 freighter-tpt (5500/8500T).

**JAPAN:**

25. Tsushima Str: 2 Jul: 1 sm tanker, 3 freighters (150/300T) on crs ESE, spd 8, believed sunk.  
26. NE Kyushu: 2 Jul: 20 ships anchored at Usuki.  
27. S Kyushu: 1 Jul: 1 steel lugger (100T) left listing in Kagoshima Bay.  
28. S Honshu: 2 Jul: 8 freighters, 1 freighter-tpt (2/4500T), 40 mi SEExS of C Shino.

**CAROLINES:**

29. Truk: 29 Jun: Torpedo wake sighted, 300 mi NE. (Rpt graded C-4).

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1. Summary of the Enemy Situation:

a. Activities in Forward Areas:

Northern Philippines (Luzon):

East of Manila: Scattered enemy contacts in the Ipo-Infanta areas.

Highway 4: Minor enemy contacts made north of Bolog, as heavy rains limited our forces to patrol action.

Southern-Central Philippines (Mindanao):

Northwest of Davao: The enemy, employing mortars, automatic weapons and rifles from the commanding ground west of Kibangay, is offering stubborn resistance.

Kibawe-Talomo Trail: Scattered enemy groups encountered as positions 2500 yards south Pinamola taken. About 200 enemy observed northwest of Waloe, while another 200 armed with machine guns and mortars reported southwest of Waloe. Two enemy strongpoints of estimated platoon strength each, and armed with machine guns and mortars, reported in the Sagunto vicinity.

Borneo:

Balikpapan: Intense enemy machine gun fire encountered in advance across the Klandasan River to positions 1000 yards east thereof. No enemy contacts reported as points 2000 yards north of Stalkoedo reached. Nil hostile air activity.

b. Activities in Rear Areas:

Formosa: 23 Fs on Toyohara a/d.

Ningpo (China): 1 en a/c dest on Tinghai strip.

Okinawa: Nil air attacks.

Miyako: 8 Poss operational a/c Hirara a/d.

Kyushu: 2 T/E Bs shot down by CAP.

Nagoya: 3 en a/c dest in air 3 on grd by 142 P-51s.

c. Identifications: Borneo: 552nd and 553rd Independent Infantry Battalions located in Jesselton area in April 1945; from captured documents.

d. Weather: Nil rptd interference with air operations.

2. Conclusions.

a. Enemy Capabilities:

Operations on Borneo:

1) Defense of Balikpapan.

2) Troop Deployment in Northwest Borneo.

Operations in the Philippines:

3) Defense of the Kiangnan-Banaue Approaches, N Luzon.

Operations on Okinawa:

4) Passive Reaction to Expanded Air Operations.

Operations in China:

5) Troop Realignment.

a) North China.

b) Central China.

c) South China.

d) Coastal Areas.

Operations on Borneo:

1) Defense of Balikpapan: Allied troops, by-passing several small pockets of resistance, advanced eastward along the coast capturing the Sepinggang airfield and the village of Sepinggang Besar, approximately 6 miles east of Klandasan. Other troops of the 7th Australian Division moved inland against increasing resistance occupying the 2nd phase line, approximately 1 3/4 miles from the beach. The beachhead area has been under intermittent light artillery fire from positions about 3 1/2 miles to the north. Enemy dead to 1200I/2 July totalled 116.

The first indication of enemy disposition in the Balikpapan area was obtained from a captured enemy document dated 7 May 1945. From this source three possible infantry battalions were located as follows: the first in the vicinity of Manggar, 13 miles east of Klandasan; a second, west of the Klandasan Besar River and north to the mouth of the Sumbir River and a third east and north of the Wain River. The identification of these

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Summary 1185 - Cont'd

units is not yet known, although previous information from captured documents and prisoners of war has suggested the presence of the 369th and 554th Independent Infantry Battalions in the vicinity of Balikpapan. Whether these battalions could possibly be the units referred to in this report cannot be determined at this early date. Meager information from the field, during the first two days of the landing, precludes a full analysis of the enemy situation existing in or near the operational area. Yet the passive attitude of the enemy thus far, even though our penetrations are moving toward objectives to the north without significant opposition, tends to confirm previous estimates of a low proportion of combat troops to service personnel. The town area is rapidly being enveloped and the garrison is threatened with the loss of northward routes of withdrawal. Coordinated opposition may yet develop but the activities thus far do not support the presence of a major unit or a particular strong combat force committed to the defense of Balikpapan. (See Enclosure No. 1).

2) Troop Deployment in Northwest Borneo: Although still lacking confirmation by actual field contacts, major troop unit dispositions in Northwest Borneo have emerged as a fairly complete picture. Recent information obtained from captured documents identifies the 552nd (for the first time) and 553rd Independent Infantry Battalions in the Jesselton area in April 1945; there are also slight indications from the same source that the 2nd Company of the 553rd was deployed in the vicinity of Beaufort as late as May. Previous information had placed the 553rd in the Miri area, probably moving south towards Kuching. The 20th Independent Machine Gun Battalion, with an estimated strength of 200 as of 17 June, also previously reported in the northwest, with the 553rd Independent Infantry Battalion and the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment were said to be responsible for the defense of the area from Ambong Bay, approximately 25 miles northeast of Jesselton, to the Weston-Beaufort area. Inland, at least one-half of the 56th Independent Mixed Brigade was reported deployed in the Tenom-Ranau-Keningau area after completing the overland movement from the east coast. In light of these reports, the enemy plan of defense in Northwest Borneo appears to be as follows: the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment with the 552nd, 553rd Independent Infantry Battalions and the 20th Independent Machine Gun Battalion defending the coastal area from Beaufort to Jesselton with three, possibly four, battalions of the 56th Independent Mixed Battalion defending the valley approach from Tenom through Keningau to Ranau.

#### Operations in the Philippines:

3) Defense of the Kiangnan-Banaue Approaches, Northern Luzon: Absence of conclusive evidence prevents accurate identification of enemy units blocking the avenues of approach into the Kiangnan-Banaue defense sector. However, recent information, coupled with previous reports, suggests specially organized groups, although of questionable combat value, deployed at each of the sector's three main entrances. Typical of the enemy's improvisation, these parent units initially consisted of cadres only, later strengthened by troops from the various remnant L of C organizations. The 58th Independent Brigade assigned to defend Highway 11 has been reorganized in accordance with this policy. (See Daily Summary No. 1179). The rejuvenation fell short insofar as increased combat efficiency is concerned. Present tactics north of Camp 30 substantiate this and further suggest that his defense will consist of a succession of road blocks lightly covered by small groups. In the Mankayan-Loo area, remnants of the 73rd Infantry Regiment and a battalion of the 76th Infantry Regiment, 19th Division, are opposing Philippine Army units. Artillery fire on our positions 1,500 yards northwest of Mankayan indicates possible presence of an unidentified artillery unit. By reason of its location, this area between Mankayan and Loo appears well fortified, yet sufficient troop strength which would seriously restrict our advances after a breakthrough northwest of Mankayan is not indicated. Large displacements eastward from this sector a few weeks ago would tend to suggest that the bulk of the 19th Division is now located in the general Kiangnan sector.

Documents and PW testimony place the 75th Regiment, 19th Division, in the Bontoc area, possibly supported by remnants of the 79th Brigade, 103rd Division. Combat reluctance of these units is evidenced

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by their hurried withdrawal from Besao, although a strong delaying action may yet develop in the Bontoc area further to the east. A similar situation is developing on Highway 4 in the Bolog area, where an estimated four battalions of the 105th Division, supported by artillery and mortar units, have been deployed astride this approach. It is possible that these units have been augmented by miscellaneous service troops, but reorganization to full strength would be surprising.

Considering the questionable overall efficiency of units charged with securing the Kiangnan-Banaue approaches, there is considerable doubt as to the effectiveness of the enemy's defense, although the advantages from eventual shortened lines of communication may yet emerge as a coordinated defense in the Banaue area. (See Enclosure No. 2).

#### Operations at Okinawa:

4) Passive Reaction to Expanded Air Operations: The enemy's reaction to our recently expanded air operations at Okinawa so far has been practically negative. On 1 July, Okinawa based B-25s escorted by Marine Corsairs struck Chiran airfield on Southern Kyushu. No airborne opposition was reported. Land based fighters from Okinawa during the past several weeks have made a number of sweeps of the South Kyushu airfields, reporting little or no air opposition. On 1 July, a combat air patrol was maintained over South Kyushu almost continuously from daylight until evening. These planes reported no airborne opposition. Also on the 1st, 8 P-47s escorted a PB4Y on a daylight shipping raid to the Shanghai area where no air opposition was encountered. At Okinawa, enemy air effort since 22 June has been confined to limited reconnaissance.

The only visual indication of any recent redeployment of enemy air strength was a report of 23 enemy fighters discovered yesterday on Toyohara airdrome, Formosa. These planes, the largest concentration of aircraft observed on any of the Formosa dromes for some time, were bombed and strafed by Fifth Air Force B-24s and P-51s.

Unfavorable weather to date has interfered materially with our Kyushu air operations. Furthermore these operations have been limited for the most part to the Southernmost part of Kyushu. Weather notwithstanding however, it appears that the enemy has made no serious attempt thus far to contest air superiority over South Kyushu. Whether his perimeter of air defense has been drawn across Central or Northern Kyushu remains to be seen. When the last carrier attacks were made on the Central and Northern Kyushu fields, aggressive and skillful opposition was reported.

This passivity over South Kyushu, at Okinawa, along the China coast, and over Formosa definitely supports an enemy policy of conservation of air strength. As far as Kyushu is concerned, however, this passive reaction may end at any time with vigorous interception. Although few planes have been observed by our fighters on the South Kyushu fields, total estimated air strength on the Kyushu-Kure airfields is 980 combat aircraft, including 610 operative fighters. In addition, there is an estimated 290 fighters in Korea.

The enemy's aircraft losses during June were extremely low compared with losses during the preceding two months due to his restricted air operations. Revised estimates have indicated that enemy aircraft production recently has been somewhat higher than formerly believed. These various factors indicate that the enemy should be establishing a fair sized backlog of combat aircraft. Total estimated combat strength for Japan, Korea and Manchuria at present is 4,000 aircraft.

Many of these aircraft will be openly destroyed by Allied strikes--land based and carrier. At the same time, it may be expected that the enemy has benefitted from past experience to the extent that many planes will be cleverly dispersed and camouflaged and protected by covered or underground revetments. Many of these planes will be hard to find and hard to destroy. The enemy's skill in this direction was effectively demonstrated in the Philippine campaign. Over 100 aircraft were so effectively dispersed and concealed above ground around the Negros dromes, it was weeks before these planes were discovered and destroyed. No doubt even more skillful tactics on a much larger scale will be employed by the enemy in the homeland. The use of aircraft so hidden will likely pose a continuing threat to friendly forces for some time even after Japan has been invaded.

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## Operations in China:

5) Troop Realignment:

a) North China: As troops continue to move northward through Hankow into a general area 300 miles east of the Yellow River bend it appears that the rail center of Hsinhsiang may be the main concentration area for enemy forces in North China. From this key center the enemy is in position to quickly shift troops to Shanghai, Haichow Bay, Tientsin or north into Manchuria to counter any ground or amphibious threat.

In view of the non-existence of good roads over the vast areas of North China, the strategy of the enemy command is to a large extent based on rail communication for its survival as an integrated force. The railroads are vital for the mobility of troops in realignment and for movement of supplies between North China and Manchuria, as well as for the rapid shifting of forces to threatened areas. Thus, the continuous attacks and resulting attrition by our air force on railroad bridges, locomotives and rolling stock seriously reduces the potency of Japanese armies in China, particularly in this north sector.

b) Central China: As enemy forces continue to move northeast out of the Liuchow-Hangyang Corridor, the immediate collapse of the Liuchow sector is inevitable, as is the eventual fall of the former Allied airbase of Kweilin, 90 miles to the northeast. At the present time the enemy appears to be leaving only sufficient holding forces to prevent Chinese troops from interfering with an organized withdrawal northward. A Korean PW of the 104th Regiment, 13th Division, considered one of the best-equipped units in the corridor, claims that food was scarce, over one-half of the troops were suffering from cholera, many soldiers wore Chinese clothes, and the allotment of small arms consisted of one rifle with thirteen rounds for each four men. Japanese distrust of puppet troops may explain the shortage of weapons in the company, to which the PW belonged. Previous reports substantiate the statements relative to the scarcity of food and equipment of Japanese units in the corridor.

c) South China: The Chinese 6th Army is exerting pressure on the isolated enemy troops moving south into Indo-China. Most of the Hainan Island and Southern Liuchow Peninsula garrisons already have been withdrawn. The current evacuation of additional enemy forces from Fort Bayard area to Canton strongly suggests that all Hainan Island, Liuchow Peninsula and Fort Bayard eventually will be relinquished. Latest estimates of enemy strength in the immediate Canton area total no more than 65,000. A month ago estimates from similar sources placed the concentration there at approximately 140,000, substantiating reports of heavy troop movements northward out of the Canton area. This sharp strength decline in such a relatively short period is demonstrative of the present trend and possibly presages eventual evacuation of the Canton-HongKong area. Or, the Japanese perhaps plan to mass their forces 300 miles north in the Kukong-Kanhsien area where they could be quickly moved either northward on the Kan River, navigable the entire distance by launches to the Yangtze water routes, or be sent back into the Canton sector in the event of an emergency there.

d) Coastal Areas: At Amoy the enemy recently destroyed his defensive works and is in process of evacuating overland all Army personnel toward Swatow; a small naval garrison is being left behind. The former enemy garrison of Wenchow is now at a point 100 miles north of that port. Consequently, it appears that the evacuation of the entire coastal area between Shanghai and Hongkong is but a matter of time.

Continued heavy troop movements northward out of Central and Southern China, as well as evacuation from the coastal areas, possibly foreshadow complete Japanese withdrawal therefrom to North China positions more strategically suited to meet the varied potential of Allied invasion. (See Enclosure No. 3).

b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Defense of Balikpapan: Coordinated opposition may yet develop but the activities thus far do not support the presence of a major unit or a particular strong combat force committed to the defense of Balikpapan.

2) Troop Deployment in Northwest Borneo: The enemy plan of defense in Northwest Borneo appears to be as follows: the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment with the 552nd, 553rd Independent Infantry Battalions and the 20th

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Independent Machine Gun Battalion defending the coastal area from Beaufort to Jesselton with three, possibly four, battalions of the 56th Independent Mixed Brigade defending the valley approach from Tenom through Keningau to Ranau.

3) Defense of the Kiangnan-Banaue Approaches, Northern Luzon: Considering the questionable overall efficiency of units charged with securing the Kiangnan-Banaue approaches, there is considerable doubt as to the effectiveness of the enemy's defense, although the advantages from eventual shortened lines of communication may yet emerge as a coordinated defense in the Banaue area.

4) Passive Reaction to Expanded Air Operations: The current passive reaction to our air operations over Kyushu may terminate at any time in vigorous interception.

5) Troop Realignment: Continued heavy troop movements northward out of Central and Southern China, as well as evacuation from the coastal areas, possibly foreshadow complete Japanese withdrawal therefrom to North China positions more strategically suited to meet the varied potential of Allied invasion.

#### V MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

##### New Japanese Weapons:

New defensive weapons, particularly those under development for some years with German technical assistance, come to light as inner Empire perimeters are penetrated although transportation difficulties prevent their widespread issue. Many of them, not yet encountered but known to exist, will be uncovered only by an assault on Japan proper. Allied occupation of Germany and its well-directed intelligence search, interrogation of captured German crews and ordnance specialists whose submarines were sunk on the Germany-Japan run, and a wealth of captured Japanese documents and PW interrogations, all attest to the liberal German assignment to Japan of new weapons already previewed during the European campaign. Japanese addition of the suicide factor renders many of these copies more potent, particularly in the field of guided projectiles. A preliminary survey of these weapons' most important classes includes:

- (1) Rockets and guided missiles, designed for use against our very heavy bombers and amphibious assault forces, as well as against ground targets.
- (2) Concentrations of coastal defense guns, protected from aerial observation and attack, representing the reinforcement of normal fixed defenses by surplus naval weapons.
- (3) Anti-aircraft artillery of all kinds, including new heavy anti-aircraft artillery and fire control equipment.
- (4) Mines and demolition charges of various kinds, many employing the hollow-charge principle. Minefields actuated by remote control will be encountered in increasing numbers.
- (5) Anti-tank weapons, both close range infantry weapons like our Bazooka, and high velocity guns. These may well be copies or adaptations of similar German weapons.
- (6) New and improved armored fighting vehicles, with heavier armor and more powerful weapons. A percentage of these will be armed with flame throwers.

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
EXPLANATORY NOTES:

On 2 Jul:

1. Troops of the 7th Aust Div moved inland against increasing resistance and occupied the 2nd phase line. Enemy casualties to 1200/I 2 July were 116 killed.
2. Other troops advanced along the coast capturing the Sepinggang airfield; advance elements reached the Sepinggang Besar River, approximately 6 miles E of Klandasan.
3. According to captured documents a possible unidentified battalion is deployed in the vicinity of Manggar.
4. Documentary evidence suggest an unidentified infantry battalion with MG Co, arty Co, tank unit and attached Indonesians in the area W of a line from the Klandasan Besar River to the mouth of the Sumbir River.
5. Captured documents place a possible third unidentified infantry battalion in the area N and E of the Wain River.



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To Accompany Encl No. 2  
Daily Summary No. 1185


EXPLANATORY NOTES:

On 2/3 Jul:

1. Observers report large number of Japs are dug-in in the areas adjoining Banaue.
2. Enemy activity limited to minor scattered contacts N of Bolog. Heavy rains in Highway 4 area halted our advances.
3. Patrols continue to mop up Daklan and Camp 30 areas without enemy opposition.
4. For the fifth consecutive day enemy stubborn resistance 1,500 yds N of Mankayan continues against the PA units advancing SE to seize Mankayan.
5. Japs have been observed withdrawing toward Bontoc from Sagada area. Few carts loaded with food stuffs have also been seen moving toward Bontoc from the W.

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To Accompany Encl No. 3  
Daily Summary No. 1185


EXPLANATORY NOTES:

1. As the enemy in N China must depend mainly upon rail communications for survival as an integrated force, continued attrition of the rail net by our air attacks will seriously handicap effective troop deployment.
2. Heavy troop movements continue northward through Changsha and Hankow with their possible destination the Hsinhsiang rail Center.
3. Continued withdrawal of large numbers of troops from the Liuchow-Hengyang corridor renders immediate collapse of the Liuchow sector and the eventual fall of Kweilin inevitable.
4. Further evacuation of enemy forces from the Fort Bayard area to Canton, suggests the eventual relinquishment of Fort Bayard as well as virtually-abandoned Hainan and S Liuchow Peninsula.
5. Recent estimates reveal that enemy strength in the Canton area has been reduced by almost one-half in the last month.
6. Many troops formerly in the Canton sector are now reported in the Kukong-Kanhsien area.
7. Enemy activity during the past week indicates possible opening of a corridor on the Kan River, navigable to the Yangtze River communication net, from Kanhsien to Nanchang as an alternate route for movement of the enemy forces northward. Destruction of rail nets by our air attacks, and Chinese pressure on the Hangyan-Changsha corridor, may have made such a move necessary.
8. Troops formerly at Amoy are moving overland along the coast toward Swatow, leaving only a small naval force at Amoy. The withdrawing Wenchow garrison has reached a point 100 miles N of that city.

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CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA  
ENCLOSURE NO. 3

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff  
GENERAL COMBINED SITUATION  
TO 2 JULY 1945  
FOR SUMMARY NO. 1185

Solid lines show Japanese  
areas of contact, **hatched** lot  
represent a fixed line of  
resistance.  
Areas of principal enemy  
troop concentrations.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

I-III: DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE  
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION  
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No.

1184

DATE

1/2 July 1945

I GROUND:

SOLOMONS:

1. Bougainville: 30 Jun: Determined enemy groups cleared fr crest Wearnes Hill; 70-100 Japs obsvd 2000 yds NNW Turugum (7 mi NNE Rusei); en attack repulsed 500 yds S of Shishigatero (5 mi ESE Rusei on Buin Rd).

NEW GUINEA:

2. Wewak: 30 Jun: Two en strongpoints 2300 yds E Mt Shiburangu overrun; 35 Japs contacted 3½ mi SSE Boiken Mission; en cleared fr villages 8 mi S Maprik; en posns contacted 4 mi ENE & 1 mi SSW Mikau.

BORNEO:

3. Balikpapan: 1 Jul: Lt en opposn encountered by assault forces landing Balikpapan area at 0855I; intermittent en shore battery, mortar & 37mm fire rcvd by ships & small craft offshore; opposn stiffened in afternoon; en on our right flank withdrew; 3 en trucks dest & 12 damaged by a/c.
4. Brunei Bay: 1 Jul: En posns encountered at Lunadan (7 mi NE Weston); en forced to withdraw fr posns 1400 yds E Beaufort; 50 Japs 3 mi SSW Miri engaged with unobsvd results.

PHILIPPINES:

5. Mindanao: NW of Davao: 1 Jul: En delaying posn 2000 yds W Kibangay out-flanked; strongpoint contacted 100 yds E Samy R. NE Malaybalay: 29 Jun: 20 Japs contacted 6000 yds ENE Malaybalay; civilians rpt 200 enemy 13,000 yds NE that town. Agusan Valley: 1 Jul: Mortar, MG and rifle fire fr est 200 Japs rcvd by our troops in Waloe; smbr en with MGs rptd 4000 yds NW Segunto; undetermined nbr en obsvd Langasian-Camota area.
6. Luzon: Central Sector: 1 Jul: No major contacts rptd as mopping-up continues E of Manila. Northern Sector: 1 Jul: No en encountered as PA forces occupied numerous barrios E & SE Lallo & reached Callao (8000 yds NNE Penablanca); 4 en tanks dest & 3 trucks and 1 sedan capt'd 4000 yds NE Penablanca; no en opposn rptd as posns 1700 yds NW Bolog reached; stubborn en resistance continues NW Mankayan and NE Kayan; lt opposn overcome as Guinsdac (8000 yds SW Sabangan) capt'd.

II AIR:

LESSER SUNDAS:

1. Flores Id: Photos 30 Jun: Nil a/c on Maomere, Waioti & Sissa River a/ds; r'ways serv.
2. Soemba Id: Photos 30 Jun: Nil a/c, r'ways u/s at Waiwalla & Waitaboela; nil a/c, r'way poss serv at Waikalo.

BORNEO:

3. Mangkalihat: 30 Jun: 5 u/i Fs sighted airborne nr Cape Mangkalihat by 24 B-24s; 1100I.
4. Manggar: 30 Jun: 1 en F intcptd 24 B-24s; nil dam either side; 1305I.
5. Keningau: 29 Jun: 2 en a/c dest on a/d by 5 P-40s.

FORMOSA:

6. Shinchiku: Night 28/29 Jun: 1 en F airborne; did not intcpt B-24s.

PESCADORES:

7. Mako: Night 28/29 Jun: a) 1 en F intcptd 2 B-24s; nil dam either side.  
b) 1 en F intcptd 1 B-24; nil dam either side.

MALAYA:

8. Singapore: 30 Jun: 3 en Fs sighted by Navy search a/c; nil intcptn; 0900-0915I.

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## FRENCH INDO CHINA:

9. Haiphong: Night 30 Jun/1 Jul: 1 T/E en a/c airborne; did not intercept 2 B-24s.  
 NANSEI SHOTOS:

10. Okinawa: 30 Jun: 1 en a/c shot down 75 mi off Bolo Pt.

## JAPAN:

11. Kyushu: 30 Jun: 1 en a/c followed Navy search a/c for 20 minutes; did not close; night.

## III NAVY:

## MOLUCCAS:

1. Halmahera: Night 28/29 Jun: PTs sank 4 lrg canoes at Ternate.

## LESSER SUNDAS:

2. Flores Sea: a) 30 Jun: 2 luggers strafed at Kakobia Is. b) Night 30 Jun-1 Jul: 5 luggers & sev native craft sighted at Kakobia Is.

3. Solor Group: 30 Jun: 1 lugger, 14 prahus, strafed at Sagoe.

## GREATER SUNDAS:

4. Bangka Is: 30 Jun: 1 vs1 (3000T) anchored, 5 mi S of Muntok.

## BORNEO:

5. Pontianak: 30 Jun: 1 freighter, 1 lugger & 2 hulls destroyed in shipyard.

6. Laoet Is: 1 Jul: 4 u/i ships, S of southern tip.

## MALAY PENINSULA:

7. Kuantan: 30 Jun: 2 of 7 freighters (150/300T) destroyed.

8. Marang: 30 Jun: 1 freighter (150/300T), 1 lugger destroyed, 15 mi S of Trengganu.

## GULF OF SIAM:

9. Bangkok: 30 Jun: 2 escorts, 2 sm freighters on crs SW, 140 mi SE.

## FRENCH INDO CHINA:

10. Haiphong: 1 Jul: Sev lrg u/i vs1s in river.

## HAINAN:

11. Yulin Bay: 1 Jul: 2 freighters (150/300T) damaged.

12. Samah: 1 Jul: 2 freighters (150/300T) on crs E, spd 8 damaged by near bomb misses & strafing.

13. Kiungshan: 1 Jul: 2 freighters (150/300T), 2 luggers anchored.

14. Hainan Bay: 1 Jul: 1 motor launch strafed & damaged.

## FORMOSA:

15. Ryukyu Is: 30 Jun: Of 10 beached luggers, 2 were destroyed & 8 damaged.

16. General: 1 Jul: Takao & Keelung empty.

## CHINA COAST:

17. Shanghai: a) 30 Jun: 1 freighter-tpt sunk, 2 sea-trucks damaged, 20 mi SE. b) 30 Jun: 1 destroyer, 2 escorts, 3 merch vs1s, 2 stack-aft vs1s, 50 mi SE.

18. Haitan Is: 1 Jul: 2 luggers destroyed.

19. Amoy: 1 Jul: 4 freighters (150/300T), 1 riverboat anchored.

20. General: Night 30 Jun/1 Jul: Night search planes sighted an exceptional nbr of junks off Amoy, Swatow & HongKong, within 10 mi of coast & showing lights.

21. Canton: a) 29 Jun: Vs1 destroyed in Canton R was a lugger instead of freighter-tpt as rptd in Part III, D/S 1182. b) 1 Jul: 1 freighter-tpt (300/1200T) & 4 freighters (150/300T) anchored.

22. HongKong: 1 Jul: 1 riverboat strafed & damaged, 10 mi W.

## NANPO SHOTO:

23. Bonins: 30 Jun: 1 freighter (300/1000T) harassed by dive bombing & strafing, 1 sm tanker unsuccessfully attacked.

## KOREA:

24. Chosen Str: 20 Jun: 1 lrg freighter-tpt, 1 lrg u/i ship attacked; no hits.

## JAPAN:

25. W Coast Kyushu: 30 Jun: 2 picket boats.

## CAROLINES:

26. Woleai: 30 Jun: Poss periscope sighted, 300 mi S.

27. Yap: 30 Jun: 1 sub sighted, 90 mi NW.

## IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

## 1. Summary of the Enemy Situation.

a. Activities in Forward Areas:

Northern Philippines (Luzon):

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East of Manila: Only scattered contacts as mopping-up Marikina Watershed area continues.

Cagayan Valley: No enemy encountered to occupation numerous barrios E and SE of Lallo. Four enemy tanks destroyed and 3 trucks and 1 sedan captured NE of Penablanca. An enemy troop concentration in Lattu (6,000 yards E Penablanca) reported by civilians.

Highway 4: No enemy opposition to our advances NW of Bolog.

Cervantes: The enemy is continuing to offer stubborn resistance, in some cases supported by artillery fire, NW of Mankayan and NE of Kayan. Light enemy opposition overcome in capturing Guinsdac (8,000 yards SW Sabangan).

Southern-Central Philippines (Mindanao):

NW of Davao: One Jap delaying position outflanked and another contacted in continued advances W Kibangay.

NE Malaybalay: Concentration of 200 Japs reported by civilians partially confirmed when telephone linemen contacted 20 enemy NE of Malaybalay.

Agusan Valley: Mortar, MG and rifle fire received from estimated 200 enemy in Waloe area. Only minor, scattered defensive positions encountered elsewhere in the Agusan Valley.

Borneo: 2 en a/c dest Keningau; 5 en a/c airborne Mangkalihat.

Balikpapan: Slight opposition Balikpapan landings; light intermittent, enemy shore battery, mortar and 37mm fire received by our ships and small craft. Enemy opposition stiffened in afternoon except on our right flank where enemy was withdrawing.

Brunei Bay: Patrol clashes in Miri, Weston and Beaufort areas.

**b. Activities in Rear Areas:**

Formosa: 1 en F airborne over Shinchiku.

Pescadores: 2 en Fs intcptd B-24s over Mako.

Singapore: 3 en a/c airborne.

Haiphong: 1 T/E en a/c airborne.

Okinawa: 1 en a/c shot down off Bolo Pt.

Kyushu: 1 en a/c airborne.

**c. Identifications:** PW claims 369th Ind Inf Bn moved from Tawao to Balikpapan.

**d. Weather:** Overcast prevented photo a/c & hecklers from reaching Kyushu.

**2. Conclusions.**

**a. Enemy Capabilities:**

Operations on Borneo:

1) Defense of Balikpapan.

Operations in the Philippines:

2) Defense of the Kiangnan-Banaue Sector, Northern Luzon.

3) Defense of Isolated Pockets in Agusan Valley, Mindanao.

Operations on Borneo:

1) Defense of Balikpapan: Late yesterday, enemy resistance stiffened as Allied troops continued their advance inland after securing the beachhead. During the landing operations, our forces were subjected to intermittent fire from mortars and coastal defense batteries; these were silenced by naval guns. Little ground resistance was encountered before completing the first phase of the operation.

During the first day's operation, approximately 4,000 yards of the coast between Klandasan and Stalkeedo was secured, with an advance inland averaging about 1,200 yards. Patrols reached the vicinity of Hill 99 approximately 1,700 yards north of Klandasan beach with unreported contact. Heavy oil fires were observed in the Plateau tank farm area, 2,300 yards northeast of Cape Toekoeng. Enemy resistance encountered thus far has been confined to small dispersed centers employing mortar, machine gun and rifle fire. The initial tank obstacles were overrun and our armor quickly moved inland.

From the reaction to the first day's attack, it would appear that the enemy was initially rendered incapable of supporting his carefully prepared beach defenses with strong defensive fires. It is too early to determine the extent of the enemy's capabilities for later inland defense. It is possible that troops have been withdrawn inland to avoid naval bombardment

and to occupy previously developed high ground from where the natural avenues of approach can be effectively covered by fire. While the usefulness of emplaced coast defense guns and dual purpose anti-aircraft weapons will be short-lived, strong typical inland resistance may yet develop. Photographs disclose that the enemy has taken advantage of existing terrain, preparing what appear to be rather extensive strong points thereon.

Little information relative to troop dispositions was obtained during the first day of the operation. The 22nd Special Base Force was quickly identified. Rather tenuous evidence has suggested the presence of elements of the 71st Independent Mixed Brigade and, according to both documentary evidence and PW testimony, the 554th Independent Infantry Battalion moved to Balikpapan from Tawao in March. First indication of the location of the 369th Independent Infantry Battalion (56th IMB) came from a PW who claimed that unit likewise moved south from Tawao to Balikpapan last February. Presence of these units in or near the objective area has yet to be confirmed by contact or other reliable means.

Whether by design or an incapability, the enemy has in the first day's fighting relinquished important ground leading to his inner defense. Some clue to an eventual line of action may be gathered from the report of vehicles moving to the north, yet the conclusion of a complete withdrawal would be premature. The enemy's principal capability at present is one of stubborn defense of inland positions, denying us those approach avenues necessary for complete control of the objective area. (See Enclosure No. 1).

#### Operations in the Philippines:

2) Defense of the Kiangnan-Banaue Sector, Northern Luzon: Except for strong local resistance 1,500 yards northwest of Mankayan, supported by artillery, elements of the 6th Division and PA units continued to tighten the belt around the enemy's Kiangnan-Banaue defensive sector. From Bolog (4 miles southeast of Kiangnan) as well as in the Besao area (7 miles west of Bontoc), the enemy's withdrawal toward the center of this sector is hurriedly in progress, covered only by scattered and generally ineffective rearguard action. The 19th Division, fast approaching remnant status plus elements of the 105th Division are endeavoring to hold the avenues of approach without adequate troop strength or strong artillery support. Over 200 additional Japs have been found dead from our artillery fire and air strikes along Highway 4 in the vicinity of Bolog; much equipment of various types was found abandoned. Although a few artillery pieces and tanks have been observed in this sector, no attempt has yet been made by the enemy to utilize them at either of the two approaches into the Banaue and Kiangnan areas. His hurried but orderly withdrawal in face of our advances at Bontoc and Kiangnan indicates his usual plan of maneuver, viz: utilization of a delaying force, written off as an eventual loss, while other groups withdraw to successive positions following an identical tactic with similar results.

Delaying actions covering avenues of approach into the Kiangnan-Banaue areas will continue, although recent engagements suggest an eventual repetition of his Cagayan Valley maneuvers, viz: retirement to flanking terrain at the expense of the Highway defense. (See Enclosure No. 2).

3) Defense of Isolated Pockets in Agusan Valley, Mindanao: Within a 5 to 7 mile radius north to west of Waloe, some enemy resistance has developed on a front athwart our axis of attack now paralleling the Adgaoan River. At least 7 potential Japanese positions have been contacted or observed, the strongest of which covers Waloe itself; heavy mortar, MG and rifle fire from an estimated 200 Japs opposed our entrance into the village. On a line roughly northward from Waloe, terminating in a flank northwest of Sagunto which our outposts report as dug in with MGs, small enemy groups have been observed at scattered points. Westward toward the mountains, long range mortar and MG fire has been encountered from dispersed groups around Camota.

Preliminary reconnaissance of this little-known area does not as yet permit definite evaluation of existing enemy defenses. However, the superficial appearance of dispersed defenses in depth probably has no actual basis. Rather, the enemy's crippled 30th Division remnants, their straggling retreat from Bukidnon, and lack of time to effectively reorganize thereafter, point to haphazard resistance by small groups wherever contact is unavoidable. Not only is the enemy here incapable of any organized defense in depth, but he has lost even the facilities for protracted survival. Remote difficult terrain is his only remaining advantage.

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Summary 1184 - Cont'd

b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Defense of Balikpapan: Whether by design or an incapability, the enemy has in the first day's fighting relinquished important ground leading to his inner defense. Some clue to an eventual line of action may be gathered from the report of vehicles moving to the north, yet the conclusion of a complete withdrawal would be premature. The enemy's principal capability at present is one of stubborn defense of inland positions, denying us those approach avenues necessary for complete control of the objective area.

2) Defense of the Kiangnan-Banaue Sector, Northern Luzon: Delaying actions covering avenues of approach into the Kiangnan-Banaue areas will continue although recent engagements suggest an eventual repetition of his Cagayan Valley maneuvers, viz: retirement to flanking terrain at the expense of the Highway defense.

3) Defense of Isolated Pockets in Agusan Valley, Mindanao: The enemy's crippled 30th Division remnants, their straggling retreat from Bukidnon, and lack of time to effectively reorganize thereafter, point to haphazard resistance by small groups wherever contact is unavoidable. Not only is the enemy here incapable of any organized defense in depth, but he has lost even the facilities for protracted survival. Remote difficult terrain is his only remaining advantage.

V MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

Japanese Civilian Secret Police in Borneo:

A general survey of this little-known organization appears in Sec. V, Daily Summary No. 1180. PW interrogation throws light on its control of civil administration in Borneo:

Branches of the Tokumu Kikan were established under Civil Administration, in the county capitals: Tarakan, Malinau, TG Selor, and TG Redeb. Naval Administration extended in these countries only to the detachments of Expeditionary Forces stationed there.

The Naval controlled Expeditionary Forces acted on orders received from the Special Police Force stationed at Tarakan, after information had been handed on by the Tokumu Kikan.

Operations of the Tokumu Kikan established in the county capitals, usually operated in villages and areas in which large numbers of Indonesians and Chinese were employed.

A. Civil Administration Control:

Tokumu Kikan employed Japanese, Indonesians, and Chinese as agents. Total number and Indonesians employed was as follows:

Tarakan : Four Japanese and 30 Indonesians, amongst whom were some Chinese.  
Noenoeakan Is: One Japanese and two or three Indonesian Police.  
P Derawan : Two Japanese and a large number of Indonesian Police.  
TG Redeb : Two Japanese and unknown number of Indonesian Police.  
Bulungan : One Japanese and unknown number of Indonesian Police.  
Malinau : One or two Japanese and unknown number of Indonesian Police.

In each village or area where Indonesian and Chinese are employed in large numbers, a constant watch was kept by Indonesian Police.

All Japanese members of Tokumu Kikan had received special schooling in native affairs of Borneo, and could speak Malayan well. They received their training in Japan.

Interrogation of PW Goto, Koroku, Civilian, Manager of Sanko Co., captured at Babatloe Is (Borneo), 31 May 45. Australian Forces ADVATIS Interrogation Report No. 6, 26 June 1945.

Special care must be taken to insure the secrecy of this document. Information contained herein will not be circulated or reproduced beyond the Staff Section to which it is addressed. When not actually in use, this document is to be kept in a safe and is chargeable to the custody of an Officer. See AR 380-5, 15 March 1944, and Standing Operating Procedure Instructions No. 14, 14 March 1944, regarding security Classifications.

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EXPLANATORY NOTES:


1. Anti-tank ditches have been observed around the foothills of Pandansari extending from the Drum Factory to the N for approximately 2300 yds in the southern half, the ditch is 6-8 ft wide with a built-up bank 12 ft wide following the foothills to the sea.
2. Enemy defensive installations in the Klandasan-Stalkoedo-Pandansari area, shown by recent aerial photographs, include 6 C/D guns; 6 heavy, 18 medium and 9 light A/A guns with several additional unoccupied pits; approximately 60 bunkers and some 50 tunnel entrances.
3. Heavy oil fires with smoke rising to 5000 ft were reported in the tank area on high ground overlooking the water front. Truck convoy on road to N attacked by our air support; 3 trucks burned, 12 damaged.
4. Yesterday, approximately 4,000 yds of the coast between Klandasan and Stalkoedo was secured; advances inland averaged 1200 yds. Strong resistance encountered 1000 yds north of our left flank.
5. Defenses in the vicinity of Sepinggang consists of trenches and anti-tank ditches along the W bank of the Sepinggang River; an extensive trench system embraces the weapon pits and MG positions on the high ground overlooking the airfield.
6. Information from local sources discloses that the enemy has mined the area between the road and sea-shore from Klandasan to Manggar, 13 miles ENE.
7. Recent enemy activity has been devoted to the trench system in the vicinity of the Manggar airfield and the elaboration of offshore obstacles.
8. PW captured at Brunei Bay states that 369th II Bn moved from Tawao to Balikpapan Feb 45. This is the first indication of the whereabouts of the Bn since no reference was made of it during the cross-country move and arrival of the 56th IMB in NW Borneo. Identification of the 22 Base Naval Force in Balikpapan has been confirmed.

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IN AREA BUT NOT YET  
IDENTIFIED IN COMBAT



Enclosure No. 1  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA  
COMBINED GROUND SITUATION  
TO: 2400/I 1 JULY  
Msgs To: 1200/I 2 July  
For Summary No. 1184

BALIKPAPAN



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EXPLANATORY NOTES:

On 30 Jun-1 Jul:

1. Without opposition, patrols of 37th Div reached Callao ( $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles NNE of Penablanca); 4 enemy light tanks and 4 vehicles were destroyed en route.
2. Without significant opposition, elements of 6th Div reached a position 1 mile NW of Bolog. 213 dead Japs found vicinity of Bolog.
3. Withdrawal northward from Kiangan continues. No movement S from Bontoc observed.
4. Without opposition, PA Inf elements bypassed Bauko on Highway 4 and continued their advance toward Sabangan.
5. Heavy resistance supported by enemy arty NW of Mankayan continues as elements of PA Inf move toward Mankayan.
6. Patrol clashes only as elements of 32nd Div continued to mop-up area N of Camp 30.

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
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Enclosure No. 2

Military Intelligence Section  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

COMBINED GROUND SITUATION  
To: 2400I/1 Jul 45  
Msgs To: 1200I/2 Jul  
For Summary No. 1184

Scale 1:500,000



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

I-III: DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE  
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION  
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No.

1183

DATE

30 Jun/1 Jul 1945

I GROUND:

SOLOMONS:

1. Bougainville: 29 Jun: En attacked patrol base west Numa Numa harbor; nil en opposn as els reached posns 700 yds SE Mobiai R crossing along Buin Rd; much en activity rptd on the Buin Rd W Aku.

NEW GUINEA:

2. Wewak: 29 Jun: Strong en posns contacted N and W Mt Shiburangu; en strong-points 1000 yds NW and 2500 yds SW of Yamil overrun; Japs rptd occupying Wambuoto (E bank Amogu R, 12000 yds S Maprik).

BORNEO:

3. Brunei Bay: 30 Jun: Isolated en pockets in Beaufort cleared; continued advances E of town met light scattered opposn.

PHILIPPINES:

4. Mindanao: 30 Jun: Stiffening en resistance to 700 yd advance after seizure of Kulapu R bridge 500 yds W Kibangay; sm en grp dispersed by patrols vicin Davao R NE Tamogan; no other contacts to patrolling along and across river; many en abandoned carts and vehicles found Tamogan-Kibangay area; scattered en contacted vicin Lorenzo; attack of approx 50 en repulsed vicin Kabasalan; organized en resistance near Pinaloma overcome and town captd.
5. Luzon: a) Central Sector: 30 Jun: Minor en contacts vicin Ipo. b) Northern Sector: 30 Jun: Nil en contacts to patrolling 12000 yds E Baggao along Paret R; minor en contacts continue astride highway 5 in Cagayan Valley and vic Aritao; light to moderate en resistance SE Kiangan; against moderate en resistance, Philippine Army units advanced to 2700 yds W Bauko.

II AIR:

N.E.I.:

1. Kai-Tanimbar Is: Photos 29 Jun: Nil a/c, r'ways all overgrown & u/s Let-foear, Doeroa, Langgoer & Selaroe.
2. Timor: Photos 29 Jun: Nil serv a/c at Fuiloro, Cape Chater & Lautem W a/ds; r'ways Fuiloro overgrown & u/s; others appeared serv.
3. Java: Photos 28 Jun: Tandjoeng Perak & Madioen a/ds serv, total of 12 serv a/c, mostly T/E Bs; 10 serv F/Ps at Morokrebangam Naval Air Base.
4. Flores: 29 Jun: 1 c'flgd a/c prob dest by B-24 bombing Sissa River a/d.
5. Celebes: Photos 29 Jun: Kendari a/d u/s, nil a/c; Boroboro a/d serv, nil a/c.

BORNEO:

6. Oelin: 29 Jun: 2 en Fs ineffectively intcpt 9 B-24s attacking a/d; additional F intcpt over Cape Selatan without dam; 1235I.
7. Balikpapan Area: 30 Jun: 1 of 6 airborne en Fs ineffectively intcptd 24 B-24s vicin Manggar a/d; hvy AA holed 6 B-24s; 1100-1200I.

MALAYA:

8. Singapore Area: 29 Jun: 10 T/E Fs obsvd in revets on Changhi Pt a/d.

CHINA COAST-FRENCH INDO CHINA:

9. Canton Area: 30 Jun: a) 1 T/E F ineffectively intcpt B-24 attacking Honan Id oil refinery; 0106I. b) Haiphong: 30 Jun: 3 en Fs over area; 2 made ineffective intcptn; 0205I.

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## NANSEI SHOTOS:

- 10. Bolo: 29 Jun: 1 en F/P shot down by TAF 35 mi SW.
- 11. Okinawa: 30 Jun: a) 3 sm air raids caused nil dam; 1 F/P shot down by N-Fs; 0044-0255I. b) Total en a/c dest by TF 31, AA, TAF (Tenth Army) 18 Mar/28 Jun is 1698.

## EMPIRE:

- 12. Kyushu: 29 Jun: 4 en a/c dest on grd at Kanoya by 32 P-47s on sweep of Kanoya & Kushira a/ds; 3 T/E & 35 S/E a/c obsvd on grd at Kanoya.

## III NAVY:

## LESSER SUNDAS:

- 1. Tijger Group: 29 Jun: 1 lugger strafed & hit at Tanahdjampea Id; 6 prahus under construction.
- 2. Soembawa: 29 Jun: 1 lugger strafed & hit on NW coast.

## BORNEO:

- 3. Pontianak: 29 Jun: 2 freighters (150/300T) destroyed on shipways; 1 tug prob destroyed & 1 freighter (150/300T), 1 tug or launch damaged.
- 4. Balikpapan: 29 Jun: Sm boats obsvd in area.

## MALAY PENINSULA:

- 5. Singapore: a) 29 Jun: 2 hvy cruisers in usual posn (appeared in good condition); 4 freighter-tpts, 25 sea-trucks & freighters (150/1000T) in north Johore Straits; 1 patrol craft entering Singapore Straits; many sm craft in hbr. b) 30 Jun: 2 hvy cruisers same posn; 3 freighter-tpts (5500/8500T) anchored N side Johore Strait.

## FRENCH INDO CHINA:

- 6. Haiphong Area: a) 30 Jun: 1 med tanker, 20 freighters (150/300T) anchored. b) 30 Jun: 1 floating drydock, 5 cargo junks. c) 30 Jun: 8 freighters (150/300T), 15 mi SE. d) 30 Jun: 4 freighters (150/300T) sunk. e) 30 Jun: 5 med merch vsls, 5 tankers (2800T), 4 u/i sm S type vsls anchored, 13 mi SxSE.

## HAINAN:

- 7. Kiungshan: 30 Jun: 2 freighters (150/300T) anchored.

## PESCADORES:

- 8. Hattaku: 30 Jun: 2 luggers destroyed, 2 damaged, 15 mi SE.

## CHINA COAST:

- 9. Foochow: 30 Jun: 1 destroyer-escort anchored.
- 10. Amoy: 30 Jun: 3 freighter (150/300T), 2 barges anchored.
- 11. S. Shantung Penin: 29 Jun: 1 freighter (150/300T) sunk, 1 left burning & sinking.
- 12. Shanghai: a) 29 Jun: 1 hvy cruiser, 1 destroyer, 7 u/i merch vsls anchored in hbr, 55 mi SE. b) 29 Jun: 1 destroyer escort anchored off shore, 25 mi E; 1 freighter (150/300T) left smoking, stern blown off another on crs S, spd 4; 1 freighter-tpt (2/4500T) sunk. c) 29 Jun: 1 destroyer-escort, 5 freighter-tpts (5500/8500T) unsuccessfully attacked; 1 torpedo boat strafed & beached on crs S, spd 10, 75 mi SE.
- 13. Chusan Is: 29 Jun: 1 seaplane tender & 6 freighter-tpts (2/4500T) damaged; 1 freighter (1900T) fired.

## NANSEI SHOTO:

- 14. Okinawa: 29 Jun: Sub sighting, N of Okinawa.

## KOREA:

- 15. SW Coast: a) 29 Jun: 1 tug strafed & fired. b) 29 Jun: Sighted 1 freighter (2300T) burning & beached.

## JAPAN:

- 16. Japan Sea: (no date given): Allied subs sank 1 med & 3 sm freighters, also sank 10 sm craft. (Total to date -- 30 ships sunk by torpedoes, 16 sm craft by gunfire).
- 17. NW Kyushu: 29 Jun: 2 freighters (150/300T), crs W, spd 6.
- 18. West Kyushu: a) 29 Jun: 1 freighter (150/300T) seriously damaged on crs WSW, spd 6. b) 29 Jun: 1 of 2 freighters (6600T) or Tankers (5200T) left damaged & burning; 1 freighter (150/300T) ser damaged, 1 prob sunk.
- 19. Hokkaido: 27 Jun: B-29 photos show 35 merch vsls operational (83,000T total), 3 train ferries, 1 passenger ferry, 2 merch vsls repairing (2000T total) at Hakodate Hbr; 3 train ferries at Aomori Hbr.
- 20. Honshu: 30 Jun: 1 freighter-tpt (700/1300T) destroyed, 1 freighter (150/300T) prob sunk, 20 mi NxW of Tsuruga; 3 fishing vsls sunk Hamamatsu area.

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## CAROLINES:

21. Truk: a) 28 Jun: Allied aux vs1 attacked by 2 subs (1 considered fleet type--1 midget, which was poss damaged by Allied destroyer), 420 mi NNE.  
 b) 29 Jun: 1 poss sub sighted, 330 mi N (Rpt graded C-3).  
 22. Ulithi: 29 Jun: Sub contact, 50 mi NE. (Contd evidence of 1 or 2 Jap subs between Eniwetok & Marianas).

## IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

## 1. Summary of the Enemy Situation:

a. Activities in Forward Areas:

## Northern Philippines (Luzon):

East of Manila: Minor enemy contacts continue vicinity of Ipo.

Cagayan Valley: Only minor enemy contacts astride Highway 5; patrols from Baggao east along the Paret River encountered no enemy.

Highway 4: Light to moderate enemy resistance encountered southeast of Kiangnan. Enemy forces this area are continuing withdrawal northward toward Banaue.

Cervantes: Against moderate enemy opposition, Philippine Army troops advanced east toward Bauko.

## Southern-Central Philippines (Mindanao):

Northwest of Davao: Against stiffening enemy resistance, our forces continued to advance after seizing the Kulapu River bridge west of Kibangay. The enemy has abandoned a large number of vehicles and carts in indicated hasty withdrawal from the Kibangay area. Scattered contacts in the Lorenzo area.

Kabacan: Approximately 50 enemy who attempted to enter Goodyear Plantation near Kabasalan were repulsed.

Kibawe-Talomo Trail: Organized enemy resistance vicinity Pinaloma overcome.

## Borneo:

Brunei Bay: Minor enemy opposition east of Beaufort, while in the town area isolated enemy pockets were mopped-up.

Balikpapan: No opposition to landing of first wave this morning on Klandasan beaches; some light fire later fell in beach area. Minor ineffective air intercepts continue.

b. Activities in Rear Areas:

N.E.I.: A/ds in Timor, Kai & Tanimbar Is overgrown & u/s; 12 a/c & 10 F/Ps in Tandjoeng Perak area, Java.

China Coast: Continued sm scale intercepts of search a/c with nil results.

Nansei Shotos: Continued surveillance of Okinawa area, principally by F/Ps.

Empire: 4 of 38 en a/c dest on grd by P-47s sweeping S Kyushu (Kanoya a/d).

c. Identifications: None.d. Weather: Curtailed air operations over Luzon.

## 2. Conclusions:

a. Enemy Capabilities:

## Operations on Borneo:

## 1) Defense of Balikpapan, Southeastern Borneo.

a) Objective Area Defenses.

b) Estimated Enemy Strength.

c) Troop Reinforcement from Adjacent Areas.

## Operations in the Philippines:

2) Defense of Isolated Areas, Sierra Madre Mountains, N. Luzon.

3) Scattered Resistance Northwest of Davao, Mindanao.

## Operations on Borneo:

1) Defense of Balikpapan, Southeastern Borneo: This morning, elements of the 7th Australian Division effected an amphibious landing at Balikpapan on the southeast coast of Borneo. The first wave landed on the Klandasan beaches at 0855I without opposition; preliminary reports mentioned that "some" light fire later fell on the landing beach area.

a) Objective Area Defenses: Recently, enemy effort appears to have been devoted entirely to the completion of defensive preparations around the



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Summary 1183 - Cont'd

Balikpapan Harbor and north along the coast to Manggar. The enemy garrison, predominately naval troops similar to those of the former Tarakan garrison, may well have adopted similar methods of defense; both garrisons began their defensive preparations in April in anticipation of Allied landings. With more time and greater facilities at their disposal, the Balikpapan forces perhaps have constructed more elaborate and complete tunnel, anti-tank and trench systems. Recent intelligence reveals that from Klandasan to Manggar, the enemy has mined the section between the road and sea shore using electrically controlled sea mines buried from 4 to 6 feet and zig-zagged at 100 foot intervals. Whether the enemy will use burning oil cannot be determined, although there is one stream present which oil could be directed in an attempt to hamper our landing operations on Klandasan Beach. The strongest beach defenses appear to be at Klandasan, where the enemy has strongly fortified the high ground overlooking the beachhead. Anti-aircraft defenses in the Bay area include some 31 heavy and 38 medium AA guns; 18 coastal defense guns are reported extending from the Bay along the coast to Manggar (13 miles northeast). Since the enemy has had ample time and facilities available, well developed and extensive defenses in the objective area may be encountered.

b) Estimated Enemy Strength: Enemy strength in the Balikpapan-Samarinda area is currently estimated between 6,000 and 7,000 of which 2,000 are believed to be mobile combat. In addition, there are reportedly about 4,500 civilians and laboring personnel attached to these units; they consist generally of 1,000 Jap civilians, 1,000 Formosans and 2,500 Indonesian laborers. As demonstrated in other SWPA areas, the number of regular combat troops shown cannot be taken as an index of the enemy's ability to resist our attack; service troops and civilians may be armed and pressed into service with combat units or organized into provisional organizations. The bulk of the troops are believed to be part of the 22nd Naval Base Force with several Naval Air Defense and Fuel Depot units attached. It is known that the 554th Independent Infantry Battalion moved from Tarakan to Balikpapan just prior to our landing at Tarakan early in May; elements of the 71st Independent Mixed Brigade (or an unidentified Independent Mixed Brigade), may also be in this area, as recent information indicated its deployment in southern Borneo. Approximately two-thirds of the troops are believed to be deployed in the Balikpapan-Sambodja area, the remainder in the vicinity of Samarinda, 60 miles north northeast.

c) Troop Reinforcement from Adjacent Areas: Reinforcement from outside of Borneo is remote. From within Borneo, the only possible source of reinforcement exclusive of the immediate objective area, would be from Bandjermasin in the south (approximately 400 miles by sea; 325 miles overland) and Samarinda (60 miles northeast). A movement of troops early after the landing, from either area, does not appear likely; the enemy could not afford to weaken his Bandjermasin garrison to any extent for fear of a possible landing after the attack on Balikpapan. Similarly, any withdrawal from Samarinda would substantially weaken the force allotted to the defense of these oilfields. Distance, time involved, relatively poor communications and constant interference by our Naval and Air Forces would seriously handicap any attempt at early reinforcement of the objective area.

Fragmentary reports preclude a full analysis of enemy reaction to this third Borneo landing. Potentially the enemy is in a position to offer stubborn resistance; local objective area defenses appear well developed and coordinated. Absence of a significant number of mobile combat troops, however, militates against a protracted defense. (See Enclosure No. 1).

#### Operations in the Philippines:

2) Defense of Isolated Areas, Sierra Madre Mountains, Northern Luzon: With Cagayan Valley secured, elements of the 37th Division and Philippine Army units commenced mopping-up operations in the foothills of the Sierra Madres east of Highway 5 without enemy contacts. The complete absence of significant opposition since the beginning of our operations in Cagayan Valley proper, when coupled with evidence from ground reconnaissance, substantiates previous estimates of his retirement to the rugged terrain paralleling Highway 5. The tremendous losses in men and supplies sustained at Balete Pass and along the Villa Verde Trail shattered the remainder of his fast dwindling tactical potential, forcing him to follow this alternate plan of action of seeking those areas most suited for prolonged survival. The physiography of the Sierra Madres affords three well suitable and now probably occupied latent defensive terrain

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sectors between Aparri and just north of Casiguran Bay. Previous reports state that the garrison formerly deployed in the Aparri area and along the north coast as far as Buguey, had withdrawn south and southeast with the bulk moving to the Cataggayan Mountains, 15 miles east of Highway 5. Those troops scattered along Highway 5 between Tuguegarao and Gattaran, withdrew east by following streams and Negrito trails along the foothills of the Sierra Madres. Remnants of the Balete Pass-Santa Fe operation, withdrawing rapidly in the face of our advances northward astride Highway 5, had the choice of continuing the withdrawal or following the trails both eastward and westward at Ilagan. Observer reports substantiate that both selections were adopted; e.g., some troops followed the trail eastward to Palanan Bay while others turned west either at Ilagan or Cauayan, ostensibly to join those forces in the Kiangnan and Banaue areas.

The shortage of supplies, existing before the withdrawal eastward, will be further aggravated in these newly occupied areas. With the exception of the area between Ilagan and Palanan Bay, local sources of food in the Sierra Madres are extremely limited. Perhaps adding more complications is the probability that the Japs, having planned to use Cagayan Valley as the principal source of subsistence, failed to stock-pile in the mountains east of the Highway. Along the Ilagan-Palanan Bay trail, however, the terrain is under cultivation and offers some relief for troops concentrated in this sector. In addition to the supply problems, there were numerous indications that the enemy's haste and disorganization prior to the withdrawal eastward were such that they abandoned large quantities of arms and ammunition.

It is evident from the above factors that any aggressiveness and initiative as might have remained among enemy remnants now in the Sierra Madres to the east of Highway 5 will rapidly disappear as the time progresses, and with food problems becoming increasingly difficult, the enemy will eventually disperse into small scattered groups whose sole efforts will be directed towards survival. (See Enclosure No. 2).

3) Scattered Resistance Northwest of Davao, Mindanao: In their broken withdrawal northwest from Davao, 100th Division remnants have been further disrupted by transportational difficulties. The main road westward from Kibangay is described as impassable for vehicular traffic. Many carts and some motor vehicles were found abandoned in addition to scattered supplies. Beyond Kibangay, it appears that the enemy has been able to take very little. Since none of his equipment or supplies is replaceable, the collapse of his supply train here seriously impairs his already tenuous hold on survival. Although a makeshift alternate road has been reportedly worked on from Tamogan west to Basiao, it can now be of but little use.

As in Agusan Valley, enemy activity throughout southern Mindanao has disintegrated from organized defense to scattered efforts to keep alive. The 100th Division, to date, has lost an estimated 8,500 troops; as a major combat unit it no longer exists. No appreciable reorganization of provisional combat personnel has been effected, nor has any amalgamation of naval with army troops occurred. Rather, the situation is one of widely dispersed small groups everywhere avoiding contact, except on the road west of Kibangay. Guerrillas report small furtive Japanese groups continuously on the move along Davao Gulf's eastern coast, far inland west of Sayre Highway, and at Sarangani Bay. At the latter, bridge demolitions are reportedly in progress.

The overall enemy predicament in Southern Mindanao is the same as in Agusan Valley: i.e., aimless efforts of widely dispersed unit remnants to avoid contact and to survive despite a hopeless tactical situation. (See Enclosure No. 3).

b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Defense of Balikpapan, Southeastern Borneo: Fragmentary reports preclude a full analysis of enemy reaction to this third Borneo landing. Potentially the enemy is in a position to offer stubborn resistance; local objective area defenses appear well developed and coordinated. Absence of a significant number of mobile combat troops, however, militates against a protracted defense.

2) Defense of Isolated Areas, Sierra Madre Mountains, Northern Luzon: Any aggressiveness and initiative as might have remained among enemy remnants now in the Sierra Madres to the east of Highway 5 will rapidly disappear as the time progresses, and with food problems becoming increasingly difficult, the enemy will eventually disperse into small scattered groups whose sole



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efforts will be directed towards survival.

3) Scattered Resistance Northwest of Davao, Mindanao: The overall enemy predicament in southern Mindanao is the same as in Agusan Valley: i.e., aimless efforts of widely dispersed unit remnants to avoid contact and to survive despite a hopeless tactical situation.

#### V MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

##### Withdrawal of 10th Base Naval Force from Borneo:

The following enemy movement order had already been executed, at least in part, by the time Allied troops reached Brunei Bay and Labuan:

1. BRUNEI Expeditionary Unit will withdraw from their present location and proceed to SINGAPORE where they will make necessary preparations for transfer to the East Coast of Malaya. However, the Brunei Defense Post (BOBI SHO) will continue their present duties for the time being.

2. CO of Expeditionary Unit, utilizing all small craft except two large MLC and the crews thereof, will proceed immediately by night to Kuching.

3. The remaining force will cooperate with the local Army Forces in regard to replenishment of supplies and in signal matters. Translation of single handwritten sheet comprising message from 10 Base, Singapore, to CO, Brunei Expeditionary Unit of 10 Base Naval Force. Undated. Captured at Brunei Dist - 10/11 Jun 45. Recd 1 Aust Corps ATIS Adv Ech - 15 Jun 45. Recd AFA - 16 Jun 45. From Australian Forces ADVATIS translation of Document No. 90038, Bulletin No. 6.

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To Accompany Encl No. 1  
Daily Summary No. 1183

#### EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. Elements of the 7th Aust. Div. landed at 0855I this morning on Klandasan (Balikpapan) beaches. No opposition to first wave; some light fire developed later on the beach.
2. Organized resistance Tarakan ceased 21 June; casualties as of 30 June, 1,246 dead; PW 101. On mainland, documents show 370th II Bn (56th IMB) at Tawao; no evidence to indicate withdrawal of unit.
3. No evidence of mobile combat units in Sandakan area; troops are probably base and service.
4. Documentary evidence and information from local sources indicate that the bulk of the 56th IMB and 25th IMR have completed the overland move from the E coast and are now deployed in northwestern Borneo, mainly in the Jesselton-Ranau-Keningau area. The 432nd II Bn formed at Jesselton Nov 44.
5. There was no significant opposition during the Labuan-Brunei-Miri operations; about 150 miles of coastline now under Allied control. Only small disorganized enemy groups (including some 56th IMB elements) are in the area.
6. Enemy troops evacuating S from the Miri area have been observed moving along the coastal route through Sibut, Niah, Suai and Birtulu; other information from local sources indicates that the enemy has established small garrisons with food and supplies in these villages probably to act as staging points.
7. Evidence on unit identifications has been meagre; bulk probably comprises base and service and miscellaneous garrison troops. Strength believed to fluctuate due indicated movement to Kuching from the NW.
8. Accumulative intelligence has not conclusively identified units in Bandjermasin area; bulk of strength probably comprised of garrison and base and service troops.

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To Accompany Encl No. 2  
Daily Summary No. 1183

EXPLANATORY NOTES


On 29/30 Jun:

1. Forty Japanese were killed in scattered contacts throughout the Cagayan Valley but no large enemy concentrations were encountered. Patrols fanning out from Baggao in all directions failed to contact any enemy.
2. Following the capture of Bolog by elements of 6th Division, enemy strong-point 1500 yards east of the town was reported crumbling.
3. Stubborn resistance continues 1500 yards north northwest and 4000 yards northwest of Mankayan.
4. Philippine Army Units continued to pursue fleeing enemy troops withdrawing eastward from Kayan, reaching a position  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles west of Banko (8 miles east of Cervantes).

S E C R E T



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EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. 29 Jun: Guerrillas estimate total enemy strength in Pintatagan, on E coast Davao Gulf N Piso Pt, as 400.
2. 30 Jun: Only scattered enemy contacts were encountered in Lorenzo area after stubborn resistance from enemy strongpoints was broken.
3. 30 Jun: After dispersing small enemy group, elements of our 19th Inf patrolled along and across Davao R without further contact.
4. 29/30 Jun: Following seizure of Kulapu R bridge, 500 yds W Kibangay, our leading elements advanced 700 yds against stiffening enemy resistance; road from Kibangay westward for 1,800 yds is impassable to all vehicles, and shows no sign of recent transportational use or evacuation of significant supplies during enemy retreat thereon; many abandoned enemy vehicles and carts throughout Tamogan-Kibangay area indicated that the Japs probably were unable to evacuate much equipment beyond this point.
5. 29 Jun: Civilian reports that enemy has built a good road westward from Tamogan to Basiao, with bridges good for heavy loads and defended with MGs.
6. 30 Jun: Only scattered enemy contacts encountered W and S of Unapan-Tamogan area.


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ENCLOSURE NO. 3

# BALATUKAN - DAVAO

Military Intelligence Section  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES  
IN THE PACIFIC

COMBINED GROUND SITUATION  
TO: 2400/I, 30 JUNE 45  
MSG TO: 1200/I 1 JULY  
For Summary No. 1183



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